Biased Justice: A Perpetuating Case Against Kosovo

International justice mechanisms in Kosovo are righteously perceived—and as the data shows—as biased, directed primarily against Kosovo Liberation Army in their efforts to examine war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo. UNMIK and EULEX issued 48 indictments, 16 against Albanians, 13 against Serbs and four indictments against Montenegrins, indicted 61 Albanians and 44 Serbs, and convicted 34 Albanians as opposed to four Serbs and one Montenegrin. And, while the Specialized Chambers of Kosovo in The Hague begins the trial against the former heads of state, the vast majority of mass murders—out of an estimated 186 mass murders committed in Kosovo—remain unresolved.

AS KOSOVO and Serbia make the final struggles to normalize their neighborly-relations, many Albanians criticize Prime Minister Albin Kurti for his willingness to accept the EU Proposal-Agreement—through which—Kosovo agrees to “overcome the legacy of the past,” giving up her quest to sue Serbia in an international tribunal. If Serbia accepts—and fully agrees—to implement the proposal, it would further advance toward the EU membership—without resolving thousands of internationally recognized crimes perpetrated by Milosevic regime in Kosovo (and in the territory of former Yugoslavia), without apologizing and without providing remedies and reparation measures to victims and the affiliated, and without addressing the issue of the missing persons from the war. As of today, 1,617 individuals, predominantly Albanians, are unaccounted for—alongside with 9,876 belonging to other nationalities—who disappeared during or as a result of wars in the region. The resolution of the missing persons’ whereabouts is determinant for achieving peace and reconciliation with Serbia, which families are NOT willing and ready for—until they receive truth and justice for each and every one. Of their beloved. Ultimately.

The overwhelming majority of mass murders, on the other hand, remain unresolved. None of the mass murders out of an estimated 186 mass murders carried out in Kosovo, except for mass murder in Krushe e Vogel and Recak, had been investigated or tried by international justice mechanisms in Kosovo, UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) and EULEX (EU Mission of Rule of Law). None of them except for Krusha e Vogel, Izbica and Meja, were included in the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) indictments against Milosevic et al. and Milutinovic et al., nor were they investigated or tried by Serbia Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor (OWCP). In most cases, such as the mass murder of Meja and Korenica, the authors of crimes, as BIRN’s Serbeze Haxhiaj revealed, are known to local people and live free in Serbia, Montenegro or Slovenia; they never been prosecuted despite the existing evidence and the witnesses’ testimonies submitted to the ICTY. Some of the survivors have been waiting for 20 years, with some even dying, without having a chance to testify to the court,meaning, as Haxhiaj suggests, that the perpetrators are unlikely to ever face justice.

25 years since the mass murder of Qirez and Likoshan and the mass murder of Jashari family in Prekaz i Ulët, meanwhile, no one has ever been investigated or tried for these crimes—both constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law. UNMIK and EULEX never initiated an investigation nor did thesecases appear in the ICTY’s indictment against Milosevic et al. and Milutinovic et al., let alone being investigated or tried by Serbia justice institutions. And, while the murder of Jashari family is under the investigation of Kosovo Special Prosecution Office, Hamdi Sejdiu’s quest for justice (for his four brothers tortured and executed through February 28—March 1st, 1998, in Qirez) has been turned down by three instances of justice on the grounds that Kosovo’s judicial institutions have no power to bring another state, Serbia, to the court.

International transitional justice mechanisms have collectively failed to prosecute and adjudicate war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo. Serbia, from its part, has made little or no progress to addressing impunity and bringing to justice suspects of criminal responsibility. Accountability, truth and justice remain ideals rather than reality in the region, BIRN concludes in a book, After the ICTY: Accountability, Truth and Justice in the Former Yugoslavia, published in 2020. Regional cooperation is at its lowest level in years. There is a stagnation and a significant fall in the number of new cases launched. No charges involving complex cases and high-level perpetrators—with only a few middle-to-high-ranking officers indicted so far. The number of indictments, as Humanitarian Law Center in Serbia (HLCS) suggests, has continued to decline: fewer suspects indicted and fewer victims named (2019). The EU Commission criticized Serbia for “weak records,” blaming the government for showing “no genuine commitment to investigating and adjudicating war crimes cases,” particularly complex and high-ranking officials cases, while demanding to prioritize these cases and provide a clear legal approach to resolving the issue of command responsibility.

Whereas the practice of impunity in Serbia prevails, Kosovo, on the other side, was forced to set up the Specialist Chambers, the fourth international transitional justice mechanism to prosecute and adjudicate war and post-war crimes, and the first hybrid court”directed primarily, although not explicitly stated, against one militarized ethnic group,” the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). And whilst, the former President of Kosovo Hashim Thaci, the first sitting head of state indicted from a hybrid court, awaits the beginning of the trail in Specialist Chambers in The Hague, Serbia high rank perpetrators walk free—without being disturbed from justice. Created under the international pressure to deal with the supposedly KLA unpunishable crimes, the Specialist Chambers is viewed by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs more as a political rather than a legitimate instrument of justice; a mechanism, which will, most likely, deal with the same set of crimes and defendants, suggesting, as some authors argue, that international community is willing to create as many judicial mechanisms as necessary to achieve its anticipated results—regardless of the costs—and at the expense of Kosovar people needs and wants.

