Kosovo: Implementation of Law on Gender Equality—Major Challenge

International Women’s Day: The State of Women Worldwide—Dire

Globally, the progress on gender equality and women inclusion in decision-making has slowed—even reversed, the UNSG Guterres warns. Numbers are pessimistic. Violence against women—at epidemic levels. Discrimination and bias—from media and pundits—prevails. A hard truth: 90% of men and women, as a UNDP study suggests, are biased against women. In Kosovo, the implementation of law on gender equality remains a major obstacle: Men outnumber women in all executive and legislative bodies. Happy International Women’s Day to All Women Out There!

Sebahate J. Shala

March 08, 2020.  It’s Women History Month and the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, in retrospect—not much has changed domestically and internationally in recent years—in spite of a surge in women activism worldwide. The state of women, as the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres warns, “remains dire:” violence—at epidemic levels, legal protection against rape and domestic violence is being diluted or rolled back, gender inequality—is a stain just like slavery and colonialism. “Everywhere, women are worse off than men simply because they are women […]. The progress has slowed to a standstill—and in some cases—been reversed […]. There is a strong and relentless push back against women’s rights.” (TIME, February 28, 2020)

The situation on the ground, particularly in complex humanitarian setting, is alarming. Women, according to UN Women Executive Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, continue to be used as a “weapon of war and terror” in conflict-related situations—from the Middle East to Africa—whereas survivors are left without justice or support (Security Council, S/13998/2019). At least 1 in 5 women refugee experienced sexual violence in 2018. Over 50 parties to conflict were credibly suspected of being involved in rape and other forms of sexual violence against women (UN Women, 2019). Domestically, 18% of women and girls were physically and/or sexually abused by an intimate partner in 2018. 3 in 4 human trafficking victims were women and girls, too (UN, 2019).

Gender equality is out of reach. Regardless of progress in some indicators, Goal 5—on gender equality, poses a challenge for many countries and regions (UN, 2019). Only five entities within the UN have achieved or exceeded the overall gender equity—50:50—at professional levels or higher. The majority of them are within 10 percentage points (UN Women, 2016). Women continue to be ignored, sidelined or excluded from peace and negotiation processes—representing 3% of women mediators, 13% of negotiators and 4% of signatories in major peace processes occurred between 1992 and 2018 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019; UN Women/S/13998/2019). Globally, women are underrepresented in political decision-making, constituting 24.3% of national parliaments (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019) and 26% of local assemblies. In the United States (U.S.), women make up between 23% and 25% of Congress (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019), 25.5% of senate seats and 29.7% of state house seats statewide (Center for American Women and Politics, 2018). Based on Global Gender Gap Report’s projections, the U.S. will need 208 years to close its gender gap nationwide (World Economic Forum, 2019).

Women in politics face resistance, misogynism, threat, and discrimination of all forms (S/13998/2019; UN Women, 2019), whereas the media is often biased, applying double standards in reporting about them. The refusal of President Donald Trump to shake hands with the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, for example, did not receive the overreaction as did it Pelosi’s rip of Trump’s “State of the Union” speech—an act condemned as “unprecedented, aggressively rude and unapologetic.” (CNN, February 5, 2020) Thousands of miles away, in Kosovo, Pelosi’s homologue, Vjosa Osmani, made headlines following the removal of President’s photography from her office—but not so the refusal of Prime Minister Albin Kurti to pay a courtesy visit to the grave of Kosovo first president.

Most recently, Elizabeth Warren, the running candidate for the U.S. president, dropped the race—failing to win any state, including her own, in Super Tuesday. Portrayed as “strident,” “shrill” and “condescending” by media and pundits, Warren, the Atlantic writes, was punished for her competence—her unapologetically and unavoidably credentials (March 5, 2020). Former candidate, Hillary Clinton, had faced—what she calls a “pernicious double standard.” (TIME, March 5, 2020) The harsh truth is that close to 90% of both men and women, as a UNDP study suggests, hold some sort of bias against women. Nearly half of the world’s population in 75 countries involving 80% of the world’s population, according to UNDP, believes that men make better political leaders, and more than 40% believe men make better business executives (2020). In her FiveThirtyEight’ profiling Pete Buttigieg, Clare Malone quotes a woman—positioned toward Buttigieg—saying for Warren, “When I hear her talk, I want to slap her, even when I agree with her.” Unfortunately, the Atlantic follows, an irrational animus inspired among those whom Warren has sought as constituents was a common refrain about the candidate (March 5, 2020).

Attempting to amend the injustice against women historically, the TIME magazine spotlighted influential women in its 100 Women of the Year Project—ranging from women in positions of men to those in activism and culture—who were often overshadowed in face of systemic inequality (March 5, 2020). Women “factor” is deemed critical for peace, good governance as well as development and poverty and inequality reduction (Community of Democracies & OECD, 2019; Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2003; UN Women, S/13998/2019). Research found a positive relationship between women’s participation and increased propensity of peace, and the quality and durability of peace agreements (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). Gender equality, based on a Columbia University study, is a number one predictor of peace, indicating a linkage between gender inequality and politics and security on international and national levels (Valerie et al., 2014). Other publications place a bidirectional correlation between women’s empowerment and economic development: discrimination against women can hamper development whereas empowerment can accelerate development (Dufflo, 2012). This article looks on women inclusion and participation in political decision-making in Kosovo—namely legislative and executive bodies.

Women in Politics in Kosovo: In Numbers

Kosovo has recently reached a milestone regarding women inclusion in political decision-making by appointing—for the first time in history—a woman as Speaker of the Parliament, including the First Deputy Speaker, as well as assigning five women in ministerial positions in a government of 15 members. Kosovo women—for the first time in history—won their seats in the parliament without using the necessary quota of 30%, bringing the number to 39 of 120 members (Radio Free Europe, November 8, 2019). The increased number of women in public institutions, particularly in the government, marks a significant step especially compared to previous government represented by one woman—minister (originally two) of 21 ministers, 6 women—deputy ministers of 70 ones, and no woman deputy-prime minister of five.

This achievement has improved Kosovo standing in relation to its neighbors, too. Kosovo ranks second for the number of women ministers following Albania with 8 women of 16 members, North Macedonia with 5 ministers and 2 deputy prime ministers of 16 members, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia with 4, and Bosnia with 3 women in the government. Except for North Macedonia and Serbia—whose women participation in parliament consists of 40% (46 of 120 members), respectively 37.65% (93 women of 247 members), other countries have lower percentage than Kosovo, including Croatia, member of the European Union, with 19.21% or 31 women parliamentarians of 151 members. Except for Serbia—whose Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament are women—all other neighboring countries are led by men. Kosovo, also, praises itself for having had the first woman president in the region.

Legally, Kosovo has regulated gender balance representation in public institutions—guaranteed by the Constitution and the law. The country complies to international human rights norms—attached to the Constitution as well as has adopted National Action Plan for the implementation of the UNSC 1325. The Law on Gender Equality sets a minimum of 50% of women participation in three branches of government, it prohibits while providing sanctions to prevent and eliminate gender discrimination, gender-based violence and unfair treatment of women, and commits to attaining gender equality in public institutions (Kosovo Assembly, Law No. 05/L-020/2015). The Law on General Election requires all political entities and elections bodies to respect the gender quota of at least 30% male and female when compiling the election list (Kosovo Assembly, Law No. 03 L-073).

Notwithstanding, the implementation of law is problematic. Women are underrepresented in legislative and executive as well as in independent state agencies. All Kosovo Assembly’s organs, the presidency, parliamentary groups and commissions, are dominated by men. The current presidency consists of two women, the Speaker and the First Deputy Speaker, of six members—better than the sixth and fifth legislatures represented by one woman out of six members, and the fourth, third and second legislatures—with no women out of six to nine members. All parliamentary groups are chaired by men same as previous legislature (six), marking a decline from earlier mandates—two women chairs in the fifth, one in the fourth, and two in the second legislature of nine parliamentary groups. Likewise, the majority of commissions are led by men: women lead 4 of 14 commissions, 7 commissions are co-chaired equally (Kosovo Assembly, Legislatures).

The composition of commissions favors men, too. Women outnumber their male counterparts only in three commissions in relation 9:1, 6:5 and 4:6. All other commissions are dominated by men in relation 9:1, 8:1, 8:2, and 8:3. While there was an equal share in chairing positions in sixth and fifth legislatures, the composition favored men–which led eight commissions in six legislature, respectively six in the fifth, seven were co-chaired equally as in the fifth. Only in two commissions, women outnumbered men–which otherwise dominated the commissions’ structure (Kosovo Assembly, Commissions). The data suggests a decline in women participation from the first to the last legislature.

Women in Government: Below the Minimum

Although the gender quota in parliament and local assemblies is maintained to a minimum level, in senior executive positions (secretary general, chief executive, executive director), it stands below the minimum. The situation, as the Kosovar Gender Studies Center (KGSC) observes, is worse compared to local and central level senior positions in public institutions (2017). In the previous mandates of government, there were only two women ministers. In 2016, women constituted 40.6% of central government and 28% of local government, 5.2% of leadership positions in the government and 10% in municipalities. The percentage of women in senior decision-making positions in the Office of Prime Minister was 11, and 20 in senior positions in government agencies of 10 positions throughout 2014-2016. Women’s share in security structures is low, too: 15% in the police (UN Women, 2017), 8.2% in the military (Kosovo 2.0, March 23, 2019). All municipalities are led by men.

Further, only one woman holds the position of the secretary general in the government ministries, including the Office of Prime Minister: 14 secretaries general are men of currently 15 ministries (previously 21), totaling at 16 including the Office of Prime Minister. Only one of six government agencies, the Agency for Gender Equality, is headed by a woman; all government councils same as the absolute majority of divisions and directorates within ministries are led by men. Only one woman serves as the executive director of 9 independent state agencies.

The situation is way too worse in the Office of the President. All president’s advisers are men, totaling at 10. Except for the general secretary of Consulting Council on Communities, other presidential commissions are chaired by men (The President of Kosovo, 2020). The preparatory team for the establishment of the commission for truth and reconciliation is represented by 2 women of 9 members (The President of Kosovo, 61/2018).

Implementation of Laws and Policies—A Major Obstacle

Kosovo has a fairly comprehensive legal framework and mechanisms that sanctions gender equality and women participation in public institutions, however the implementation of law, as the Agency for Gender Equality (AGE) argues, is challenging. The agency highlights the overlapping action plans, lack of sufficient funding to implementing strategies as well as lack of understanding of how to mainstream gender within government institutions, as some of the main hurdles— additionally to marginalization of gender equality officers within ministries and municipalities, exclusion from processes and consultations on analyzing and assessing draft laws, as well as setting policies or priorities from a gender perspective (2014).

The OSCE comes to the same conclusion in a study conducted with key stakeholders and experts in 2017: the legal framework on gender equality is well-established and formulated but the implementation of laws and policies is a major problem (2018). According to Kosovo Women’s Network, lack of mechanisms for implementing the law is the major obstacle for the enforcement of gender equality laws—part of the reason is that most of the institutions are led by men who operate based on patriarchal values. The lack of hard data to measure the implementation of law is another problem, including the AGE’s insufficient power and resources to complete its work (BIRN, November 8, 2017).

Photo: Atdhe Mula, Balkan Insight, February, 2020

Biased Justice: A Perpetuating Case Against Kosovo

International justice mechanisms in Kosovo are righteously perceived—and as the data shows—as biased, directed primarily against Kosovo Liberation Army in their efforts to examine war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo. UNMIK and EULEX issued 48 indictments, 16 against Albanians, 13 against Serbs and four indictments against Montenegrins, indicted 61 Albanians and 44 Serbs, and convicted 34 Albanians as opposed to four Serbs and one Montenegrin. And, while the Specialized Chambers of Kosovo in The Hague begins the trial against the former heads of state, the vast majority of mass murders—out of an estimated 186 mass murders committed in Kosovo—remain unresolved.

AS KOSOVO and Serbia make the final struggles to normalize their neighborly-relations, many Albanians criticize Prime Minister Albin Kurti for his willingness to accept the EU Proposal-Agreement—through which—Kosovo agrees to “overcome the legacy of the past,” giving up her quest to sue Serbia in an international tribunal. If Serbia accepts—and fully agrees—to implement the proposal, it would further advance toward the EU membership—without resolving thousands of internationally recognized crimes perpetrated by Milosevic regime in Kosovo (and in the territory of former Yugoslavia), without apologizing and without providing remedies and reparation measures to victims and the affiliated, and without addressing the issue of the missing persons from the war. As of today, 1,617 individuals, predominantly Albanians, are unaccounted for—alongside with 9,876 belonging to other nationalities—who disappeared during or as a result of wars in the region. The resolution of the missing persons’ whereabouts is determinant for achieving peace and reconciliation with Serbia, which families are NOT willing and ready for—until they receive truth and justice for each and every one. Of their beloved. Ultimately.

The overwhelming majority of mass murders, on the other hand, remain unresolved. None of the mass murders out of an estimated 186 mass murders carried out in Kosovo, except for mass murder in Krushe e Vogel and Recak, had been investigated or tried by international justice mechanisms in Kosovo, UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) and EULEX (EU Mission of Rule of Law). None of them except for Krusha e Vogel, Izbica and Meja, were included in the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) indictments against Milosevic et al. and Milutinovic et al., nor were they investigated or tried by Serbia Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor (OWCP). In most cases, such as the mass murder of Meja and Korenica, the authors of crimes, as BIRN’s Serbeze Haxhiaj revealed, are known to local people and live free in Serbia, Montenegro or Slovenia; they never been prosecuted despite the existing evidence and the witnesses’ testimonies submitted to the ICTY. Some of the survivors have been waiting for 20 years, with some even dying, without having a chance to testify to the court,meaning, as Haxhiaj suggests, that the perpetrators are unlikely to ever face justice.

25 years since the mass murder of Qirez and Likoshan and the mass murder of Jashari family in Prekaz i Ulët, meanwhile, no one has ever been investigated or tried for these crimes—both constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law. UNMIK and EULEX never initiated an investigation nor did thesecases appear in the ICTY’s indictment against Milosevic et al. and Milutinovic et al., let alone being investigated or tried by Serbia justice institutions. And, while the murder of Jashari family is under the investigation of Kosovo Special Prosecution Office, Hamdi Sejdiu’s quest for justice (for his four brothers tortured and executed through February 28—March 1st, 1998, in Qirez) has been turned down by three instances of justice on the grounds that Kosovo’s judicial institutions have no power to bring another state, Serbia, to the court.