In Numbers: The Indicted and the Convicted Albanian vs. Serbian Defendants

“…Serbian regular forces kidnapped a girl from a nearby town in Suva Reka, they raped her and cut her throat and left her naked in the tall grass to die. Barbarities of this kind have been ongoing on for thousands of years, but it was not until this century that a mechanized army carried out such crimes in the service of its government. That is genocide; the rest is just violence. And, whenever I read stories of Albanian atrocities that confuse the two, I think about that girl in Suva Reka and all that it took to bring about her death.” Sebastian Junger, Lives; A Different Kind of Killing, New York Times, February 27, 2000.

THE INTERNATIONAL community at large and the international transitional justice mechanisms in Kosovo in particular are righteously perceived by ethnic Albanians—and as the data shows—as biased, directed primarily against Kosovo Liberation Army in their efforts to examine war crimes and crimes against humanity inKosovo, demonstrating a tendency to balance the victim with the perpetrator. Based on the existing data, the number of Albanians/KLA members prosecuted, tried and convicted by UNMIK and EULEX is higher comparable to Serbs/members of armed forces, considering the balance of forces and the magnitude of crimes committed by Serbia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) forces versus the KLA members. (The number of convicted Albanian and Serbian defendants from the ICTY is equal: five from each side out of 14 persons indicted.) Needless to say, the length of sentences against Albanian defendants are higher than those against Serbs.

The ICTY sentenced between 15 to 22 years in prison the Serbia high-ranked war criminals—Milosevic’s immediate subordinates, Sainovic, Pavkovic, Lukic, Ojdanic and Lazarevic, for committing systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo, whereas the Specialist Chambers sentenced Salih Mustafa, a KLA senior official, to 26 years in prison for torture of at least six detainees and the murder of one prisoner.

According to Humanitarian Law Center in Kosovo (HLCK), UNMIK and EULEX filed 48 indictments throughout 1999-2018against 111 individuals: 25 indictments against Serbs, 19 against Albanians, three against Montenegrins and one indictment against others. UNMIK filed 10 indictments, three against three Serbs, six indictments involving 19 Albanians and one against one Montenegrin. EULEX filed 22 indictments: 10 against 11 Serb defendants, 10 against 39 Albanian defendants and two indictments against one Montenegrin and others. Overall, international justices indicted 61 Albanian defendants as opposed to 44 Serb defendants, five Montenegrins and one defendant belonging to others, convicted 34 Albanians as opposed to four Serbs and one Montenegrin (final judgements), acquitted 23 Albanians, 13 Serbs and two Montenegrins. Out of 28 suspects/persons at large, 24 are of Serbian nationality.

The data is controversial, though. UNMIK, as Amnesty International reported, completed just over 40 war crime casesagainst 37 individuals, leaving behind a backlog of 1,187 cases to its successor, EULEX. Of these cases, 21 were brought by Albanian justice authorities against Kosovo Serbs arrested and detained for war crimes in 1999. By mid-2002, 19 of these cases were completed: the majority of defendants (Serbs) were acquitted by international panels, while the majority of subsequent cases prosecuted by UNMIK were brought against ethnic Albanians for crimes against other ethnic Albanians. In total, the UN mission, asUNMIK’s spokesperson Sanam Dolatshahi says, investigated and/or tried 18 war crimes cases. Which means an average of two cases per year.

EULEX, according to spokesperson Ioanna Lachana, issued 22 indictments, including two indictments in cooperation with local prosecutors, and convicted 38 out of 41 defendants convicted for war crimes in Kosovo. An average of two cases per year. When EULEX ended its mandate in June 2018, it handed over to Special Prosecutor of Kosovo 434 war crime police case files, including missing persons’ case files, judicial case files and more than 1.400 prosecutorial case files. Prosecutors of Kosovo, on the other hand, filed 16 indictments: 11 against 29 Serbs and one indictment each against one Albanian and three Montenegrins. In the last two years, local prosecutors have been dealing with 14 cases against 12 defendants, and only last year, authorities arrested three persons in charge of war crimes in Kosovo.

Whilst Dolatshahi doesn’t make any comments relating to the number of cases based on the ethnicity of defendants and the smallernumber of Serb vs. Albanian defendants tried and convicted for war crimes, Lachana provides a number of reasons: the mission’s limited mandate—EULEX did not have jurisdiction to operate outside of the territory of Kosovo given that many suspects moved out when the war ended; lack of the law in absentia at the time when the mission was deployed, which prevented EULEX to proceed with war crime cases allegedly committed by individuals who were at large; and the unwillingness of Serbia institutions to cooperate with the mission to extradite Serb defendants who were born/lived in Kosovo.