International transitional justice mechanisms have collectively failed to prosecute and adjudicate war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo. Serbia, from its part, has made little or no progress to addressing impunity and bringing to justice suspects of criminal responsibility. Accountability, truth and justice remain ideals rather than reality in the region, BIRN concludes in a book, After the ICTY: Accountability, Truth and Justice in the Former Yugoslavia, published in 2020. Regional cooperation is at its lowest level in years. There is a stagnation and a significant fall in the number of new cases launched. No charges involving complex cases and high-level perpetrators—with only a few middle-to-high-ranking officers indicted so far. The number of indictments, as Humanitarian Law Center in Serbia (HLCS) suggests, has continued to decline: fewer suspects indicted and fewer victims named (2019). The EU Commission criticized Serbia for “weak records,” blaming the government for showing “no genuine commitment to investigating and adjudicating war crimes cases,” particularly complex and high-ranking officials cases, while demanding to prioritize these cases and provide a clear legal approach to resolving the issue of command responsibility.

Whereas the practice of impunity in Serbia prevails, Kosovo, on the other side, was forced to set up the Specialist Chambers, the fourth international transitional justice mechanism to prosecute and adjudicate war and post-war crimes, and the first hybrid court”directed primarily, although not explicitly stated, against one militarized ethnic group,” the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). And whilst, the former President of Kosovo Hashim Thaci, the first sitting head of state indicted from a hybrid court, awaits the beginning of the trail in Specialist Chambers in The Hague, Serbia high rank perpetrators walk free—without being disturbed from justice. Created under the international pressure to deal with the supposedly KLA unpunishable crimes, the Specialist Chambers is viewed by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs more as a political rather than a legitimate instrument of justice; a mechanism, which will, most likely, deal with the same set of crimes and defendants, suggesting, as some authors argue, that international community is willing to create as many judicial mechanisms as necessary to achieve its anticipated results—regardless of the costs—and at the expense of Kosovar people needs and wants.

In Numbers: The Indicted and the Convicted Albanian vs. Serbian Defendants

“…Serbian regular forces kidnapped a girl from a nearby town in Suva Reka, they raped her and cut her throat and left her naked in the tall grass to die. Barbarities of this kind have been ongoing on for thousands of years, but it was not until this century that a mechanized army carried out such crimes in the service of its government. That is genocide; the rest is just violence. And, whenever I read stories of Albanian atrocities that confuse the two, I think about that girl in Suva Reka and all that it took to bring about her death.” Sebastian Junger, Lives; A Different Kind of Killing, New York Times, February 27, 2000.

THE INTERNATIONAL community at large and the international transitional justice mechanisms in Kosovo in particular are righteously perceived by ethnic Albanians—and as the data shows—as biased, directed primarily against Kosovo Liberation Army in their efforts to examine war crimes and crimes against humanity inKosovo, demonstrating a tendency to balance the victim with the perpetrator. Based on the existing data, the number of Albanians/KLA members prosecuted, tried and convicted by UNMIK and EULEX is higher comparable to Serbs/members of armed forces, considering the balance of forces and the magnitude of crimes committed by Serbia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) forces versus the KLA members. (The number of convicted Albanian and Serbian defendants from the ICTY is equal: five from each side out of 14 persons indicted.) Needless to say, the length of sentences against Albanian defendants are higher than those against Serbs.

The ICTY sentenced between 15 to 22 years in prison the Serbia high-ranked war criminals—Milosevic’s immediate subordinates, Sainovic, Pavkovic, Lukic, Ojdanic and Lazarevic, for committing systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo, whereas the Specialist Chambers sentenced Salih Mustafa, a KLA senior official, to 26 years in prison for torture of at least six detainees and the murder of one prisoner.

According to Humanitarian Law Center in Kosovo (HLCK), UNMIK and EULEX filed 48 indictments throughout 1999-2018against 111 individuals: 25 indictments against Serbs, 19 against Albanians, three against Montenegrins and one indictment against others. UNMIK filed 10 indictments, three against three Serbs, six indictments involving 19 Albanians and one against one Montenegrin. EULEX filed 22 indictments: 10 against 11 Serb defendants, 10 against 39 Albanian defendants and two indictments against one Montenegrin and others. Overall, international justices indicted 61 Albanian defendants as opposed to 44 Serb defendants, five Montenegrins and one defendant belonging to others, convicted 34 Albanians as opposed to four Serbs and one Montenegrin (final judgements), acquitted 23 Albanians, 13 Serbs and two Montenegrins. Out of 28 suspects/persons at large, 24 are of Serbian nationality.

The data is controversial, though. UNMIK, as Amnesty International reported, completed just over 40 war crime casesagainst 37 individuals, leaving behind a backlog of 1,187 cases to its successor, EULEX. Of these cases, 21 were brought by Albanian justice authorities against Kosovo Serbs arrested and detained for war crimes in 1999. By mid-2002, 19 of these cases were completed: the majority of defendants (Serbs) were acquitted by international panels, while the majority of subsequent cases prosecuted by UNMIK were brought against ethnic Albanians for crimes against other ethnic Albanians. In total, the UN mission, asUNMIK’s spokesperson Sanam Dolatshahi says, investigated and/or tried 18 war crimes cases. Which means an average of two cases per year.

EULEX, according to spokesperson Ioanna Lachana, issued 22 indictments, including two indictments in cooperation with local prosecutors, and convicted 38 out of 41 defendants convicted for war crimes in Kosovo. An average of two cases per year. When EULEX ended its mandate in June 2018, it handed over to Special Prosecutor of Kosovo 434 war crime police case files, including missing persons’ case files, judicial case files and more than 1.400 prosecutorial case files. Prosecutors of Kosovo, on the other hand, filed 16 indictments: 11 against 29 Serbs and one indictment each against one Albanian and three Montenegrins. In the last two years, local prosecutors have been dealing with 14 cases against 12 defendants, and only last year, authorities arrested three persons in charge of war crimes in Kosovo.

Whilst Dolatshahi doesn’t make any comments relating to the number of cases based on the ethnicity of defendants and the smallernumber of Serb vs. Albanian defendants tried and convicted for war crimes, Lachana provides a number of reasons: the mission’s limited mandate—EULEX did not have jurisdiction to operate outside of the territory of Kosovo given that many suspects moved out when the war ended; lack of the law in absentia at the time when the mission was deployed, which prevented EULEX to proceed with war crime cases allegedly committed by individuals who were at large; and the unwillingness of Serbia institutions to cooperate with the mission to extradite Serb defendants who were born/lived in Kosovo.

In general, UNMIK and EULEX, based on the HLCK monitoring, issued 48 war crimes indictments against 111 defendants—with one final judgement by UNMIK and 22 by EULEX. To date, the international and local judges and prosecutors indicted 119 individuals, convicted 45, acquitted 41, and the process against six defendants is ongoing. As the above data illustrates, the number of Albanians/KLA members indicted and convicted supersedes the number of Serbs, members of Serbia and former Yugoslavia armed forces acting on behalf of the State, indicating that international justices in Kosovo had been biased, directed against Kosovo Albanians/the KLA members in their war crimes and crimes against humanity proceedings.

Serbia: The Culture of Impunity Prevails

IN SERBIA, on the other side, “there was negligible progress in bringing to justice” those who committed crimes illegal under international law. The highest state officials have continued to publicly challenge the judgments of the ICTY and provide support to and public space for convicted war criminals. Although the government adopted the 2016-2020 National Strategy for War Crimes Prosecution aimed at investigating and adjudicating high profile cases, no significant progress on war crimes prosecutions has been made, the HLC in Serbia found in 2019. The charges against high-level perpetrators are absent—with no indictments filed against high-ranking perpetrators so far. The EU Commission evaluated as “very weak” the 2016-National Strategy rate of implementation,demanding from Serbia to prioritize complex and high-ranking officials’ cases, as well as provide a clear legal approach to resolving the issue of command responsibility.

Based on the existing data, the OWCP has completed 52 casesagainst 212 individuals, convicting 54 defendants, including one person relating to war crimes in Kosovo (Prizren case) and acquitting 49 others. (The website of the OWCP, whose data I am referring to, is currently under maintenance). In four years of the 2016-National Strategy’s enforcement, the OWCP, according to the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Fabian Salvioli, issued 34 indictments against 45 defendants (the majority of them transferred from Bosnia and Hercegovina-BiH), and 17 indictments following the implementation of the 2021-2026 National Strategy for War Crimes Prosecution: seven in 2021 against nine defendants, of which four cases were transferred from BiH (two of them high-ranking criminals) and 10 indictments in 2022. The Higher Court rendered five judgments in 2021, convicting six defendants, while the Court of Appeals rendered six final decisions, convicting sixdefendants. No defendants were acquitted (EU Commission, 2022). In the 52 indictments of the ZPKL against 238 persons, the conviction rate was 85 percent, 94 percent of the indicted were Serbian nationals. Momentarily, Serbia has a case backlog of 1,731 pre-investigative cases.

The OWPC has been subject to pressure and political interference—criticized for inefficiency and slow progress in investigating and adjudicating war crimes. The fact that the vast majority of indictments did not result from the OWCP’s own investigation but were transferred from the BiH Judiciary, according to HLCS, is an indication of the OWCP’s inefficiency. “If the OWCP continues to work at its present speed, over the next 10-year period it will solve only an insignificant portion of war crimes cases,” concludes HLCSin its report (2019).

In four years of the 2016-National Strategy implementation, meanwhile, the OWPC, as the HLCS notices, has not issued a singleindictment relating to crimes in Kosovo and failed to conduct an adequate and effective investigation into the Landovica case. The OWCP has taken over 952 cases from the courts of general jurisdiction in Prishtina, Peje and Prizren, of which 810 are against unknown perpetrators (2018). The HLCS has—since 2013—filed nine criminal complaints for crimes committed in Kosovo but none of the suspects had been subject to OWCP investigation by the end of 2018 (2019). Since the OWCP does not have de facto jurisdiction over the territory of Kosovo, it is unable to investigate crimes and prosecute alleged perpetrators residing there.

As a matter of fact, the cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia on war crimes has stalled since May 2014, when the responsibility for war crimes investigation was transferred from EULEX to local prosecutors (HLCS, 2018). In reviewing cases relating to war crime in Kosovo, FDHK, as BIRN reports, found that the cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia on 14 war crime cases was absent. The same number of cases had been investigated by the Hague Tribunal, as well—a too small number compared to the gravity of crimes committed by Milosevic regime in Kosovo: 13,535 persons were killed, 862,979 others were forcibly deported, 6,024 were reported as missing, and supposedly 20,000 women were sexually abused.    

Police. Stop. Brutality. Against. Black. People!

2,216 Black Americans were killed by the police through 2013-2021 compared to 3,886 Whites and 1,365 Hispanics—representing the highest murder rate in the U.S. Black Americans represented 28% of people killed by the police in 2020 despite being only 13% of the U.S. population. Only in January 2020, the police killed 30 Blacks or one Black American every day. The number of Blacks killed by the police stands at higher rates than of Whites in 47 of the 50 largest American cities—with Chicago leading the list.

Sebahate J. Shala

January. 2020. Jamarri Tarver, 26, Las Vegas, NV. Tyree Davis, 25, Chicago, IL. Tina Marie Davis, 53, Spring Valley, NY.Brandon Dionte Roberts, 27, Milford, DE. Kwame Jones, 17, Jacksonville, FL. Miciah Lee, 18, Sparks, NV. Claude Washington Fain III, 47, Philadelphia, PA. Earl Facey, 37, New York, NY. Henry Isaac Jones, 47, Bainbridge, GA. Ryan Simms, 49, Miami Beach, FL. Keenan McCain, 29, Gary, IN. Albert Lee Hughes, 47, Lawrenceville, GA. Renard Antonio Daniels, 55, Cocoa, FL. Mubarak Soulemane, 19, West Haven, CT. Samuel David Mallard, 19, Powder Springs, GA. Kelvin White, 42, Chesapeake, VA. Gamel Antonio Brown, 30, Owings Mills, MD. Darius J. Tarver, 23, Denton, TX. Reginald Leon Boston Jr., 20, Jacksonville, FL. Michael J. Rivera, 32, Bloomingdale, NJ. Andrew J. Smyrna, 32, Atlanta, GA. Deandre Lee Seaborough-Patterson, 22, Savannah, GA. Marquis Golden, 29, St. Petersburg, FL. Joshua James Brown, 34, Columbus, OH. D’ovion Semaj Perkins, 19, Aurora, CO. William Howard Green Jr., 43, Marlow Heights, MD. Jaquyn O’Neill Light, 20, Graham, NC. Keith Dutree Collins, 52, Raleigh, NC. Abdirahman Salad, 15, Columbus, OH. 

[…] Breonna Taylor, 26, Louisville, KY. […] George Floyd, 46, Minneapolis, MN. 

29 Black Americans were killed by the police only in January 2020. Which means one Black every day—except on January 1st and 31st. According to CBS News list, which relies in reported and verified cases, the U.S. police killed 164 Black people through January 1—August 31, 2020—or one Black every week since January 1st, with only two states—Rhode Island and Vermont—recording zero killings during the reported period. In total, Black Americans, as Mapping Police Violence indicates, represented 28% of people killed by the police in 2020 despite being only 13% of the U.S. population. The number of Blacks killed by the police stands at higher rates than that of Whites in 47 of the 50 largest American cities—with Chicago leading the list: the Chicago police killed Black people at 20x the rate of White people per population from 2013 to 2020.

In total, 2,216 Black Americans, according to Statista Department Research, were killed by the police from 2013 to 2021 comparing to 3,886 Whites and 1,365 Hispanics. Of 1,021 persons killed in 2020, 241 were Blacks as opposed to 457 Whites and 167 Hispanics; of 1,098 people killed in 2019, 259 were Blacks, 406 Whites, 182 Hispanics and 13 Native Americans; 258 of 1,143 people killed in 2018 were Blacks; 276 in 2017 of 1,095 people killed; 279 were Blacks in 2016 of 1,071 people killed; 305 in 2015 of 1,103 people killed, 277 in 2014, respectively 291 in 2013. The rate of Black people killed by the police through 2015-2021 is much higher than any other ethnicity, standing at 36 per million for Black people, 23 per million for Hispanics and 12 per million for Whites. 

Generally, Black people, based on Mapping Police Violence data, are three times more likely to be killed by the police and 1.3 times more likely to be unarmed than the White people: 17% of unarmed Blacks, 13% of Whites, and 14.5% of unarmed Hispanics were killed by the police between 2013 and 2020. Unfortunately, the trend of fatal police shootings, as Statista Department Research suggests, is on increase—totaling at 213 Americans killed only in the first three months of 2021, 30 of whom were Black. Based on the Mapping Police Violence updated list, the police killed 352 people in 2021—in a rate similar to the past years—with only three days without having killed someone. 