In general, UNMIK and EULEX, based on the HLCK monitoring, issued 48 war crimes indictments against 111 defendants—with one final judgement by UNMIK and 22 by EULEX. To date, the international and local judges and prosecutors indicted 119 individuals, convicted 45, acquitted 41, and the process against six defendants is ongoing. As the above data illustrates, the number of Albanians/KLA members indicted and convicted supersedes the number of Serbs, members of Serbia and former Yugoslavia armed forces acting on behalf of the State, indicating that international justices in Kosovo had been biased, directed against Kosovo Albanians/the KLA members in their war crimes and crimes against humanity proceedings.

Serbia: The Culture of Impunity Prevails

IN SERBIA, on the other side, “there was negligible progress in bringing to justice” those who committed crimes illegal under international law. The highest state officials have continued to publicly challenge the judgments of the ICTY and provide support to and public space for convicted war criminals. Although the government adopted the 2016-2020 National Strategy for War Crimes Prosecution aimed at investigating and adjudicating high profile cases, no significant progress on war crimes prosecutions has been made, the HLC in Serbia found in 2019. The charges against high-level perpetrators are absent—with no indictments filed against high-ranking perpetrators so far. The EU Commission evaluated as “very weak” the 2016-National Strategy rate of implementation,demanding from Serbia to prioritize complex and high-ranking officials’ cases, as well as provide a clear legal approach to resolving the issue of command responsibility.

Based on the existing data, the OWCP has completed 52 casesagainst 212 individuals, convicting 54 defendants, including one person relating to war crimes in Kosovo (Prizren case) and acquitting 49 others. (The website of the OWCP, whose data I am referring to, is currently under maintenance). In four years of the 2016-National Strategy’s enforcement, the OWCP, according to the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Fabian Salvioli, issued 34 indictments against 45 defendants (the majority of them transferred from Bosnia and Hercegovina-BiH), and 17 indictments following the implementation of the 2021-2026 National Strategy for War Crimes Prosecution: seven in 2021 against nine defendants, of which four cases were transferred from BiH (two of them high-ranking criminals) and 10 indictments in 2022. The Higher Court rendered five judgments in 2021, convicting six defendants, while the Court of Appeals rendered six final decisions, convicting sixdefendants. No defendants were acquitted (EU Commission, 2022). In the 52 indictments of the ZPKL against 238 persons, the conviction rate was 85 percent, 94 percent of the indicted were Serbian nationals. Momentarily, Serbia has a case backlog of 1,731 pre-investigative cases.

The OWPC has been subject to pressure and political interference—criticized for inefficiency and slow progress in investigating and adjudicating war crimes. The fact that the vast majority of indictments did not result from the OWCP’s own investigation but were transferred from the BiH Judiciary, according to HLCS, is an indication of the OWCP’s inefficiency. “If the OWCP continues to work at its present speed, over the next 10-year period it will solve only an insignificant portion of war crimes cases,” concludes HLCSin its report (2019).

In four years of the 2016-National Strategy implementation, meanwhile, the OWPC, as the HLCS notices, has not issued a singleindictment relating to crimes in Kosovo and failed to conduct an adequate and effective investigation into the Landovica case. The OWCP has taken over 952 cases from the courts of general jurisdiction in Prishtina, Peje and Prizren, of which 810 are against unknown perpetrators (2018). The HLCS has—since 2013—filed nine criminal complaints for crimes committed in Kosovo but none of the suspects had been subject to OWCP investigation by the end of 2018 (2019). Since the OWCP does not have de facto jurisdiction over the territory of Kosovo, it is unable to investigate crimes and prosecute alleged perpetrators residing there.

As a matter of fact, the cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia on war crimes has stalled since May 2014, when the responsibility for war crimes investigation was transferred from EULEX to local prosecutors (HLCS, 2018). In reviewing cases relating to war crime in Kosovo, FDHK, as BIRN reports, found that the cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia on 14 war crime cases was absent. The same number of cases had been investigated by the Hague Tribunal, as well—a too small number compared to the gravity of crimes committed by Milosevic regime in Kosovo: 13,535 persons were killed, 862,979 others were forcibly deported, 6,024 were reported as missing, and supposedly 20,000 women were sexually abused.    

Police. Stop. Brutality. Against. Black. People!

2,216 Black Americans were killed by the police through 2013-2021 compared to 3,886 Whites and 1,365 Hispanics—representing the highest murder rate in the U.S. Black Americans represented 28% of people killed by the police in 2020 despite being only 13% of the U.S. population. Only in January 2020, the police killed 30 Blacks or one Black American every day. The number of Blacks killed by the police stands at higher rates than of Whites in 47 of the 50 largest American cities—with Chicago leading the list.

Sebahate J. Shala

January. 2020. Jamarri Tarver, 26, Las Vegas, NV. Tyree Davis, 25, Chicago, IL. Tina Marie Davis, 53, Spring Valley, NY.Brandon Dionte Roberts, 27, Milford, DE. Kwame Jones, 17, Jacksonville, FL. Miciah Lee, 18, Sparks, NV. Claude Washington Fain III, 47, Philadelphia, PA. Earl Facey, 37, New York, NY. Henry Isaac Jones, 47, Bainbridge, GA. Ryan Simms, 49, Miami Beach, FL. Keenan McCain, 29, Gary, IN. Albert Lee Hughes, 47, Lawrenceville, GA. Renard Antonio Daniels, 55, Cocoa, FL. Mubarak Soulemane, 19, West Haven, CT. Samuel David Mallard, 19, Powder Springs, GA. Kelvin White, 42, Chesapeake, VA. Gamel Antonio Brown, 30, Owings Mills, MD. Darius J. Tarver, 23, Denton, TX. Reginald Leon Boston Jr., 20, Jacksonville, FL. Michael J. Rivera, 32, Bloomingdale, NJ. Andrew J. Smyrna, 32, Atlanta, GA. Deandre Lee Seaborough-Patterson, 22, Savannah, GA. Marquis Golden, 29, St. Petersburg, FL. Joshua James Brown, 34, Columbus, OH. D’ovion Semaj Perkins, 19, Aurora, CO. William Howard Green Jr., 43, Marlow Heights, MD. Jaquyn O’Neill Light, 20, Graham, NC. Keith Dutree Collins, 52, Raleigh, NC. Abdirahman Salad, 15, Columbus, OH. 

[…] Breonna Taylor, 26, Louisville, KY. […] George Floyd, 46, Minneapolis, MN. 

29 Black Americans were killed by the police only in January 2020. Which means one Black every day—except on January 1st and 31st. According to CBS News list, which relies in reported and verified cases, the U.S. police killed 164 Black people through January 1—August 31, 2020—or one Black every week since January 1st, with only two states—Rhode Island and Vermont—recording zero killings during the reported period. In total, Black Americans, as Mapping Police Violence indicates, represented 28% of people killed by the police in 2020 despite being only 13% of the U.S. population. The number of Blacks killed by the police stands at higher rates than that of Whites in 47 of the 50 largest American cities—with Chicago leading the list: the Chicago police killed Black people at 20x the rate of White people per population from 2013 to 2020.

In total, 2,216 Black Americans, according to Statista Department Research, were killed by the police from 2013 to 2021 comparing to 3,886 Whites and 1,365 Hispanics. Of 1,021 persons killed in 2020, 241 were Blacks as opposed to 457 Whites and 167 Hispanics; of 1,098 people killed in 2019, 259 were Blacks, 406 Whites, 182 Hispanics and 13 Native Americans; 258 of 1,143 people killed in 2018 were Blacks; 276 in 2017 of 1,095 people killed; 279 were Blacks in 2016 of 1,071 people killed; 305 in 2015 of 1,103 people killed, 277 in 2014, respectively 291 in 2013. The rate of Black people killed by the police through 2015-2021 is much higher than any other ethnicity, standing at 36 per million for Black people, 23 per million for Hispanics and 12 per million for Whites. 

Generally, Black people, based on Mapping Police Violence data, are three times more likely to be killed by the police and 1.3 times more likely to be unarmed than the White people: 17% of unarmed Blacks, 13% of Whites, and 14.5% of unarmed Hispanics were killed by the police between 2013 and 2020. Unfortunately, the trend of fatal police shootings, as Statista Department Research suggests, is on increase—totaling at 213 Americans killed only in the first three months of 2021, 30 of whom were Black. Based on the Mapping Police Violence updated list, the police killed 352 people in 2021—in a rate similar to the past years—with only three days without having killed someone. 

In a study published last year, researchers of Yale and the University of Pennsylvania found that Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) victims, whether armed or unarmed, have significantly higher death rates compared to Whites. Analyzing 4,653 fatal shootings by the police, researchers found a small but statistically significant decline in White deaths (about 1%) but no significant change in deaths for BIPOC at all. Black people were killed at 2.6 times the rate of White people (1,265 total killed), while Hispanics were killed at nearly 1.3 times the rate of White people (889 total killed). Among unarmed victims, Black people were killed at three times the rate (218 total killed), and Hispanics at 1.45 times the rate of White people (146 total killed). While the average age of those killed by the police is 34, for Black people, the average age is 30, for Hispanics 33, and for White people is 38.