In a study published last year, researchers of Yale and the University of Pennsylvania found that Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) victims, whether armed or unarmed, have significantly higher death rates compared to Whites. Analyzing 4,653 fatal shootings by the police, researchers found a small but statistically significant decline in White deaths (about 1%) but no significant change in deaths for BIPOC at all. Black people were killed at 2.6 times the rate of White people (1,265 total killed), while Hispanics were killed at nearly 1.3 times the rate of White people (889 total killed). Among unarmed victims, Black people were killed at three times the rate (218 total killed), and Hispanics at 1.45 times the rate of White people (146 total killed). While the average age of those killed by the police is 34, for Black people, the average age is 30, for Hispanics 33, and for White people is 38.

Black, American Indian and Alaska Native women and men, too, are significantly more likely to be killed by the police than White women and men or about one Black in every 1,000, a study of Edwards, Lee, and Esposito shows. Likewise, Latino men are more likely to be killed by police than White men. Regretfully, the police violence, as Mapping Police Violence indicates, is not related to crime at all. In most cases, the killings begin with traffic stops, mental health checks, domestic disturbances, or reported low level offenses. And the worst thing is that there is no accountability for these killings: 98.3% of killings by police from 2013-2020 went without being prosecuted.

Racial profiling has been an issue in United States of America. 2020 marked one of the worst years, following the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, MN—two months after the killing of Breonna Taylor in her apartment in Louisville, KY—actions those that led to massive protests and demonstrations across the U.S. and worldwide. Finally, the Minneapolis police officer who killed Floyd, Derek Chauvin, was found guilty, a verdict with which agree three-quarters of Americans, according to a NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist poll, whilst about half of Republicans and Trump supporters think it was either the wrong decision or they aren’t sure. This polling, also, shows that White and Black Americans have very different views of race in America and have had very different experiences when it comes to dealing with discrimination and trusting police. 

Police. Stop. Killing. Black. People! 

THE POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK PEOPLE—MUST END—ONCE AND FOR ALL. 

The Legal Status of Jashari Family Under International Humanitarian Law: Civilians, Their Murder—War Crime and Crime Against Humanity (II)

All members of Jashari family, excluding Adem and Hamëz Jashari, are entitled to the status of civilians pertinent to international humanitarian law, therefore, they should be treated as victims of the war and be served justice. Their murder constitutes war crime and crime against humanity under international law.   

Sebahate J. Shala

The Fourth Geneva Convention defined protected persons as those “who at a given moment” find themselves in the hands of a “party to conflict or an occupying power” and who should—at all times—be “treated humanely” and protected, especially, against “all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.” In situations relating to a non-international armed conflict, as the Convention provides, the parties to conflict should protect and treat humanely all “persons taking no active part in hostilities,” as well as respect—at all circumstances—five principles, as embodied in the Additional Protocols I and II, including the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, of indiscriminate attacks, of precautions in attack, of limiting the use of force and means of combat, and the principle of proportionality of attack. 

Civilians, as described in the Additional Protocol I, and as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia(ICTY) ruled in Blaškić case in 2000, are “persons who are not members of the armed forces,” or “(are) no longer, members of the armed forces,” thus, they enjoy international protection from threats of violence or direct military attacks in an armed conflict. “Intentionally directing attacks against civilian population” or against individuals not taking active part in hostilities, as International Criminal Court (ICC) stipulates, constitutes a “war crime in international armed conflicts.” 

However, civilians in both international and non-international armed conflicts, as the Protocol I (Art. 51.3) encapsulates, lose their protection when, and as long “they take a direct part in hostilities,” a provision honored by the United Kingdom upon the ratification of Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, as well as the ICTY in Blaškić case. Whilst in some practice, a civilian loses protection against attack when directly participates in hostilities, yet, as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) argues, such a civilian doesn’t thereby become a combatant—eligible for prisoner-of-war status—and upon capture, may be subjected to the municipal criminal law for the mere participation in conflict.

This article discusses the legal status of Jashari family from Prekaz i Ulët/Donje Prekaze, and by applying the international humanitarian law in the context of Kosovo conflict, argues that all members of Jashari family, excluding Adem and Hamëz Jashari, are entitled to the status of civilians concordant to the Fourth Geneva Convention, correspondingly, they should be treated as victims of the war and be served justice. Additionally, the article, referring to the ICC Statute, concludes that the murder of Jashari family constitutes war crime and crime against humanity under international law. 

The Jashari Family: Civilians, Internationally Protected     

On March 5, 1998, the Serbia police forces launched a military attack against the compound of Adem and Hamëz Jashari, killing—after three days of fighting—54 members of their extended family, including women, children and elderly. All members of Jashari family, excluding Adem and Hamëz Jashari, were civilians, a protected category under international law and international humanitarian law. For, they do not fall in any of six categories of combatants as described in the Third Geneva Convention, respectively they didn’t belong to “inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously, take up arms to resist the invading forces,” and, though, hadn’t had time to organize themselves into regular armed units, “they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war”; nor did they represent people who lost their protection after having “directly participated in hostilities,” based on Article 51.3 of the Protocol I. 

The Jasharis belonged to people who fell in the hands of a party to conflict or an occupying power, they were people of an occupied territory, Kosovo, illegally integrated into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Serbia and Montenegro, following the disintegration of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992. They, except for Adem and Hamëz Jashari, weren’t members of armed forces, thus the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), nor did they organize themselves, spontaneously, into a regular armed unit, or directly participated in hostilities. If any member indirectly involved in hostilities, they did so to defend themselves, their family, their property, and ultimately, their homeland. As Besarta Jashari, the only survivor of Jashari family, revealed, once the attack started, all women, children and elderly were crammed into one room in the basement—to be protected from shelling. Occasionally, some members like Adile, Adem Jashari’s wife, joined fighting by helping with the ammunition, or the youngsters, Kushtrim, Blerim and Igball, who filled the machine guns or fought back along with Adem and Hamza (Hamzaj and Hoti, 2003). 

Further, except for Adem and Hamëz Jashari and their uncle Osman Geci, the elders Ali, Faik, Sinan, Shaban and Sherif Jashari, as well as the youngsters Besim, Blerim and Fitim, although figuring as members of Kosovo Liberation Army, cannot legally be treated as combatants. For, the first category was over sixties, the second under the age of eighteen; based on the former FRY law, all men aged 18 to 55 were eligible to be drafted in case of war or imminent threat of war. Whereas the average age varies, it is only those who are actually drafted, according to the ICRC, that account for combatants. Using the FRY law, Ali, Faik, Sinan, Shaban and Sherif Jashari, and Besim, Blerim and Fitim Jashari, did not meet the age requirement to be drafted in the event of war, or imminent threat of war, consequently, they cannot be considered as combatants, belonging to Kosovo Liberation Army whose membership was voluntary.

That is to say, all members of Jashari family, except for Adem and Hamëz Jashari and Osman Geci, are eligible for the status of civilians accordant to the Fourth Geneva Convention, therefore, they should be treated as victims of the war and be served justice.  

Definitions: Mass Murder, Crime Against Humanity, War Crimes 

In the public discourse, academic and political, the slaughter of Jashari family is mainly referred to as a massacre same as the 186 massacres committed during the conflict in Kosovo in 1998-1999, a notion that shouldn’t be used—for two reasons. One, there is no legal definition of massacre as there is for genocide, for example; massacre and genocide, as Dwyer and Ryan suggest, are often used interchangeably, especially in genocide research, with few scholars differentiating between massacre, mass killing and genocide. Two, massacre doesn’t constitute a separate category of crime like genocide or crime against humanity, neither is it a sub-category of crime against humanity as defined by the ICC. The ICC and ICTY do not use massacre in their proceedings against war criminals; instead they rely on the category of crime against humanity. 

To determine the crime against the Jashari family, thus, I will first eliminate the term massacre, and then look onto the definitions of mass murder, crime against humanity of murder and of extermination, and war crimes. Mass murder is defined as an intentional killing of a massive number of persons, belonging to any kind of groups (ethnical, political, religious) as long as they are civilians and their deaths were caused intentionally. Mass murder involves the killing of at least three people in a single event, within the same spatial area, and within a brief period of time. 

Crime against humanity, as described in the ICC Statute, incorporates any of the following acts—when committed as part of widespread or systematic attack directed against civilian population with the knowledge of attack—namely murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecution based on political, racial or ethnic grounds; and enforced disappearances. Crime against humanity of murder involves the killing of one or more persons, and the conduct is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population (Art. 7.1.a.). Crime against humanity of extermination refers to the killing of “one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population,” an act that takes place as part of “a mass killing of members of a civilian population.” (Art. 7.1.b) “Attack directed against any civilian population,” according to ICC, involves the multiple commission of acts as above-mentioned against any civilian population in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. 

War crimes, in particular, when committed as part of a plan or policy, or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, mean grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, including willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment; other serious violations of laws and customs of war applicable to non-international armed conflict, including intentionally directing attacks against civilian population not taking direct part in hostilities, intentionally causing extensive destruction and appropriation of property—not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; and serious violations of Article 3, common to all Geneva Conventions, namely murder, cruel treatment and torture (The ICC, Art. 8). 

The Murder of Jashari Family: War Crime and Crime Against Humanity

The crime against Jashari family falls in two of the above-mentioned categories, namely crime against humanity of murder and war crime, meeting the threshold attached to these crimes: the number, the legal status of population and its ethnic/religious affiliation, the intent, and the act of killing—sponsored and directed by the state. The numeric aspect: for a murder to qualify for mass murder, based on the definition of Peck and Jenkot, at least three or four murders must be committed, at approximately the same time, within the same spatial area, and within a brief period of time. And, the act of killing, as Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay suggest, must be intentional and directed against any kind of groups or civilian population (ethnical, political, religious) as long as their deaths were caused intentionally. The number, time, space and the intent are determinant characteristics of mass murder. 

Does the onslaught of Jashari family meet characteristics to be qualified as mass murder? Yes. The total number of deaths caused as a result of attack was 57. All people killed, except for Adem and Hamëz Jashari and Osman Geci, were civilians. They were killed within the same location, the Jashari compound and neighborhood, in the village of Prekaz i Ulët/Donje Prekaze, and within a brief period of time—through March 5 and 7, 1998—and the act of killing was intentional as part of the FRY and Serbia state policy as well as Milosevic’s widespread and systematic campaign against Kosovo Albanians launched in early 1998.

The intent. The FRY and Serbia military operation against Jasharis was intentional, it followed two previous attacks directed against the family: the first in December 1990; the second—on January 22, 1998. The Jashari family was a deliberated target of Serbia’s regime due to their political beliefs and activities, as well as their ethnic and religious origins: Adem Jashari organized and participated in widespread demonstrations against Milosevic’s terror and violent campaign against Albanians incepted in 1990, following the suspension of Kosovo autonomy in 1989; and along with fourteen members of the KLA, was convicted in absentia for “terrorist acts” in a trial that, according to Human Rights Watch, “clearly failed to conform to international standards.” Having been trained in the Republic of Albania in early 1990s, Adem Jashari, with a group, returned to Kosovo and created the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1993. Following the January 1998 attack, the Jashari family, particularly Adem and Hamëz Jashari, were under the surveillance of Serbia police. 

Additionally, the attack against Jasharis was premeditated and well-orchestrated—directed and ordered by Serbia Government or with its complicity. The operation, as Amnesty International reported, was executed by Serbia Special Police, trained for special operations like hijacking, consisting of Special Anti-Terrorism Unit, the Special Operations Unit, and the Special Police Unit, and was supported by armored personnel carriers (APCs), using artillery shelling from the nearby ammunition factory. The police forces, several hundred in number, according to this organization, or over 5,000 based on the local witnesses, were heavily armed with vehicle-mounted weapons, including heavy machine guns and cannons, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, assault rifles, as well as sniper rifles. Apparently, the attack was disproportional to the threat in question—and in grave violation of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, specifically it violated the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, of the proportionality of attack, of indiscriminate attacks, of precautions in attack, and the principle of limiting the use of force and means of combat.

Further, the intent was to kill the whole family! The police, as the Humanitarian Law Center in Prishtina argues, were ordered to kill indiscriminately, anyone, be it a child, women, or elderly, who attempted to get out of or into the village. Human Rights Watch reported for extrajudicial executions and unlawful killings resulting from the use of excessive and indiscriminate force against civilians, the detainees and the surrendered. The Serb military operation, based on Amnesty International evidence, was in a “more prepared and determined manner,” and the intent “was to eliminate the suspects and their families”—not to apprehend the armed suspects in order to protect lives of civilians guaranteed under the national and international law. And, while the head of the Yugoslav armed forces, the Serb general Nebojsha Pavkovic, called the attack “successful,” a normal policing action against a well-known criminal, adding that “The other details I don’t remember,” the onslaught of Jashari family, using the Amnesty International’s definition of political killings, was “unlawful and deliberate”—ordered by the Serb government or with its complicity, due to “their real or imputed political beliefs or activities” and “religion or ethnic origin.” 

Of course, Adem Jashari could have evacuated women, children and elderly while organizing the defense, as some Kosovo women from urban area suggest, calling him crazy for sacrificing his entire family, for, as a woman said, “nobody has the right to get his children and wife killed” regardless of circumstances. The fact of the matter is that, initially, the Serbia police forces, whilst shooting uninterruptedly with automatic machine guns, called on Jasharis to surrender, but Shaban, Adem and Hamëz Jashari organized the defense, in which participated men from Jashari neighborhood, Sherif, Ali, Faik and Sinan Jashari. The Jasharis were called to surrender, but they declined. They were offered to leave Kosovo, but they refused. Instead, the family decided to stay home, and if necessary, as Hamëz Jashari said, “die to protect their home and homeland.” 

“We don’t have anywhere else to go, we will stay here and die in the land of our ancients who fought over the centuries. We will never leave Kosovo. They can come whenever they want, we will be waiting here, and will respond with whatever means we have. Even if Europe opens the door for us, we will never leave our country.” (Hamëz Jashari, interview following the second attack on January 22, 1998).

Moreover, the attack against Jasharis, according to Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers, was neither the only mass murdernor the worst during the war; it wasn’t a single event neither and their deaths and destruction of their property wasn’t the end of story either. The attack followed the mass killing in Likoshan and Çirez/Likošane and Cirez, taking place through February 28 and March 1, 1998, and resulting in 28 ethnic Albanians slaughtered and executed from Serbia militaries and paramilitaries. In its immediate aftermath, the Serb offensive campaign spread and intensified, resulting in mass killings in Rezalle/Rezala (April, 1998), Lybeniq/ Ljubenić (May, 1998), Poklek/Poklek (May, 1998), Duboc/Dubovac (September, 1998), Abri e Eperme/Gornje Obrinje (September, 1998), Gollubovc/Golubovac (September, 1998), totaling at 186 mass killings committed in Kosovo throughout the war. 