Black, American Indian and Alaska Native women and men, too, are significantly more likely to be killed by the police than White women and men or about one Black in every 1,000, a study of Edwards, Lee, and Esposito shows. Likewise, Latino men are more likely to be killed by police than White men. Regretfully, the police violence, as Mapping Police Violence indicates, is not related to crime at all. In most cases, the killings begin with traffic stops, mental health checks, domestic disturbances, or reported low level offenses. And the worst thing is that there is no accountability for these killings: 98.3% of killings by police from 2013-2020 went without being prosecuted.

Racial profiling has been an issue in United States of America. 2020 marked one of the worst years, following the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, MN—two months after the killing of Breonna Taylor in her apartment in Louisville, KY—actions those that led to massive protests and demonstrations across the U.S. and worldwide. Finally, the Minneapolis police officer who killed Floyd, Derek Chauvin, was found guilty, a verdict with which agree three-quarters of Americans, according to a NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist poll, whilst about half of Republicans and Trump supporters think it was either the wrong decision or they aren’t sure. This polling, also, shows that White and Black Americans have very different views of race in America and have had very different experiences when it comes to dealing with discrimination and trusting police. 

Police. Stop. Killing. Black. People! 

THE POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK PEOPLE—MUST END—ONCE AND FOR ALL. 

The Legal Status of Jashari Family Under International Humanitarian Law: Civilians, Their Murder—War Crime and Crime Against Humanity (II)

All members of Jashari family, excluding Adem and Hamëz Jashari, are entitled to the status of civilians pertinent to international humanitarian law, therefore, they should be treated as victims of the war and be served justice. Their murder constitutes war crime and crime against humanity under international law.   

Sebahate J. Shala

The Fourth Geneva Convention defined protected persons as those “who at a given moment” find themselves in the hands of a “party to conflict or an occupying power” and who should—at all times—be “treated humanely” and protected, especially, against “all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.” In situations relating to a non-international armed conflict, as the Convention provides, the parties to conflict should protect and treat humanely all “persons taking no active part in hostilities,” as well as respect—at all circumstances—five principles, as embodied in the Additional Protocols I and II, including the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, of indiscriminate attacks, of precautions in attack, of limiting the use of force and means of combat, and the principle of proportionality of attack. 

Civilians, as described in the Additional Protocol I, and as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia(ICTY) ruled in Blaškić case in 2000, are “persons who are not members of the armed forces,” or “(are) no longer, members of the armed forces,” thus, they enjoy international protection from threats of violence or direct military attacks in an armed conflict. “Intentionally directing attacks against civilian population” or against individuals not taking active part in hostilities, as International Criminal Court (ICC) stipulates, constitutes a “war crime in international armed conflicts.” 

However, civilians in both international and non-international armed conflicts, as the Protocol I (Art. 51.3) encapsulates, lose their protection when, and as long “they take a direct part in hostilities,” a provision honored by the United Kingdom upon the ratification of Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, as well as the ICTY in Blaškić case. Whilst in some practice, a civilian loses protection against attack when directly participates in hostilities, yet, as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) argues, such a civilian doesn’t thereby become a combatant—eligible for prisoner-of-war status—and upon capture, may be subjected to the municipal criminal law for the mere participation in conflict.

This article discusses the legal status of Jashari family from Prekaz i Ulët/Donje Prekaze, and by applying the international humanitarian law in the context of Kosovo conflict, argues that all members of Jashari family, excluding Adem and Hamëz Jashari, are entitled to the status of civilians concordant to the Fourth Geneva Convention, correspondingly, they should be treated as victims of the war and be served justice. Additionally, the article, referring to the ICC Statute, concludes that the murder of Jashari family constitutes war crime and crime against humanity under international law. 

The Jashari Family: Civilians, Internationally Protected     

On March 5, 1998, the Serbia police forces launched a military attack against the compound of Adem and Hamëz Jashari, killing—after three days of fighting—54 members of their extended family, including women, children and elderly. All members of Jashari family, excluding Adem and Hamëz Jashari, were civilians, a protected category under international law and international humanitarian law. For, they do not fall in any of six categories of combatants as described in the Third Geneva Convention, respectively they didn’t belong to “inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously, take up arms to resist the invading forces,” and, though, hadn’t had time to organize themselves into regular armed units, “they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war”; nor did they represent people who lost their protection after having “directly participated in hostilities,” based on Article 51.3 of the Protocol I. 

The Jasharis belonged to people who fell in the hands of a party to conflict or an occupying power, they were people of an occupied territory, Kosovo, illegally integrated into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Serbia and Montenegro, following the disintegration of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992. They, except for Adem and Hamëz Jashari, weren’t members of armed forces, thus the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), nor did they organize themselves, spontaneously, into a regular armed unit, or directly participated in hostilities. If any member indirectly involved in hostilities, they did so to defend themselves, their family, their property, and ultimately, their homeland. As Besarta Jashari, the only survivor of Jashari family, revealed, once the attack started, all women, children and elderly were crammed into one room in the basement—to be protected from shelling. Occasionally, some members like Adile, Adem Jashari’s wife, joined fighting by helping with the ammunition, or the youngsters, Kushtrim, Blerim and Igball, who filled the machine guns or fought back along with Adem and Hamza (Hamzaj and Hoti, 2003). 