Most importantly, the murder of Jashari family was part of the FRY and Serbia’s State plan and policy as well as part of the Milosevic’s widespread and systematic campaign against ethnic Albanians employed in the early 1998. As the ICTY’s indictment against Milosevic et al. read, Slobodan Milosevic, acting individually or in concert with his subordinates, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Vlajko Stojiljkovic, planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a well-planned and coordinated campaign of unlawful deportation and forcible expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians, including widespread killings, persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, destruction of civilian property, constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity according to Article 7.1 of the Statute of the ICTY. The purpose of the joint criminal enterprise“was, inter alia, the expulsion of a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from the territory of the province of Kosovo” to modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo so to ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian authorities over the province; and this policy was achieved through a widespread or systematic campaign of terror or violence against the Kosovo Albanian population starting from October 1998 until 20 June 1999. An estimated 13,535 people—predominantly ethnic Albanians were killed, about 862,979 others were forcibly expelled from their homes, 6,024 were reported as missing, and supposedly, over 20,000 women were sexually abused.   

Woefully, Milosevic died without ever being convicted for his crimes committed in Kosovo and Bosnia and Hercegovina. However, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, and Lukic, were found guilty for committing crimes against humanityin Kosovo, including deportation, a crime against humanity; forcible transfer as “other inhumane acts,” a crime against humanity; murder, a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws or customs of war; and persecution, a crime against humanity (Milutinovic et al.).

With that being said, Serbia police forces—ordered or in complicit with the Government—killed 54 members of Jashari family, belonging to Albanians as the largest ethnic group in Kosovo, with the intent to “destroy a part of the population”; the conduct took place as part of “a mass killing of members of a civilian population” and was committed as “part of Milosevic’s widespread and systematic campaign” against Albanians, an occupied people. Occurring in a non-international armed conflict, and involving “the commission of multiple acts,” i.e., murder, extermination, destruction of civil property, deportation or forcible transfer of population, and enforced disappearances, the attack against the Jasharis, applying the ICC definition, was in furtherance of Serbia’s state plan or policy committed with the knowledge of these crimes, thereby constitutes crime against humanity, according to Article 7.

The murder of Jashari family constitutes a war crime, too, committed as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes—meaning the breach of the Geneva Conventions, in that it involved willful killing, extensive destruction and appropriation of property of Jashari family—not justified by military necessity, and was carried out unlawfully and wantonly; and other serious violations applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, including intentionally directing attacks against civilian population or against individuals not taking direct part in hostilities, violence to life and person, murder of all kinds; as well as intentionally causing damage or destruction of Jasharis’ property, as prescribed in Article 8 of the ICC Statute. 

To conclude, members of Jashari family, excluding Adem and Hamëz Jashari and Osman Geci, belonging to an occupied people—killed in a non-international armed conflict, enjoy the status of civilians pursuant to the Fourth Geneva Convention. Accordingly, they should be treated as victims of war, and be served justice, whilst their murder constitutes war crime and crime against humanity under international law. Noting that the murder of Adem Jashari’s family had never been investigated by international justice mechanisms in charge of war crimes in Kosovo, UNMIK and EULEX, nor did the case appear in the ICTY’s indictment against Milosevic et al. and Milutinovic et al., let alone the Serbia Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor. In March 2019, however, the Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office opened a preliminary investigation over the murder of Adem Jashari and his family, after having received competences of war crimes from EULEX, and following a verification indicating that the case had never been investigated.

(The author is a Researcher, currently a Research Fellow with World Mediation Organization in Berlin. She received an MA in International Affairs from the New School, New York, with focus on war and peace studies, peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development, as well as international law and international humanitarian law). 

Statusi Juridik i Familjes Jashari Sipas të Drejtës Ndërkombëtare Humanitare: Civilë, Vrasja e Tyre—Krim Lufte dhe Krim Kundër Njerëzimit (II)

Të gjithë anëtarët e familjes Jashari, me përjashtim të Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, e gëzojnë statusin e “civilëve” në përputhje me të drejtën ndërkombëtare humanitare, rrjedhimisht duhet të trajtohen si viktima të luftës dhe t’u ofrohet drejtësi. Vrasja e tyre, ndërkaq, përbën “krim lufte” dhe “krim kundër njerëzimit” në akordancë me ligjin ndërkombëtar.

Sebahate J. Shala

Konventa e Katërt e Gjenevës i definon personat e mbrojtur si ata “që në një moment të caktuar” e gjejnë veten në duart e një “pale në konflikt ose një force pushtuese” dhe të cilët—në çdo kohë—duhet të “trajtohen njerëzisht” dhe të mbrohen, veçanërisht, kundër “të gjitha akteve të dhunës ose kërcënimeve të përdorimit të saj, dhe kundër fyerjeve dhe kuriozitetit publik”. Në rastet e konfliktit të brendshëm të armatosur, siç e parasheh Konventa, palët në konflikt duhet të mbrojnë dhe të trajtojnë njerëzisht të gjithë “personat që nuk marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në armiqësi”, si dhe të respektojnë—në të gjitha rrethanat—pesë parimet e mishëruara në Protokollet Shtesë I dhe II, përfshirë parimin e dallimit ndërmjet luftëtarëve dhe civilëve, të sulmeve pa dallim, të masave paraprake në sulm, të kufizimit të përdorimit të forcës dhe mjeteve të luftimit, dhe parimin e proporcionalitetit të sulmit.

Civilët, sipas përshkrimit të Protokollit Shtesë I, dhe siç kishte vendosur Tribunali Ndërkombëtar për Krime në ish Jugosllavi në rastin Blaškić në vitin 2000, janë “personat të cilët nuk janë anëtarë të forcave të armatosura”, ose që “(nuk) janë më anëtarë të forcave të armatosura”, prandaj ata gëzojnë mbrojtje ndërkombëtare nga dhuna dhe kërcënimet e dhunës ose sulmet e drejtpërdrejta ushtarake në një konflikt të armatosur. “Drejtimi i qëllimshëm i sulmeve kundër popullatës civile” ose kundër individëve që nuk marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në armiqësi, siç përcakton Gjykata Ndërkombëtare Penale (GjNP/ICC), përbën “krim lufte në konflikte të armatosura ndërkombëtare.”

Sidoqoftë, civilët në konfliktet e armatosura ndërkombëtare dhe jondërkombëtare, siç parasheh Protokolli I (Neni 51.3), e humbin mbrojtjen e tyre në momentin, dhe për aq kohë sa “marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në armiqësi”, dispozitë kjo që është respektuar nga Mbretëria e Bashkuar me rastin e ratifikimit të Konventës mbi Armë të Caktuara Konvencionale, si dhe nga Tribunali i Hagës në rastin Blaškić. Ndërsa në disa praktika, personi civil e humb mbrojtjen nga sulmet ushtarake kur merr pjesë aktive në armiqësi, megjithatë, siç argumenton Komiteti Ndërkombëtar i Kryqit të Kuq (KNKK), ai person civil nuk bëhet automatikisht luftëtar, së këndejmi i burgosur i luftës, dhe pas kapjes nga forcat kundërshtare, ai mund t’i nënshtrohet ligjit penal për të vetmen arsye—pjesëmarrje në konflikt.

Ky artikull diskuton statusin juridik të familjes Jashari nga Prekazi i Ulët, dhe duke e aplikuar të drejtën ndërkombëtare humanitare në kontekst të konfliktit në Kosovë, argumenton se të gjithë anëtarët e familjes Jashari, me përjashtim të Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, e gëzojnë statusin e civilëve përkitazi me Konventën e Katërt të Gjenevës, prandaj duhet të trajtohen si viktima të luftës dhe t’u ofrohet drejtësi. Për më tepër, artikulli, duke iu referuar Statutit të GjPN-së/ICC, konkludon se vrasja e familjes Jashari përbën krim lufte dhe krim kundër njerëzimit në bazë të së drejtës ndërkombëtare.

Familja Jashari: Civilë, Të Mbrojtur Ndërkombëtarisht     

Më 5 mars, 1998, forcat policore serbe sulmuan kullën e Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, duke vrarë—pas tre ditësh luftime—54 anëtarë të familjes së tyre të gjerë, përfshirë gra, fëmijë dhe pleq. Të gjithë anëtarët e familjes Jashari, me përjashtim të Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, ishin civilë, kategori kjo e mbrojtur me ligjin ndërkombëtar dhe ligjin ndërkombëtar humanitar. Sepse, ata nuk i takojnë asnjëres nga gjashtë kategoritë e luftëtarëve të përshkruara në Konventën e Tretë të Gjenevës, përkatësisht, ata nuk i përkisnin “banorëve të një territori jo të pushtuar të cilët, me afrimin e armikut, në mënyrë spontane, kapin armët për t’i rezistuar forcave pushtuese”, dhe, megjithëse, nuk kishin pasur kohë të organizoheshin në njësite të rregullta ushtarake, “ata mbajnë armët publikisht dhe respektojnë rregullat dhe zakonet e luftës”; e as nuk përfaqësonin personat të cilët e humbin mbrojtjen e tyre pasi “marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në armiqësi”, siç specifikon Neni 51.3 i Protokollit I.

Jasharët i takonin një populli që ra në duart e një pale në konflikt ose një force okupuese, ata ishin banorë të një territori të pushtuar, Kosovës, i integruar ilegalisht në Republikën Federale të Jugosllavisë (RFJ), Serbisë dhe Malit të Zi, pas shpërbërjes së Republikës Socialiste Federale të Jugosllavisë (RSFJ) në vitin 1992. Ata, përveç Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, nuk ishin pjesëtarë të forcave ose grupeve të armatosura, pra Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës (UÇK), as nuk u organizuan, spontanisht, në një njësi të rregullta ushtarake, e as nuk morën pjesë drejtpërdrejt në luftime. Nëse ndonjë anëtar i familjes ishte përfshirë në njëfarë forme në armiqësi, ata e kishin bërë atë për të mbrojtur veten, familjen, pronën, dhe atdheun e tyre. Siç kish rrëfyer Besarta Jashari, e mbijetuara e vetme e familjes Jashari, me të filluar sulmi, gratë, fëmijët dhe të moshuarit ishin mbyllur në një dhomë në bodrum—për t’u mbrojtur nga granatimet. Në disa raste, sidoqoftë, disa anëtarë të familjes, si Adilja, gruaja e Adem Jasharit, kishin ndihmuar burrat duke sjellë municion, ose të rinjtë, Kushtrimi, Blerimi dhe Igballi, të cilët mbushnin karikatorët ose luftonin së bashku me Ademin dhe Hamzën (Hamzaj dhe Hoti, 2003).

Tutje, përveç Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit dhe dajës së tyre Osman Geci, të moshuarit Ali, Faik, Sinan, Shaban dhe Sherif Jashari, si dhe të rinjtë Besim, Blerim dhe Fitim Jashari, ndonëse figurojnë si anëtarë të Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës, ligjërisht nuk mund të trajtohen si luftëtarë. Kjo pasi që kategoria e parë ishte mbi të gjashtëdhjetat, ndërsa e dyta nën moshën tetëmbëdhjetë vjeç, e bazuar në ligjin e ish RFJ-së, të gjithë burrat e moshës 18 deri 55 vjeç ishin të obliguar të paraqiteshin si rezervistë në rast lufte ose të kërcënimit të menjëhershëm me luftë. Përderisa mosha mesatare varion, janë vetëm ata që janë rekrutuar ndërkaq, që sipas KNKK-së, llogariten si luftëtarë. Prandaj, duke e aplikuar ligjin e ish RFJ-së, Ali, Faik, Sinan, Shaban dhe Sherif Jashari dhe Besim, Blerim dhe Fitim Jashari nuk i plotësonin kriteret e moshës për t’u rekrutuar në rast të luftës ose të kërcënimit me luftë, rrjedhimisht, ata nuk mund të konsiderohen si luftëtarë, që i përkisnin Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës anëtarësia e së cilës ishte vullnetare.

Kjo nënkupton se të gjithë anëtarët e familjes Jashari, përveç Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit dhe Osman Gecit, e gëzojnë statusin e civilëve në përputhje me Konventën e Katërt të Gjenevës, së këndejmi duhet të trajtohen si viktima të luftës dhe t’u ofrohet drejtësi. 

Definicionet: Vrasje Masive, Krim Kundër Njerëzimit, Krim i Luftës 

Në diskursin publik, akademik dhe politik, vrasjes së familjes Jashari i referohet kryesisht si masakër ngjashëm si 186 masakrat tjera të kryera gjatë luftës në Kosovë, një term ky që nuk duhet të përdoret—për dy arsye. Një, sepse nuk ekziston një përkufizim ligjor mbi masakrën siç ekziston për gjenocidin, për shembull; masakra dhe gjenocidi, siç sugjerojnë Dwyer dhe Ryan, shpesh përdoren si zëvendësim për njëra-tjetren, veçanërisht në studimet e gjenocidit, dhe shumë pak studiues bëjnë dallimin ndërmjet masakrës, vrasjes masive dhe gjenocidit. Dy, masakra nuk paraqet kategori të veçantë të krimit si gjenocidi ose krimi kundër njerëzimit, e madje nuk është as nën-kategori e krimit kundër njerëzimit siç definohet nga GjNP/ICC. GjNP dhe Tribunali i Hagës nuk e përdorin nocionin masakër në proceset e tyre kundër kriminelëve të luftës; në vend të kësaj këto gjykata mbështeten në kategorinë e krimit kundër njerëzimit.

Për të përcaktuar krimin ndaj familjes Jashari, së pari do ta eliminojë termin masakër, dhe pastaj do t’i shikojë definicionet e vrasjes masive, vrasjes dhe shfarosjes si krime kundër njerëzimit, dhe të krimeve të luftës. Vrasja masive definohet si vrasje e qëllimshme e një numri të madh personash, që i përkasin cilitdo grup (etnik, politik, fetar) për aq kohë sa janë civilë dhe vdekjet e tyre janë shkaktuar qëllimshëm. Vrasja masive përfshin vrasjen e të paktën tre personave në një incident të vetëm, brenda së njëjtës zonë hapësinore, dhe brenda një periudhe të shkurtër kohore.

Krimi kundër njerëzimit, siç përshkruhet në Statutin e GjNP-së, përfshin cilindo nga veprimet e mëposhtme—kur kryhet si pjesë e një sulmi në shkallë të gjerë ose sistematik i drejtuar kundër popullatës civile me dijeninë e kryerjes së sulmit—përkatësisht vrasje; shfarosje; skllavërim; deportim ose transferim me forcë i popullsisë; burgim; torturë; dhunim; persekutim i bazuar në baza politike, racore ose etnike; dhe rrëmbim me forcë. Vrasja si krim kundër njerëzimit përfshin vrasjen e një ose më shumë personave, dhe akti/administrimi i saj është pjesë e një sulmi të gjerë ose sistematik i drejtuar kundër një popullate civile (Neni 7.1.a.). Shfarosja si krim kundër njerëzimit i referohet vrasjes së “një ose më shumë personave, përfshirë shkaktimin e kushteve të jetës të kalkuluara qëllimshëm që të shkatërrojnë një pjesë të një populli”, akt ky që ndodh si pjesë e “vrasjes masive të pjesëtarëve të një popullate civile”. (Neni 7.1.b) “Sulmi i drejtuar kundër popullatës civile”, sipas GjNP-së/ICC, përfshin kryerjen e akteve të shumëfishta—që u përmenden më lartë—kundër një popullate civile si pjesë ose në avancim të politikës dhe strategjisë së një Shteti ose organizate për të kryer një sulm të tillë.

Krimet e luftës, në veçanti, kur kryhen si pjesë e një plani ose politike, ose si pjesë e krimeve të kryera në shkallë të gjerë, përbëjnë shkelje të rëndë të Konventave të Gjenevës, përfshirë vrasje me dashje/me paramendim, torturë ose trajtime çnjerëzore; shkeljet tjera serioze të rregullave dhe zakoneve të luftës të zbatueshme në konfliktin e armatosur jondërkombëtar, përfshirë sulmet e qëllimshme ndaj popullatës civile që nuk merr pjesë drejtpërdrejt në luftime, duke shkaktuar qëllimisht shkatërrim të gjerë të pasurisë dhe përvetësim të pronës—e që nuk justifikohet me nevojë të ndërhyrjes ushtarake dhe që kryhet paligjshëm dhe në mënyrë të kalkuluar; dhe shkelje serioze të Nenit të Përbashkët 3, të të gjitha Konventave të Gjenevës, përkatësisht vrasje, trajtime mizore dhe torturë (GjNP, Neni 8).

Vrasja e Familjes Jashari: Krim Lufte dhe Krim Kundër Njerëzimit

Krimi kundër familjes Jashari bie në dy nga kategoritë e lartpërmendura—krim kundër njerëzimit dhe krim i luftës, meqë i plotëson kriteret për t’u llogaritur si i tillë: numrin e të vrarëve, statusin juridik të popullsisë dhe përkatësinë e saj etnike/ fetare, qëllimin, dhe akti i vrasjes—i sponsorizuar dhe drejtuar nga Shteti. Aspekti numerik: në mënyrë që një vrasje të kualifikohet si vrasje masive, sipas definimit të Peck dhe Jenkot, të paktën tre ose katër vrasje duhet të kryhen, afërsisht në të njëjtën kohë, në të njëjtën zonë hapësinore, dhe brenda një periudhe të shkurtër kohore. Dhe, akti i vrasjes, siç theksojnë Valentino, Huth dhe Balch-Lindsay, duhet të jetë i qëllimshëm dhe i drejtuar kundër cilitdo grup ose popullate civile (etnike, politike, fetare) për aq kohë sa vdekjet e tyre janë shkaktuar qëllimshëm. Numri, koha, hapësira dhe qëllimi janë karakteristikat përcaktuese të vrasjes masive.

A i plotëson rasti i familjes Jashari këto karakteristika për t’u kualifikuar si vrasje masive? Po. Numri i përgjithshëm i vdekjeve të shkaktuara si rezultat i sulmit ishte 57. Të gjithë të vrarët, përveç Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit dhe Osman Gecit, ishin civilë. Ata u vranë në të njëjtin vend, në kullën dhe lagjen Jashari, në fshatin Prekaz i Ulët, dhe brenda një periudhe të shkurtër kohore—ndërmjet 5 dhe 7 marsit të vitit 1998—dhe akti i vrasjes ishte i qëllimshëm si pjesë e planit dhe politikës shtetërore të RFJ-së dhe Serbisë dhe i fushatës së gjërë dhe sistematike të Millosheviqit kundër shqiptarëve të Kosovës—e lansuar në fillim të vitit 1998.

Qëllimi. Operacioni ushtarak i RFJ-së dhe i Serbisë kundër Jasharajve ishte i qëllimshëm, i cili pasoi dy sulme të mëparshme të drejtuara kundër familjes: i pari në dhjetor të vitit 1990; i dyti—më 22 janar të vitit 1998. Familja Jashari ishte në shënjestër të regjimit të Serbisë për shkak të bindjeve dhe aktiviteteve të tyre politike, si dhe origjinës etnike e religjioze: Adem Jashari kishte organizuar dhe marrë pjesë në demonstratat masive kundër terrorit dhe fushatës së dhunshme të Millosheviqit ndaj shqiptarëve të Kosovës e filluar në vitin 1990, pas suspendimit të autonomisë së Kosovës në vitin 1989; dhe së bashku me 14 anëtarë të UÇK-së, ishte dënuar në mungesë për “akte terroriste” nga një gjyq që, sipas Human Rights Watch, “haptazi dështoi t’i përmbushte standardet ndërkombëtare”. I trajnuar në Republikën e Shqipërisë në fillim të viteve 1990, Adem Jashari kthehet, me një grup, në Kosovë dhe në vitin 1993 krijon Ushtrinë Çlirimtare të Kosovës. Pas sulmit të janarit të vitit 1998, familja Jashari, veçanërisht Adem dhe Hamëz Jashari, ishin nën vëzhgimin dhe përcjelljen e vazhdushme të policisë së Serbisë.

Tutje, sulmi ndaj Jasharajve ishte i paramenduar dhe i orkestruar mirë—i drejtuar dhe urdhëruar nga Qeveria e Serbisë ose në bashkëpunim me të. Operacioni, siç kish raportuar Amnesty International, ishte ekzekutuar nga Policia Speciale e Serbisë, e trajnuar për operacione speciale si rrëmbim, në përbërje të Njësisë Speciale Kundër Terrorizmit, Njësisë së Operacioneve Speciale dhe Njësisë Speciale të Policisë, dhe ishte mbështetur nga transportuesit e blinduar të personelit, tankse e autoblinda, që përdornin artileri nga fabrika e municionit në Skenderaj. Forcat e policisë, disa qindra në numër, sipas kësaj organizate, ose mbi 5,000 sish bazuar në dëshmitë e banorëve lokalë, ishin të armatosura rëndë, përfshirë mitralozë të rëndë dhe topa, raketa dhe granatahedhës, pushkë sulmi, si dhe snajper. Sulmi, qartazi, ishte disproporcional në relacion me kërcënimin në fjalë—dhe përbente shkelje të rëndë të Konventave të Gjenevës dhe të Protokolleve të tyre, specifikisht forcat serbe shkelën parimin e dallimit ndërmjet luftëtarëve dhe civilëve, të proporcionalitetit të sulmit, të sulmeve pa dallim, të masave paraprake në sulm, dhe parimin e kufizimit të përdorimit të forcës dhe të mjeteve të luftimit.

Për më tepër, qëllimi ishte të vritej e tërë familja! Policia, siç argumenton Qendra për të Drejtën Humanitare në Prishtinë, ishte urdhëruar të vrasë pa dallim, këdo, qoftë fëmijë, grua apo i moshuar, që përpiqej të ikte ose të hynte në fshat. Human Rights Watch raportonte për ekzekutime jashtëgjyqësore dhe vrasje të paligjshme si rezultat i përdorimit të tepërt dhe pa dallim të forcës kundër civilëve, të arrestuarve dhe të dorëzuarve. Operacioni ushtarak serb, bazuar në dëshmitë e Amnesty International, ishte më i “përgatitur dhe i vendosur”, dhe qëllimi “ishte të eliminonte të dyshuarit dhe familjet e tyre”—dhe jo të kapte të dyshuarit e armatosur në mënyrë që të mbroheshin jetët e civilëve—të garantuara me ligjet kombëtare dhe ndërkombëtare. Dhe, ndërsa kreu i forcave të armatosura jugosllave, gjenerali serb Nebojsha Pavkoviq, e quajti sulmin “të suksesshëm”, një veprim normal policor kundër një krimineli të njohur, duke shtuar se “detajet e tjera nuk i mbaj mend”, vrasja e familjes Jashari, nëse i referohemi definicionit të Amnesty International mbi vrasjet politike, ishte “e paligjshme dhe e qëllimshme”—e urdhëruar nga qeveria Serbe ose në bashkëpunim me të, për shkak të “bindjeve ose aktiviteteve të tyre reale ose të nënkuptuara politike” dhe “fesë ose origjinës etnike”.

Sigurisht që, Adem Jashari ka mundur t’i evakuonte gratë, fëmijët dhe të moshuarit derisa e organizonte mbrojtjen, siç sugjerojnë disa gra të zonave urbane në Kosovë teksa e quajnë të marrë për sakrifikimin e gjithë familjes, sepse, siç kish thënë një grua, “askush nuk ka të drejtë që të flijojë fëmijët dhe gruan” pavarësisht rrethanave dhe qëllimit. E vërtetë, fillimisht, forcat e policisë së Serbisë, ndërsa gjuanin pandërprerë me armë automatike, i kishin bërë thirrje Jasharajve që të dorëzoheshin, por Shaban, Adem dhe Hamëz Jashari e kishin organizuar mbrojtjen, në të cilën kishin marrë pjesë edhe burra tjerë të lagjes, Sherif, Ali, Faik dhe Sinan Jashari. Jasharëve u ishte bërë thirrje të dorëzoheshin, ata kishin refuzuar. Atyre u ishte ofruar të largoheshin nga Kosova, ata nuk kishin pranuar. Në vend të kësaj, e tërë familja vendosi të qëndronte në shtëpi, dhe nëse ishte e nevojshme, siç kishte thënë Hamëz Jashari, të “vdisnin për të mbrojtur shtëpinë dhe atdheun e tyre”.

“Ne nuk kemi ku të shkojmë tjetër, do të qëndrojmë këtu dhe do të vdesim në vendin e të parëve tanë që luftuan gjatë shekujve. Ne kurrë nuk do të largohemi nga Kosova. Ata mund të vijnë kur të duan, ne do t’i presim këtu dhe do t’i përgjigjemi me çfarëdo mundësie e mjeti që kemi. Edhe nëse Evropa na i hap dyert, ne kurrë nuk do të largohemi nga vendi ynë”. (Hamëz Jashari, intervistë pas sulmit të dytë më 22 janar, 1998)

Veç kësaj, vrasja e Jasharajve, sipas Di Lellio dhe Schwandner-Sievers, nuk ishte vrasja masive e vetme, as më e keqja gjatë luftës; ajo nuk ishte ngjarja e vetme dhe vdekjet e shkatërrimi i pronës së tyre nuk ishte as fundi i tregimit. Sulmi u pasua nga vrasja masive në Likoshan dhe Çirez, 28 shkurt-1 mars, 1998: 28 shqiptarë ishin ekzekutuar dhe masakruar nga ushtarët dhe paramilitarët e Serbisë. Menjëherë pas saj, fushata ofensive e Serbisë u përhap dhe u intensifikua në shkallë të gjerë në tërë territorin e Kosovës, duke rezultuar në vrasje masive në Rezalle (prill, 1998), Lybeniq (maj, 1998), Poklek (maj, 1998), Duboc (shtator, 1998), Abri e Eperme (shtator, 1998), Gollubovc (shtator, 1998)—që përbënin disa nga gjithsej 186 vrasjet masive të kryera gjatë luftës në Kosovë.

Më e rëndësishmja, vrasja e familjes Jashari ishte pjesë e planit dhe e politikës shtetërore të RFJ-së dhe Serbisë, si dhe pjesë e fushatës së gjerë dhe sistematike të Millosheviqit kundër shqiptarëve të Kosovës e lansuar në fillim të vitit 1998. Siç theksonte aktakuza e Tribunalit të Hagës kundër Millosheviqit dhe të tjerëve, Sllobodan Millosheviq, individualisht ose në bashkëpunim me vartësit e tij, Milan Milutinoviq, Nikola Shainoviq, Dragoljub Ojdaniq dhe Vlajko Stojiljkoviq, kishte planifikuar, nxitur, urdhëruar, kryer, ose ndihmuar dhe mbështetur planifikimin, përgatitjen, ose ekzekutimin e fushatës së koordinuar dhe planifikuar mirë për dëbimin e paligjshëm dhe me forcë të qindra mijëra shqiptarëve të Kosovës, përfshirë vrasje masive, përndjekje në baza politike, racore ose fetare, shkatërrimin e pronës civile, që përbëjnë krime lufte dhe krime kundër njerëzimit në përputhje me Nenin 7.1 të Statutit të Tribunalit. Dhe qëllimi i kësaj ndërmarrje të përbashkët kriminale “ishte, ndër të tjera, dëbimi i një pjese të konsiderueshme të popullatës shqiptare të Kosovës nga territori i provincës së Kosovës” me qëllim modifikimin e përbërjes etnike në Kosovë në mënyrë që të sigurohet kontrolli i vazhdueshëm i autoriteteve të RFJ-së dhe Serbisë mbi provincën; dhe kjo politikë u arrit përmes një fushate masive ose sistematike të terrorit ose dhunës ndaj popullatës shqiptare të Kosovës duke filluar nga tetori i vitit 1998 deri më 20 qershor të vitit 1999. Në total, 13,535 persona—shumica dërmuese e tyre shqiptarë u vranë, rreth 862,979 të tjerë u dëbuan me forcë nga shtëpitë e tyre, 6,024 u raportuan si të zhdukur dhe supozohet se mbi 20,000 gra u abuzuan seksualisht.

Mjerisht, Millosheviqi vdiq pa u dënuar kurrë për krimet e tij të kryera në Kosovë dhe Bosnje dhe Hercegovinë. Megjithatë, Shainoviq, Ojdaniq, Pavkoviq, Lazareviq dhe Lukiq, u shpallën fajtorë për kryerjen e krimeve kundër njerëzimit në Kosovë, përfshirë deportim, si krim kundër njerëzimit; transferim me forcë dhe “veprime tjera çnjerëzore”, si krim kundër njerëzimit; vrasje, si krim kundër njerëzimit dhe shkelje e ligjeve ose zakoneve të luftës; dhe persekutim, si krim kundër njerëzimit (Milutinoviq dhe të tjerë).

Siç u tha më lartë, forcat policore të Serbisë—të urdhëruara ose në bashkëpunim me Qeverinë—kishin vrarë 54 anëtarë të familjes Jashari, të cilët i përkisnin shqiptarëve si grupi më i madh etnik në Kosovë, me qëllim që të “shkatërrojnë një pjesë të popullsisë”; ky akt u zhvillua si pjesë e “vrasjes masive të pjesëtarëve të një popullsie civile” dhe u krye si “pjesë e fushatës së gjerë dhe sistematike të Millosheviqit” kundër shqiptarëve, një popull i okupuar. Duke ndodhur në një konflikt të brendshëm, dhe që përfshinte “kryerjen e akteve të shumfishta”, si vrasje, shfarosje, shkatërrim i pronës civile, dëbim ose transferim me forcë i popullsisë dhe rrëmbim me forcë, sulmi kundër Jasharajve, sipas definicionit të GjPN-së/ICC, ishte vazhdimësi e politikës ose planit shtetëror të Serbisë, i kryer me dijeni ose paramendim, dhe si tillë përbën krim kundër njerëzimit, sipas Nenit 7.