Further, except for Adem and Hamëz Jashari and their uncle Osman Geci, the elders Ali, Faik, Sinan, Shaban and Sherif Jashari, as well as the youngsters Besim, Blerim and Fitim, although figuring as members of Kosovo Liberation Army, cannot legally be treated as combatants. For, the first category was over sixties, the second under the age of eighteen; based on the former FRY law, all men aged 18 to 55 were eligible to be drafted in case of war or imminent threat of war. Whereas the average age varies, it is only those who are actually drafted, according to the ICRC, that account for combatants. Using the FRY law, Ali, Faik, Sinan, Shaban and Sherif Jashari, and Besim, Blerim and Fitim Jashari, did not meet the age requirement to be drafted in the event of war, or imminent threat of war, consequently, they cannot be considered as combatants, belonging to Kosovo Liberation Army whose membership was voluntary.

That is to say, all members of Jashari family, except for Adem and Hamëz Jashari and Osman Geci, are eligible for the status of civilians accordant to the Fourth Geneva Convention, therefore, they should be treated as victims of the war and be served justice.  

Definitions: Mass Murder, Crime Against Humanity, War Crimes 

In the public discourse, academic and political, the slaughter of Jashari family is mainly referred to as a massacre same as the 186 massacres committed during the conflict in Kosovo in 1998-1999, a notion that shouldn’t be used—for two reasons. One, there is no legal definition of massacre as there is for genocide, for example; massacre and genocide, as Dwyer and Ryan suggest, are often used interchangeably, especially in genocide research, with few scholars differentiating between massacre, mass killing and genocide. Two, massacre doesn’t constitute a separate category of crime like genocide or crime against humanity, neither is it a sub-category of crime against humanity as defined by the ICC. The ICC and ICTY do not use massacre in their proceedings against war criminals; instead they rely on the category of crime against humanity. 

To determine the crime against the Jashari family, thus, I will first eliminate the term massacre, and then look onto the definitions of mass murder, crime against humanity of murder and of extermination, and war crimes. Mass murder is defined as an intentional killing of a massive number of persons, belonging to any kind of groups (ethnical, political, religious) as long as they are civilians and their deaths were caused intentionally. Mass murder involves the killing of at least three people in a single event, within the same spatial area, and within a brief period of time. 

Crime against humanity, as described in the ICC Statute, incorporates any of the following acts—when committed as part of widespread or systematic attack directed against civilian population with the knowledge of attack—namely murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecution based on political, racial or ethnic grounds; and enforced disappearances. Crime against humanity of murder involves the killing of one or more persons, and the conduct is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population (Art. 7.1.a.). Crime against humanity of extermination refers to the killing of “one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population,” an act that takes place as part of “a mass killing of members of a civilian population.” (Art. 7.1.b) “Attack directed against any civilian population,” according to ICC, involves the multiple commission of acts as above-mentioned against any civilian population in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. 

War crimes, in particular, when committed as part of a plan or policy, or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, mean grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, including willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment; other serious violations of laws and customs of war applicable to non-international armed conflict, including intentionally directing attacks against civilian population not taking direct part in hostilities, intentionally causing extensive destruction and appropriation of property—not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; and serious violations of Article 3, common to all Geneva Conventions, namely murder, cruel treatment and torture (The ICC, Art. 8). 

The Murder of Jashari Family: War Crime and Crime Against Humanity

The crime against Jashari family falls in two of the above-mentioned categories, namely crime against humanity of murder and war crime, meeting the threshold attached to these crimes: the number, the legal status of population and its ethnic/religious affiliation, the intent, and the act of killing—sponsored and directed by the state. The numeric aspect: for a murder to qualify for mass murder, based on the definition of Peck and Jenkot, at least three or four murders must be committed, at approximately the same time, within the same spatial area, and within a brief period of time. And, the act of killing, as Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay suggest, must be intentional and directed against any kind of groups or civilian population (ethnical, political, religious) as long as their deaths were caused intentionally. The number, time, space and the intent are determinant characteristics of mass murder. 

Does the onslaught of Jashari family meet characteristics to be qualified as mass murder? Yes. The total number of deaths caused as a result of attack was 57. All people killed, except for Adem and Hamëz Jashari and Osman Geci, were civilians. They were killed within the same location, the Jashari compound and neighborhood, in the village of Prekaz i Ulët/Donje Prekaze, and within a brief period of time—through March 5 and 7, 1998—and the act of killing was intentional as part of the FRY and Serbia state policy as well as Milosevic’s widespread and systematic campaign against Kosovo Albanians launched in early 1998.