Vrasja e familjes Jashari paraqet krim lufte, gjithashtu, i kryer si pjesë e krimeve të tilla në shkallë të gjerë—që do të thotë shkelje e Konventave të Gjenevës në atë se përfshinte vrasje me dashje, shkatërrim i gjerë dhe përvetësim i pronës së familjes Jashari—që nuk justifikohet me nevojë të ndërhyrjes ushtarake, dhe ishte kryer në mënyrë të paligjshme dhe të pamorlashme; shkelje tjera serioze të zbatueshme në konflikte të armatosura të karakterit jondërkombëtar, përfshirë sulme të qëllimshme kundër popullatës civile ose kundër individëve që nuk marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në luftime, dhunë ndaj jetës dhe personit, vrasje të të gjitha llojeve; si dhe dëm ose shkatërrim i qëllimshëm i pronës së Jasharajve, siç përshkruhet në Nenin 8 të Statutit të GjNP-së/ICC.

Si përfundim, anëtarët e familjes Jashari, me përjashtim të Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit dhe Osman Gecit, pjesëtarë të një populli të pushtuar—dhe të vrarë në një një konflikt të brendshëm të armatosur, e gëzojnë statusin e civilëve në përputhje me Konventën e Katërt të Gjenevës. Prandaj, ata duhet të trajtohen si viktima të luftës dhe t’u ofrohet drejtësi. Vrasja e tyre, ndërkaq, përbën krim lufte dhe krim kundër njerëzimit sipas ligjit ndërkombëtar. Duhet theksuar se vrasja e familjes së Adem Jasharit kurrë nuk është hetuar/ose inicuar nga mekanizmat ndërkombëtarë të drejtësisë përgjegjës për hetimin e krimeve të luftës në Kosovë, UNMIK-u dhe EULEX-i, ndërsa ky rast nuk është përfshirë as në padinë e Tribunalit të Hagës kundër Millosheviqit dhe të tjerë dhe Milutinoviqit dhe të tjerë, e të mos flasim për Zyrën e Prokurorit të Krimeve të Luftës në Serbi. Në mars të vitit 2019, ndërkaq, Prokuroria Speciale e Kosovës paralajmëroi hapjen e një hetimi paraprak mbi vrasjen e Adem Jasharit dhe familjes së tij, pasi kishte marrë kompetencat për krime lufte nga EULEX dhe pas një verifikimi që dëshmonte se ky rast nuk ishte hetuar asnjëherë.

(Autorja është Hulumtuese, momentalisht e angazhuar si Research Fellow në World Mediation Organization në Berlin. Ajo ka mbaruar studimet Master në Marrëdhënie Ndërkombëtare në New School, New York, me fokus studimet e luftës dhe paqes, paqe-ndërtimi, shtet-ndërtimi dhe zhvillimi, si dhe e drejta ndërkombëtare dhe e drejta ndërkombëtare humanitare). 

The Rise of Domestic Terrorism in America: White Supremacist Attacks Predominate

As opposed to foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism has been on rise since the Oklahoma bombing in 1995—with far-right terrorism “significantly” outpacing terrorism from other types of perpetrators. Needless to say, white supremacists preponderate, carrying out 57% of plots and attacks through 1994—2020, respectively 67% of attacks in 61 incidents between January-August 2020.

Sebahate J. Shala

Insurrection. Sedition. Domestic terror. In an unprecedented occasion, members of the U.S. Congress, media and experts unanimously used the phrase “domestic terror” to describe the January 6 riots—when an angry mob, instigated by President Trump, breached the Capitol in attempt to overrule the result of the 2020 election. In a live appearance, the Washington, D.C., Mayor Muriel Bowser called the action a “textbook terrorism” while reading the definition about the crime in the U.S. Code: “[…] the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”    

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has so far charged 205 individuals relating to the Capitol siege and returned 35 indictments on federal crimes ranging from trespassing to murder to obstruction of justice to carrying or having accessible, in the grounds of the Capitol, of a firearm and ammunition. The authorities, too, are considering filing serious charges of sedition and conspiracy against some individuals—a federal crime involving an effort to conspire to overthrow the U.S. government—punishable up to 20 years in prison. No charges on the crime of domestic terrorism, though! 

That is, the U.S. Code falls short in determining the crime of terrorism, providing, as McCord explains, an exact definition for both “international” and “domestic terrorism”—the first occurring primarily outside of the U.S. territorial jurisdiction, or transcends national boundaries, and the second one primarily within the U.S. territorial jurisdiction. But these acts do not create “terrorism offenses,” as listed in Chapter 113b, Title 18, under “Terrorism,” which include crimes that prohibit: using weapons of mass destruction or directed at U.S. government officials or property; acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries; engaging in financial transactions with countries that support international terrorism; providing material support to terrorists; or to a designated foreign terrorist organization; etc. Besides, there is no federal crime of terrorism that applies to acts—otherwise qualified as “domestic terrorism”—when perpetrated with firearms or vehicles (the most common means of terrorist attacks used within and outside of the U.S.) but not connected to a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO).

The U.S. terrorism statutes deal primarily—and exclusively—with international terrorism and terrorism in the homeland committed in furtherance of the goals of a FTO, like ISIS or Al Qaeda, standing silent toward attacks or mass shootings carried out in furtherance of political or social ideologies not connected to an FTO. That is why the killing in Charlottesville, Va., in 2017, committed by James Fields, a self-proclaimed neo-Nazi white supremacist, including mass shootings in Pittsburg, Poway, or El Paso, executed in furtherance of white supremacist and anti-immigration ideologies—were not qualified as terrorism crimes, though they, according to McCord, met the federal definition of domestic terrorism. 

The “domestic terrorism” meaning, as explained in the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2020, refers to Section 2331, Title 18, of the U.S. Code, and doesn’t include acts carried out by individuals associated with, or inspired by a foreign person or an FTO; an individual or organization designated as such under the Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); or a state sponsor of terrorism (Export Administration Act, 1979, 50 U.S.C. 4605). Hence, the Capitol attack doesn’t constitute a terrorism act as long as it’s not associated with, or inspired by a foreign terrorist or an FTO. So far, no suspicious for such a connection is reported.

Noting that, unlike “international terrorism” organizations, accounting for 61 in total, the DOJ and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, although, they have openly delineated domestic terrorist threats conducted by individuals on behalf of ideologies, like anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government, black separatism, and so forth. Instead, the FBI and the DHS, as Bjelopera, a specialist in organized crime and terrorism, observes, use the “homegrown violent extremist” (HVE) to separate domestic terrorists from foreign terrorists. An HVE is defined as: “A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the U.S. or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.” The lack of official lists or processes to designate groups or individuals as domestic terrorists, according to this author, renders it difficult to assess domestic terrorism trends and evaluate federal efforts to counter such threats; therefore, all legal actions against an identified extremist group exercising violence are constitutionally protected and not reported on by DHS.

Far-Right Terrorism: The Greatest Domestic Security Threat  

Domestic terrorism, comparing to the declining trends of foreign terrorism, has been on rise since the Oklahoma bombing in 1995, known as the first homegrown terrorism attack and the deadliest after 9/11, killing 168 people and injuring several hundred. As a DHS report released on October 2020 warned: “Domestic violent extremism is a threat to Homeland.” The formerly Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad F. Wolf, expressed his concerns on the racially-and-ethnically-motivated-violent-extremists, specifically white supremacist extremists, who, as he suggested, will remain the “most persistent and lethal threat” in the homeland. A similar warning issued the FBI, too, arguing that “the top threat we face from domestic violent extremists” comes from racially and ethnically-motivated violent extremists, including white supremacists.  

The existing data indicates that the far-right attacks, those executed by white supremacists in particular, are predominant. In the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2020, the Congress maintains that “white supremacists and other far-right-wing extremists are the most significant domestic terrorism threat facing the United States,” posing the “greatest domestic-security threats” as a Trump Administration Department of Justice official wrote at the New York Times on February 2019. Further, an unclassified 2017-FBI and DHS intelligence bulletin indicates that “white supremacist extremism (WSE)” were responsible for 49 homicides in 26 attacks from 2000 to 2016, with a number of killings ranging from 1 to 49 in a given year since September 2001, accounting for 62 (73%) of 85 violent extremist incidents against 23 (27%) incidents committed by radical Islamist violent extremists. Moreover, in its annual hate crime incident report in 2018, the FBI found that hate crimes increased by approximately 17% in 2017, raising for the third consecutive year, by almost 5% in 2016, and by 6% in 2015.

Mass shootings in Charleston, SC (2015), Colorado Springs, Col. (2015), Portland, Or. (2017), Charlottesville, Va. (2017), and in Pittsburgh, Pa (2018)—among other attacks—were all perpetrated by far-right-wing extremists. The WSE, according to DHS, have been exceptionally lethal in their abhorrent, targeted attacks in the recent years, exploiting lawful protests to cause violence, death and destruction in America, including during 100 days of violence across cities in 2020.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) supports these data, as well. In a brief issued in June 2020, Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington argue that the far-right terrorism has “significantly outpaced terrorism from other types of perpetrators”—far-left networks and individuals inspired by ISIS and Al Qaeda, accounting for the majority of all terrorist incidents in the U.S. since 1995. The plots and attacks committed by the right-wing, as these authors observe, have grown significantly during the past six years, making up two thirds of the attacks and plots in America in 2019 and over 90% between January 1 and May 8, 2020.

Based on the CSIS accounts, from 893 terrorist attacks and plots carried out through 1994—2020, the majority of them (57%) were perpetrated by right-wing terrorists as opposed to 25% by left-wing terrorists, 15% by religious terrorists, and 4% by others. The right-wing attacks predominated throughout 1994-1999, accounting for more than half of all incidents in 2008 as well as every year since 2011, with the exception of 2013. In 2016, 2017 and 2019—the number of right-wing terrorist events matched or exceeded the number in 1995, including a recent high of 53 right-wing terrorist incidents in 2017. The right-wing activity increased in 2019 to 44 incidents.

In another CSIS brief, the War Comes Home: The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism in the United States, Jones et al. reported for a growing threat from domestic terrorism coming from politically-racially-ethnically-economically-healthy motivated extremists. Based on their dataset, white supremacists and other like-minded extremists perpetrated 67% of terrorist plots and attacks in 61 incidents between January 1 and August 31, 2020, using vehicles, explosives, and firearms, whilst targeting demonstrators and other individuals on racial, ethnic, religious, or political basis, including as well as police, military and government personnel and facilities. 

In October 2020, the FBI arrested Adam Fox, Barry Croft, Ty Garbin and several others for conspiring to kidnap and possibly execute the Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, as well as for discussing to kidnap Virginia Governor Ralph Northam, in part because of his lockdown orders to slow the spread of Covid-19.

Likewise, in an unclassified document, the Texas Department of Public Safety concluded that “mass attacks pose a persistent and varied threat to the State of Texas,” cautioning that racially motivated attacks are currently the most violently active type of domestic terrorism within the U.S. and Texas, committing 10 mass attacks in Texas through 2009-2019 (2020). In another report, this Department alarms that the white racially motivated (WRM) is currently the most violently active domestic terrorism type, committing—since 2018—at least three major attacks in the U.S. (including one in Texas) and several thwarted incidents, followed by Involuntary Celibates (Incels). 

Organization and Operation: Online Through A Decentralized, Leaderless Resistance 

The CSIS categorizes the right-wing terrorist individuals into three broad groups: white supremacists, anti-government extremists, and Incels. They function under a decentralized model, or leaderless resistance, as Bjelopera describes it—with threats coming from individuals not groups—and mostly operating and organizing through social media, therefore adopting some foreign terrorist organizations’ tactics. According to Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington’s findings, many white supremacists adhere to the Great Replacement conspiracy, while the white supremacist neo-Nazi organizations to the Zionist Occupied Government. Engaged in vandalism, trespassing, and tax fraud, domestic terrorists’ operation involves two levels of activity: operational, underground, where the ideologically motivated cells or individuals engage in illegal activity without any participation in or direction from an organization; and the above-ground public face (political)—focused on propaganda and the dissemination of ideology publicly.

Same, the rioters connected to the Capitol storm used social media platforms to organize and share information and resources. Researchers of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) have identified members of a dozen extremist groups, belonging to far-right wing, including adherents of QAnon conspiracy theory, the Proud Boys, the Three Percenters, the Nationalist Socialist Club(NSC-131)—a recently founded hate group known for disrupting Black Lives Matter protests, and No White Guilt, a white nationalist group blaming “anti-whiteism” for the spread of coronavirus in the U.S. The FBI arrested members of the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters in Ohio, Colorado, Indiana and Texas. Designated by the SPLC as hate groups, none of them however is treated as a domestic terrorist entity, consequently, no indictment of conspiring to mount an attack on the Capitol is raised against them. 

Far-right groups have a long history of existence. Perhaps, since the creation of the United States of America. Certainly, they have grown in number and activities in the last decade—and resurrected especially during President Trump election campaign and following his tenure in the White House. If it weren’t for Trump, I would never have heard about KKK (Ku Klux Klan), for example. Or QAnon, or Antifa (left-wing), which he brought into conversation over and over. 

As of profilisation, the far-right, according to Pitcavage, a historian with expertise on domestic terrorism and right-wing extremism, consists of two ideological strains: white supremacy and nativism—that solidified in the early-to mid-19th century—becoming staples of the far-right to this day. By late 1800, the far-right expanded with extreme hostility to socialism and communism and ideological anti-Semitism—four belief systems dominating for most of the 20th century, and complemented by another segment, anti-government extremism, after the end of the Cold War—with white supremacy and anti-communist extremism constituting its most important pillars. “Today, traditional white supremacists are still primarily represented by Ku Klux Klan groups, though these have been in decline, as well as other groups such as the Council of Conservative Citizens and the neo-Confederate League of the South,” writes Pitcavage. Since 1866, KKK has undertaken three distinctive and sustained campaigns of terrorism, occurring between 1866 and 1871, between 1915 and 1928, and roughly 1954 to the mid-1960s. Following the Oklahoma City bombing, meanwhile, race-based hate groups experienced a dramatic and steady resurgence, including KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, and Neo-Confederate organizations, exploding from 241 in 1996 to over 750 by 2006.