The intent. The FRY and Serbia military operation against Jasharis was intentional, it followed two previous attacks directed against the family: the first in December 1990; the second—on January 22, 1998. The Jashari family was a deliberated target of Serbia’s regime due to their political beliefs and activities, as well as their ethnic and religious origins: Adem Jashari organized and participated in widespread demonstrations against Milosevic’s terror and violent campaign against Albanians incepted in 1990, following the suspension of Kosovo autonomy in 1989; and along with fourteen members of the KLA, was convicted in absentia for “terrorist acts” in a trial that, according to Human Rights Watch, “clearly failed to conform to international standards.” Having been trained in the Republic of Albania in early 1990s, Adem Jashari, with a group, returned to Kosovo and created the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1993. Following the January 1998 attack, the Jashari family, particularly Adem and Hamëz Jashari, were under the surveillance of Serbia police. 

Additionally, the attack against Jasharis was premeditated and well-orchestrated—directed and ordered by Serbia Government or with its complicity. The operation, as Amnesty International reported, was executed by Serbia Special Police, trained for special operations like hijacking, consisting of Special Anti-Terrorism Unit, the Special Operations Unit, and the Special Police Unit, and was supported by armored personnel carriers (APCs), using artillery shelling from the nearby ammunition factory. The police forces, several hundred in number, according to this organization, or over 5,000 based on the local witnesses, were heavily armed with vehicle-mounted weapons, including heavy machine guns and cannons, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, assault rifles, as well as sniper rifles. Apparently, the attack was disproportional to the threat in question—and in grave violation of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, specifically it violated the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, of the proportionality of attack, of indiscriminate attacks, of precautions in attack, and the principle of limiting the use of force and means of combat.

Further, the intent was to kill the whole family! The police, as the Humanitarian Law Center in Prishtina argues, were ordered to kill indiscriminately, anyone, be it a child, women, or elderly, who attempted to get out of or into the village. Human Rights Watch reported for extrajudicial executions and unlawful killings resulting from the use of excessive and indiscriminate force against civilians, the detainees and the surrendered. The Serb military operation, based on Amnesty International evidence, was in a “more prepared and determined manner,” and the intent “was to eliminate the suspects and their families”—not to apprehend the armed suspects in order to protect lives of civilians guaranteed under the national and international law. And, while the head of the Yugoslav armed forces, the Serb general Nebojsha Pavkovic, called the attack “successful,” a normal policing action against a well-known criminal, adding that “The other details I don’t remember,” the onslaught of Jashari family, using the Amnesty International’s definition of political killings, was “unlawful and deliberate”—ordered by the Serb government or with its complicity, due to “their real or imputed political beliefs or activities” and “religion or ethnic origin.” 

Of course, Adem Jashari could have evacuated women, children and elderly while organizing the defense, as some Kosovo women from urban area suggest, calling him crazy for sacrificing his entire family, for, as a woman said, “nobody has the right to get his children and wife killed” regardless of circumstances. The fact of the matter is that, initially, the Serbia police forces, whilst shooting uninterruptedly with automatic machine guns, called on Jasharis to surrender, but Shaban, Adem and Hamëz Jashari organized the defense, in which participated men from Jashari neighborhood, Sherif, Ali, Faik and Sinan Jashari. The Jasharis were called to surrender, but they declined. They were offered to leave Kosovo, but they refused. Instead, the family decided to stay home, and if necessary, as Hamëz Jashari said, “die to protect their home and homeland.” 

“We don’t have anywhere else to go, we will stay here and die in the land of our ancients who fought over the centuries. We will never leave Kosovo. They can come whenever they want, we will be waiting here, and will respond with whatever means we have. Even if Europe opens the door for us, we will never leave our country.” (Hamëz Jashari, interview following the second attack on January 22, 1998).

Moreover, the attack against Jasharis, according to Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers, was neither the only mass murdernor the worst during the war; it wasn’t a single event neither and their deaths and destruction of their property wasn’t the end of story either. The attack followed the mass killing in Likoshan and Çirez/Likošane and Cirez, taking place through February 28 and March 1, 1998, and resulting in 28 ethnic Albanians slaughtered and executed from Serbia militaries and paramilitaries. In its immediate aftermath, the Serb offensive campaign spread and intensified, resulting in mass killings in Rezalle/Rezala (April, 1998), Lybeniq/ Ljubenić (May, 1998), Poklek/Poklek (May, 1998), Duboc/Dubovac (September, 1998), Abri e Eperme/Gornje Obrinje (September, 1998), Gollubovc/Golubovac (September, 1998), totaling at 186 mass killings committed in Kosovo throughout the war. 