QAnon conspiracy theory surfaced in October 2017 with a series of cryptic messages unleashed by a user calling themselves Q, dropping as of 2020 over 4,000 posts. Designated by the FBI as a “domestic terror threat for its conspiracy theories,” QAnon claims that an elite group of child-trafficking paedophiles have been ruling the world for a number of decades and President Trump has a secret plan to bring this group to justice. QAnon activities spiked in March 2020 when the group spread conspiracies regarding COVID-19, anti-vaccine, anti-5G, anti-semitic and anti-migrant tropes. Unfortunately, many Americans tend to believe their conspiracies, including politicians—among those—14 congressional candidates who run for the-2020 election. The Republican Rep., Marjorie Taylor Greene (GA), for example, has been recently stripped from the House committees’ assignment due to her support for the QAnon conspiracy theory.

The Oath Keepers is an anti-government, pro-gun militia composed largely of former law enforcement and military veterans. They believe that the federal government has been co-opted by a shadowy conspiracy that is trying to strip American citizens of their rights. Three Percenters is an anti-government group with its name referring to the purported 3% of the American colonial population that rose up to fight the British Army in the Revolution.

Diary in the Time of Coronavirus COVID-19: Freedom, Freedom II (VI)

Sebahate J. Shala

WHEN all this is over, I will go out and celebrate freedom. Freedom from fear.  Freedom II. I will honor it. I will appreciate it. I will cherish it. I will savor it. I will hold it dearly. I will enjoy the beauty of simple things and do things I haven’t done before. Stare at the sun. Look the stillness of the river. Waves of the sea. Smell the cherry blossom trees. The scent of the flower. Take pleasure in Mother Nature. And walk, walk, walk, walk throughout New York City. Enjoy its beautifulness. Its noisiness. Its crowdedness. Then close my eyes. Jump. Open my arms. And scream: “I Am Free. I Am Free. I Am Free.”

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

I AM the oldest child of eleven children of father Jahir and mother Naza—born two years after Kosovo was granted autonomy (1974). I grew up with images showing demonstrations of Albanians demanding Kosovo be a republic within former Yugoslavia (1981). I watched on the TV the revocation of Kosovo autonomy in 1989. As a teenager, I marched in rallies and protests to oppose Serbia violent campaign against ethnic Albanians launched in 1990s. I witnessed war in my early adulthood. The killing of my sister and thousands of Albanians. And breathed freedom in summer 1999. And, I experienced the declaration of Kosovo independence in 2008. All these in thirty-two years life. Feels like a century.

I AM a child who lived the darkest and the brightest moments that its homeland went through—from oppression to war to liberation to independence. I belong to the most unfortunate and the luckiest generation of the nation. I had seen demonstrations, imprisonments, raids, beatings, terror, tortures, wounding, slaughtering, massacres, and killings. I have lived enough as to tell.           

I ALWAYS dreamt about freedom. Freedom from fear. Freedom from slavery. Freedom from political oppression. Freedom from Serbia. Freedom for the sake of Freedom. I imagined the day when we, Albanians, would be free and independent as all other people in the planet. The day when we would attain our political and social rights. The day when we would regain our personal freedoms and liberties, we would be free to express our opinions, our thoughts, to assemble, and to move freely throughout the country without being threatened for life. I imagined that day every day.

I IMAGINED the day when my father would go to work without fear he might be arrested, beaten or tortured just because he sought his political and social rights be protected as guaranteed by the Constitution. That my uncle wouldn’t be jailed just for demanding Kosovo be a republic equal to other federal units. I imagined the day when my sister and I would go to school without fearing we would be stopped, controlled, groped and physically abused by the police. I imagined the day when all people in the world would be free. Free from fear. I imagined that day every day.         

I WOULD wake up and sleep thinking of freedom. Especially during the war. “God, when we’re going to be free. When we’re going to be free from Serbia. When this war will be over. I want to be free. I want to be free.” Freedom became an obsession. A distant dream. An unreachable goal. Unattainable. Untouchable. The world was too busy to hear my plea, my call, my quest for freedom. 

I SHOULDN’T have been angry why the world abandoned us while our fellows at the other side didn’t solidarize with us. Not far from the war zone where people were dying and fighting for their lives, 47 kilometers away in the capital city of Prishtina, our compatriots were doing just fine. Like nothing was going on in the other part of Kosovo, Drenica region. Crowds in cafeteria. Laughing. Talking. Listening music. A different world. Two different realties. We lived in separate realities. It was painful. Unfair.

I KEPT thinking and questioning and wondering why we, Albanians, were being denied freedom while others not. Why we, Albanians, were suffering from repression and violence? Why we were living under the fear and terror just because we were Albanians. Why we were always on the run? Out of our houses. Hiding in the mountain. In the forest. In the valleys. Why we, Albanians, were in war?  

THERE is nothing worse than remembering freedom in slavery. Nothing more painful than remembering happiness in sadness. Nothing more distressing and tormenting than running out of your houses and hiding in the mountains yet and over again. Nothing more painful than dreaming about freedom and wake up in captivity. Nothing more than…

Freedom…

ABRAHAM Lincoln, the 16th president, abolished slavery. Woodrow Wilson, the 28th, proposed the right to national self-determination. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 32nd, introduced Four Freedoms: “The fourth is freedom from fear […] means […] that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.” Martin Luther King, Jr. had a dream: to attain freedom, justice and equality in America—not only for Black people but for all Americans. These are the dreams rooted in the American dream. I have a dream that one day…

“IN the truest sense,” freedom, as Roosevelt said, “cannot be bestowed; it must be achieved.” For to be free, according to Nelson Mandela, is not merely to cast off one’s chains but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others. For Bob Marley, it’s “better to die fighting for freedom then be a prisoner all the days of your life.” Freedom.

END

 

Diary in the Time of Coronavirus COVID-19: Falling in Love, in Quarantine (V)

Sebahate J. Shala

THAYNE and Riley would have forever continued their Friday nights phone conversations if it wasn’t for kidnapping of his sister and her temporary suspension for secretly using government resources to find her long-time missing sister. He, a Navy SEAL. She, an FBI profiler. They join forces to fight an increasingly ruthless adversary who had abducted their sisters just to revealing that the kidnaper was the donator father of 23 children, including Madison and Cheyenne (Forgotten Secrets, Perini).

Samantha and Ethan would have never met and fell head over heels in love if the killer of her brother hadn’t—after eighteen years—shown up, chasing and locking them in a school lab in attempt to keep an ugly secret hidden. The chemistry teacher and the child therapist were both working with her student, Thomas. As the horror of the past unveils, putting their relationship and life in danger, they come together to unravelling the deadly secrets of Hidden Falls, Oregon, find the real killer, and restore justice for Seth, and Parker and McClain families (Repressed, Naughton).

Alec and Reagan would still have lived in separation hadn’t the hospital called them to check if a four-year-old girl found in the park was their missing daughter. Two journalists reunite to uncover the truth about Emma who was kidnapped in a park when she was only one-year-old. In the road of finding her, they discover a chain of crime involving child abduction and trafficking linked to politics and charities, and along the way with Harper and Rusty, the newly lovers, they destroy the largest network of crime in Portland, Oregon, including human and sex trafficking, kidnapping and murder (Gone; Unspeakable, Naughton).

Antony and I would have never started our long phone conversations, open up and unfold our feelings toward each other if it wasn’t for the Coronavirus pandemic crisis, Covid-19. I’m in love with Antony. I’m having a phone relationship. While in quarantine.……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

THEY say, LOVE makes miracles. It comes in the time of crisis. In war. In collective fear and distress. In a moment of loss. In grief and despair. Hemingway fell passionately in love with Agnes during the World War I, following his wounding in fight against the enemy in Italy (In Love and War, Villard and Nagel). Florentino and Fermina secretly loved each other and sent letters via telegraph in a time when the Americas was struggling against the fifth pandemic of cholera. Fifty years, nine months, and four days after he first declared his love for Fermina, Florentino will do so again. “I have waited for this opportunity to repeat my vow of eternal fidelity and love.” (Love in the Time of Cholera, Marquez) Romeo of the Montague fell instantly in love with Juliet of the Capulet, and married her in secret though their powerful families were in an age-old vendetta which erupted in bloodshed (Romeo and Juliet, Shakespeare).

Love in the Time of Coronavirus

He is nice and kind, passionate, loving, and respectful. He is someone any woman could dream for. He cares about me. He supports me. He respects me. He makes me feel precious. So special. It melts my heart when he greets, “Hey gorgeous,” “Hi sweetie,” “Good morning sunshine.” He puts his heart out there. In everything. He is real. I can hardly wait to get back to normal and see him again. Hug him. Hold him tight. Kiss him hard. Love him passionately. And Say, I Love You Antony!

I met Antony six months ago when I got a temporary assignment in a luxury company. Charming. Fancy. Hard-working. Dedicated. On top of duty. We were attracted to each other, or I felt so. What I know, for sure, however, is that I wanted to be close to him. Every minute. Every second. When he was around, I was happy and enthusiastic. When he wasn’t, I became sad and bored. I felt like I was missing something. “Sebi, can you please help me because you bring my eyes,” he would say occasionally. Yet, it was too early to understand what was going on with me. Eventually, I figured it out on my very last day at work. When I ended the assignment, I was chronically sad, bored and unhappy. Not sure if that was because of the job or because of him? Or both?

While at work we would message each other, share ideas, books and articles. Talked a lot. Nevertheless, he would never reach me out after I left job except for texting back when I shared some articles of mine. That was it. A feeling like he didn’t wish to continue the conversation. Next two attempts—without success: One day I visited at work. He doesn’t follow up thereafter. I do. I make another try before we locked home. His message is confusing. Needed help to decode. It came too late. Had already decided not to visit him. A part of me, though, had been waiting all day that day for his text message. Still, I don’t want to continue my unilateral actions anymore. I go home. I gave up trying. I, definitely, gave up on him. I feel sad. I wanna cry. I have strong headache. Can’t sleep.

Last week of March, days after being quarantined, I wrote an article which I wanted to share with him. Then, I said: “No, I’m not gonna send it. No, I’m not gonna do it again. Why should I do it?” While I kept saying that, I ended up doing it. Unconsciously. He called me right after but I was too scared to answer. Ohhhh. My heart was beating fast. He asks to call him back. I did it later after taking the courage to do so. Uhhhh. First day—two hours. Next day—an hour and a half. The following—more than an hour. The fourth—the same. Energy. Connection. Passion. And the story goes on.

I became addicted to his calls. He would say some words indirectly, making me think he has feelings for me. One day he didn’t call, I got angry. Annoyed. I was missing him already. “If I don’t talk to you tonight, then I can’t sleep,” I texted. He called me. It was his birthday. After 9 days phone talking, I opened up and told him about everything. He explained the reason of his inaction, which was my explanation, too, and said he felt the same for me. The rest is history.

Antony has been a great help since the crisis unfolded, supporting me, offering his help. He was caring and supportive especially during those days when I was weak, apathic and depressive, fearing I had contracted the virus. “I just didn’t want you to think that you are alone,” he said. He was pushing and motivating to get back to writing. He is determined and persistent. He keeps pushing me to start writing a book about war in Kosovo. I already have an idea.

Love is the Answer…

I READ once that, to love someone is a wonderful feeling, but to love and be loved is the best feeling ever. “At the touch of love,” Plato said, “everyone becomes a poet.” “Love loves to love love,” Joyce wrote at Ulysses. For Ray Bradbury, “Love is the answer to everything. It’s the only reason to do anything.”

I had always underestimated love. The power of love. Last fall, I had a professional setback. I lost track. Had no strength to start over. In order to overcome the situation, I started reading books—about love. They helped me rise again. They bring me back my strength. They made me more human, more sensitive and touching. They made me love. And love—the love. They taught me one thing that: When One Day We All Die, The Only Thing We Remember Is Love. That time helped me learn something I should have learned long time ago. I, finally, admitted: That love exists. That love is real. That love is the best feeling ever. That love makes us forget everything. That, at the end, all is about love.

Next: Diary in the Time of Coronavirus COVID-19: Freedom, Freedom II (VI)

Diary in the Time of Coronavirus Covid-19: New Normalcy, Socializing in Distance (IV)

Sebahate J. Shala

THERE is always something good coming out of something bad. The good thing that came out of this crisis is turning to each other. To our families. To our beloved. To our friends. To the forgotten people. To the forgotten things. To simple things we neglected and unappreciated. To simple life we ignored and underestimated. We turned to ourselves. And, finally, we let the planet Earth breathe.

Isolation and social distance have become a new normalcy. As a result, people have found new, creative ways of communication. Clapping. Singing. Chanting. Cheering. Waving their hands. Chatting through videos. Going in a virtual date. Girls night out. Every day at 10:20 AM, for example, my brother Doni, shows up at our nephews’ building, Peon and Liri, to say hello and wave hands with them. My little munchkins go out in their balcony and wave him back. Ritual lasts 5 minutes. Then, Doni goes back to do what he has to for the day. He has 85 minutes only—assigned from the Government as part of the restriction measures. Use it for good!

To help people be together while physically apart, Facebook launched a Messenger apps enabling group video calls and messages. Mimi Zhu, a queer Chinese-Australian-Brooklyn-based artist created a Communion group, encouraging people to connect through virtual communication, streaming and broadcasting, calling loved ones, writing virtual love letters, solidarizing. Pop singer Britney Spears supported the cause, sharing Zhu’s message on Instagram: “We will feed each other, re-distribute wealth, strike. Communion moves beyond walls.” Heart in the Window and A World of Hearts invite their members to decorate their windows with cut out hearts. In Kosovo, people share favorite books and songs, as well as old pictures of themselves. A sense of being together while alone.

I have changed a lot, for good. I have become a socializer. I was an asocial person before. Phone conversation, a rare thing, now has become a routine. In New York, talking on the phone is a LUXURY we can’t AFFORD. Because of dynamism and individualism. We are given this luxury now. I communicate with a number of friends and colleagues, Albanians and Americans, in New York and D.C., and back home in Kosovo. We talk every day, share our insights, news articles and videos, offer help and discuss issues regarding government programs. We try to avoid conversation on Covid-19.

I Am Grateful to have them in my life. I Am Forever Thankful to them for taking care of me during this difficult time, reaching out and checking on me every day and offering their help about whatever, knowing that I’m alone here. I am forever thankful for calling, texting and encouraging me to write at a time when I wasn’t feeling well physically and emotionally, at a moment when I was scared that I might have contracted the virus due to some symptoms I showed, and when I was terrified figuring out I was exposed to the virus. Thanks to my family, especially to my dad. Thanks to my girlfriend, Elle, for calling me during those days and ever since this crisis unfolded. I Am Forever Thankful to All of Them.

In order to connect, solidarize and be informed on the ongoing crisis and political developments in Kosovo, I turned to social media, Facebook. I was more present, more engaging. I felt closer to my fellows. But while social media and Covid-19 crisis have helped others to unify, solidarize and love each other, in Kosovo, it has had the opposite effect. Politics and social media have polarized the society. People spread hate instead of love. They are divided rather than getting united. They offend instead of respecting each other. They don’t respect others’ right to freedom of expression. What I’ve seen during this time is hatred, division, offenses. How come Kosovo Albanians hate each other this much?! Where is this hate coming from? Why people spread negative energy? Maybe because we are a post-traumatic society, never psychologically treated. Yet, unjustifiable. I called for love against hate. I called for social and political unity. I called for help and respect toward each other.   

My compatriots use this time to love each other. There will never be a time like this again to spent with each other and do things we couldn’t, a friend of mine says. Don’t take your family for granted. Cherish and appreciate time with them. Think that some people don’t have family, or others, like me, all what they want is to be with the family right now. As Prince EA says in a video: “Use this tragedy to understand that what we really ever had in this world is each other, to understand what’s important to us…tell someone you care for them, that you cherish and will always be there for them, and the only vaccine for the F-Virus and all other viruses is LOVE.” Another video expresses gratitude to Coronavirus “for making us appreciate the luxury of life…abundance of products, freedom, health…make use see simple things… reevaluate our lives…show unity, and finally make us understand that we are all connected.” Thank you, Coronavirus!  

Mental Health Issues, Domestic Violence…

A FRIEND says she’s having anxiety and nightmares and is sleeping a lot. I, myself, moved from sleeplessness to apathy to sleeping to depression. I read news saying that people are experiencing a dip in mental well-being. Stress, depression and anxiety sparked as a result of social separation, isolation, uncertainty on the duration of pandemic, inconsistency and contradictory information on virus from authorities, fear of being infected, economic crisis, and uncertainty about the future. Millions of Americans lost jobs in the first three weeks. Unemployment surged at 20%. Worrying.

According to CDC, fear and anxiety about the disease can be overwhelming causing strong emotions. “Shortage of resources” and “imposition of unfamiliar public health measures that infringe on personal freedoms” are likely to increase emotional distress, psychiatry professors Betty Pfefferbaum and Carol S. North wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine. “Social distancing […] is especially taking toll on people who are isolated at home alone. Loneliness can be a big source of stress,” says Lisa Meredith, a senior behavioral scientist. Take breaks from news. Take care of your body. Take deep breaths. Meditate, exercise. Sleep a lot. Eat healthy and well-balanced meals. Do activities you enjoy. Connect with others. These are CDC recommendations. Apply them!

In Kosovo, domestic violence has increased. I suggested my sister, Besa, a psychologist, to voluntarily offer help to those who have mental issues. Same goes for others. There is a hotline in Kosovo police, too. Volunteering, altruism and solidarity tell a lot who you are as a person. Our good and humanity come into surface in extraordinary situations. In ordinary situations, we all are normal. We should go beyond ourselves to help others. Communication is key. Call someone. Send a text. Write a letter. Say I Love You. Talk to someone about your health issues. Seek help. Don’t be ashamed. We are humans. We are vulnerable. We have mental problems.

Next: Diary in the Time of Coronavirus COVID-19: Falling in Love, in Quarantine (V)

Diary in the Time of Coronavirus: Terrified, COVID is in the House (III)

Sebahate J. Shala

I HAVE been exposed. Virus is here. In the house. We live under the same roof. Only walls separate us. All of this time I was being protected from the outside world while it turned out the virus was here, just inside the house. Oh God. I suspected because he, the head of the household, was the last one to stop working: our last day was Monday, respectively Tuesday, his was Thursday, March 19. I was like, “Why is he still working, come on?”

15 mins to midnight. March 29. Prepare to sleep. I hear him coughing in the bathroom, so hard, so bad, with mucus, having difficulty breathing, shortness of breath. I am terrified. “Virus is here, Covid-19 is in our apartment? OMG, where I’m going to hide now?” Got panicked. I lock the door to prevent virus from entering in my room. I want to jump out of window. Then I remember, oh virus is outside, too. I’m at risk inside and out. “Where I’m going to go now?”—I scream. You have no place to go, baby. You have no place to go. The feeling that virus was inside the walls terrified me. God, I want to disappear. I WANT. TO. DIE. NOW.

I text some friends thinking to seek refuge. I told one of them. We talk should I go to a girlfriend in Brooklyn. Then, I say “No. I can’t go there. I can’t risk other people life.” I may be charged for premeditated murder. He says, “Don’t tell her!” Worse, I am guilty for hiding the crime. I decide to stay in my room. It’s safer to stay home than going elsewhere. Slept three hours that night. Woke up at 5:00 AM. Called my father and told him. “Don’t be scared, don’t be scared daddy’s girl. You weren’t scared in the war, now you are scared from a virus?! It’s just a flu.” I say: “I wish I were there daddy. I wish I were home with you now!” I am alone here. Have no one to take care of, if something happens. I may die alone.

Locked in my room all day. Drank only a coffee in the morning. Didn’t eat, didn’t drink, no bathroom, no kitchen. In bed all day. I must have napped for an hour or so when I heard his daughter, a college student, crying and crying, maybe for hours, until they took him to the hospital late afternoon. Then, we all got relieved. I ate, showered, and slept well for the first time in more than two weeks. It was a nightmare. A bad dream.

Next morning, I felt nothing whatsoever. Calm. Quiet. Silence after storm. No fear. Perhaps fear reached its culmination the night before, the peak, so I feel nothing now. Maybe something broke inside me that night. Or I lost the reason. Whatever it was, it had impact on me. Just the thinking that virus was here and I didn’t have any place to hide or go, made me crazy. That explains why in the next five-six days, I ended up in bed: weak not extremely fatigue as early signs, lost appetite and taste for food, my mood dramatically changed. No fever, light temperature and a feeling like something stuck in my throat. I slept almost all day every day. Depressive.   

A Surprise Attack: COVID Backed-Off

NEVER figured out whether I had contracted the virus or not. I had some interactions with the infected days earlier. I encountered with him in the hallway when sick. We share kitchen and bathroom, as well. The probability of having been infected is high. His son tells me he developed pneumonia. I reached out my health insurance and NY Health Department for testing right away. They recommended to call Coronavirus hotline. I did. Nobody ever called. Even if they did, I wouldn’t go because it might be long waiting in the hallway. Also, I can get the virus while in and out of the hospital. In an order issued on March 20, NYC government suggests people who have mild symptoms to stay home. I decided to wait until I develop further symptoms.

My father makes joke with me, saying that I passed it easily. “No, No. No. Don’t say it. I didn’t get the virus. No.” A friend of mine says whatever it was you beat it. The feeling that I might have had it, makes me nuts. My sister hint at stigma. She heard people hesitating to go to hospital even when sick, fearing of being isolated or stigmatized. That’s not the case for me, though. It is because, I think about myself as someone who is so strong as no virus or disease could ever attack or beat. I feel I am invincible, unbeatable. That’s why I hadn’t bought masks, alcohol, and pills. I didn’t want to think I’m going to be attacked.

Days earlier, on March 28, though, I woke up at 2:00 AM as a result of fever and a terrible headache. My head was burning. Took a pill. Couldn’t sleep. I suspected I was attacked by virus. I thought to call 911 in the morning. While in fervor and rambling, I developed some thoughts and posted on social media, reading as below: “I am physically and psychically prepared to fight Covid-19. I have suspicions that the enemy forces (the virus) have illegally entered in my body, violating physical integrity and sovereignty—guaranteed under the law on the functioning and protection of organism. I’m planning to launch a preemptive strike as a surprise attack to take advantage against virus and as an act on self-defense by using headache and fever as war rationales. Based on my anticipation, the danger from an attack is imminent. I have to make sure though that my fear is just and rational. Cause—just. War—just. Victory—inevitable.” Luckily, when I woke up in the morning, everything was gone. After reading post, my family and friends here and in Kosovo reached me out, recommending to call 911, schedule for testing and take vitamin C. Did virus attack me? Did I scare it? I don’t know.

New Life: Living Under the Roof With Covid-19 

WE’RE ISOLATED. It’s only me and his son moving around. He prepares food for his mother and sister. I do for myself. We set new rules: use gloves and masks within house, bathroom and toilet schedule—½ hours difference when shower, 30 min when using toilet. We disinfect before and after use. Communicate via a group chat. In the meantime, we shared some recipes that helped us a lot.

He is home after 7 days in the hospital. After nine days isolated in his room, he joined the family, following his doctor instruction. 3 days home+7 in the hospital+9 home isolation=19 days+incubation between 5 to 14 days. 1 month in total. The presence of virus in the house became a normalcy. The situation looks much better than I thought. Who would have thought that I would share the same roof with Covid-19?! This means, I haven’t surrendered nor succumbed to virus, to fear.

Next: Diary in the Time of Coronavirus Covid-19: New Normalcy, Socializing in Distance (IV)

 

 

Diary in the Time of Coronavirus COVID-19: Fear (II)

Sebahate J. Shala

IT’S the thirteenth day of March. Fear. Fear from the unknown. Fear from the invisible enemy. They say there is a killer out there. It’s merciless. Non-discriminatory in terms of political, economic and social status, and in relation to age and geographic position. It can attack or kill anyone, be rich or poor, celebrity or random, politician, president, or king. Oh, that’s a consolation for me as a random, not poor, or maybe?!

Never have I ever feared this much in my life. Not even during the war in Kosovo. I, actually, had no fear then. Strangely! Unusually! As someone who witnessed war first-hand, this looks like a war. Only now the enemy is invisible. It can be anywhere. The virus, according to experts, spreads fast and is highly contagious. A lawyer in New York infected 23 persons in 10 days. Four family members died in a week in New Jersey. “It is surreal,” said to CNN Elizabeth Fusco who lost her mother, two brothers and a sister. The number of confirmed cases hits 500 in U.S. Painful. Scary.

New York will soon go shutdown. America, too. This could be my last week at work. Perhaps the last day. Nobody knows what is going to happen tomorrow? That’s the talk we’ve had with friends and colleagues in the last two weeks. Events are canceled, schools are closed, borders with Europe, now the epicenter of virus, too. Italy issued a lockdown to quarantine. Spain hits nearly 2,000 new cases. Iran records 1,365 in 24 hours. Kosovo confirms the first case. WHO declares the Covid-19 outbreak “pandemic.” The world is alarmed.

We are waiting for President to tell US next steps. In a moment, he addresses the nation. Stoned, our eyes are on TV. America goes in a state of national emergency. We go silent. My heart beats fast. Sadness.  

Precaution Measures, Mobilization, Action…

1st Week: The following week, Wednesday March 18, I’m locked. Home. Businesses, except supermarkets and pharmacies, are closed. The stay-home-order enforces on Saturday, 21st. Everybody is out for food. There is a shortage in Manhattanville. In Queens, I am told, shelves were emptied two weeks ago. Bronx the same. One man said he came from Times Square to buy food in 125 St., West Harlem. Gloves, masks, alcohol, hands sanitizer, Vitamin C and Tylenol out of stock. Oh, come on, am I living in the most powerful and the richest country in the world? How come United States was this unprepared? Unbelievable. Unjustifiable. Unfair. Disproportional Distribution. I Am Panicked.

Experts say U.S. is behind—at least two weeks—in taking precautionary measures, way behind in conducting tests. Hospitals are short of ventilators, masks, beds, and other essential stuff. New York, home to about 20 million people, and hotspot of coronavirus, has 23,000 beds only or 6.4 beds per 1,000 people. In a matter of days, U.S. surpasses 3,000. In the worst scenario, America, as Dr. Anthony Fauci predicts, may see between 1.5 to 2 millions infected people, between 150,000 and 200,000 deaths. Trump made a dramatic shift in his approach toward crisis. Too late!

2nd Week: Government order is not respected in my area. I hear and see pictures showing New York City almost empty. In West Harlem, life looks normal: people staying or hanging around for nothing, without masks, supermarkets full of folks, no social distancing in line. I find myself running away of people, jumping or walking onto the vehicles’ lane, fearing of being contracted. Almost hit a pole in the street one day. That is, New York, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, is the most crowded city in U.S. with 28,000 residents per square mile, San Francisco next with 17,000. Researchers say virus can stay on air before it jumps to humans, as well as in surface and plastics between 4 to 72 hours. My fear is rational.

Outdoors, I wear one pair of clothes: coat, hat, gloves and mask. Then, I remove them, put in a plastic bag, and shower. When coming back home, my body burns, is rash and itchy. Psychological war. Media effect. Is the threat actual or is caused by the media? Friends tell me they almost had panic attack when out. Others tend to underestimate the threat. They believe the virus is man-made. Perhaps is made in a China lab. They share a book predicting this. Or maybe, deep state is involved, as Trump believes. Of course, all of this comes from those who believe in conspiracy theories, those who live in the FOX News reality. I challenge them with arguments. VOX publishes a research debunking the conspiracies.         

My physical and psychological state has deteriorated due to a combination of many factors: staying home, worries about my family in Kosovo, coronavirus and political crisis there, government collapse, polarizations, social hatred and divisions, offenses against each-other expressed in social media. Definitely, not healthy. And, because I am exposed to the virus. Weakness. Depressive. Chills. Throat Pain.  

3rd Week: Outside, the situation is different from inside surrounded by the news. Now many people wear masks and supermarkets have reinforced precautionary measures. When I go to the park, though, I see a lot of people, running, walking, relaxing, playing with kids. Most of them without masks. Weaponized, I look weird with coat, masks, gloves and two hats. Everyone else seems normal. Are we living in the same realities? Either I am overestimating the threat or they are underestimating it? I’m following the government instructions, suggesting everyone wearing masks outside, since, as Dr. Fauci said, 20% of infected people show no symptoms at all, thus threatening others. Covid-19, experts say, is discriminatory in terms of behavior and manifestation, as well. So, I’m OK. People in the park aren’t. My fear is rational.

4th Week: I usually buy food in a week or 10 days. Now almost everyone is masked. Social distance OK: 2-3 people go inside the store, and as they go out, others go in. In NYC, this happened in the first week, I am told. In 125 St., on the second, as I have seen. I feel much better physically and mentally. I got my strength back. I stopped reading the news. No social media. I’m back to normalcy, eating, sleeping, working, exercising. As New York went from state of emergency to stay-home-order to lockdown to quarantine, I, too, went from fear and excessive emotions to distress, appetite loss and sleeplessness to weakness, boredom and depression.

New York Times says people will never be as they were before Covid-19. Dr. Fauci divides life as pre and post-Coronavirus, suggesting that it (life) will never be the same as pre-Coronavirus. I know that. I feel that. I agree: We will never be the same as we were before this, but one thing I know for sure that, we will come much stronger and much better people out of this.

Next: Diary in the Time of Coronavirus: Terrified, COVID is in the House (III)