Most importantly, the murder of Jashari family was part of the FRY and Serbia’s State plan and policy as well as part of the Milosevic’s widespread and systematic campaign against ethnic Albanians employed in the early 1998. As the ICTY’s indictment against Milosevic et al. read, Slobodan Milosevic, acting individually or in concert with his subordinates, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Vlajko Stojiljkovic, planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a well-planned and coordinated campaign of unlawful deportation and forcible expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians, including widespread killings, persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, destruction of civilian property, constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity according to Article 7.1 of the Statute of the ICTY. The purpose of the joint criminal enterprise“was, inter alia, the expulsion of a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from the territory of the province of Kosovo” to modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo so to ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian authorities over the province; and this policy was achieved through a widespread or systematic campaign of terror or violence against the Kosovo Albanian population starting from October 1998 until 20 June 1999. An estimated 13,535 people—predominantly ethnic Albanians were killed, about 862,979 others were forcibly expelled from their homes, 6,024 were reported as missing, and supposedly, over 20,000 women were sexually abused.   

Woefully, Milosevic died without ever being convicted for his crimes committed in Kosovo and Bosnia and Hercegovina. However, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, and Lukic, were found guilty for committing crimes against humanityin Kosovo, including deportation, a crime against humanity; forcible transfer as “other inhumane acts,” a crime against humanity; murder, a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws or customs of war; and persecution, a crime against humanity (Milutinovic et al.).

With that being said, Serbia police forces—ordered or in complicit with the Government—killed 54 members of Jashari family, belonging to Albanians as the largest ethnic group in Kosovo, with the intent to “destroy a part of the population”; the conduct took place as part of “a mass killing of members of a civilian population” and was committed as “part of Milosevic’s widespread and systematic campaign” against Albanians, an occupied people. Occurring in a non-international armed conflict, and involving “the commission of multiple acts,” i.e., murder, extermination, destruction of civil property, deportation or forcible transfer of population, and enforced disappearances, the attack against the Jasharis, applying the ICC definition, was in furtherance of Serbia’s state plan or policy committed with the knowledge of these crimes, thereby constitutes crime against humanity, according to Article 7.

The murder of Jashari family constitutes a war crime, too, committed as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes—meaning the breach of the Geneva Conventions, in that it involved willful killing, extensive destruction and appropriation of property of Jashari family—not justified by military necessity, and was carried out unlawfully and wantonly; and other serious violations applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, including intentionally directing attacks against civilian population or against individuals not taking direct part in hostilities, violence to life and person, murder of all kinds; as well as intentionally causing damage or destruction of Jasharis’ property, as prescribed in Article 8 of the ICC Statute. 

To conclude, members of Jashari family, excluding Adem and Hamëz Jashari and Osman Geci, belonging to an occupied people—killed in a non-international armed conflict, enjoy the status of civilians pursuant to the Fourth Geneva Convention. Accordingly, they should be treated as victims of war, and be served justice, whilst their murder constitutes war crime and crime against humanity under international law. Noting that the murder of Adem Jashari’s family had never been investigated by international justice mechanisms in charge of war crimes in Kosovo, UNMIK and EULEX, nor did the case appear in the ICTY’s indictment against Milosevic et al. and Milutinovic et al., let alone the Serbia Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor. In March 2019, however, the Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office opened a preliminary investigation over the murder of Adem Jashari and his family, after having received competences of war crimes from EULEX, and following a verification indicating that the case had never been investigated.

(The author is a Researcher, currently a Research Fellow with World Mediation Organization in Berlin. She received an MA in International Affairs from the New School, New York, with focus on war and peace studies, peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development, as well as international law and international humanitarian law). 

Statusi Juridik i Familjes Jashari Sipas të Drejtës Ndërkombëtare Humanitare: Civilë, Vrasja e Tyre—Krim Lufte dhe Krim Kundër Njerëzimit (II)

Të gjithë anëtarët e familjes Jashari, me përjashtim të Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, e gëzojnë statusin e “civilëve” në përputhje me të drejtën ndërkombëtare humanitare, rrjedhimisht duhet të trajtohen si viktima të luftës dhe t’u ofrohet drejtësi. Vrasja e tyre, ndërkaq, përbën “krim lufte” dhe “krim kundër njerëzimit” në akordancë me ligjin ndërkombëtar.

Sebahate J. Shala

Konventa e Katërt e Gjenevës i definon personat e mbrojtur si ata “që në një moment të caktuar” e gjejnë veten në duart e një “pale në konflikt ose një force pushtuese” dhe të cilët—në çdo kohë—duhet të “trajtohen njerëzisht” dhe të mbrohen, veçanërisht, kundër “të gjitha akteve të dhunës ose kërcënimeve të përdorimit të saj, dhe kundër fyerjeve dhe kuriozitetit publik”. Në rastet e konfliktit të brendshëm të armatosur, siç e parasheh Konventa, palët në konflikt duhet të mbrojnë dhe të trajtojnë njerëzisht të gjithë “personat që nuk marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në armiqësi”, si dhe të respektojnë—në të gjitha rrethanat—pesë parimet e mishëruara në Protokollet Shtesë I dhe II, përfshirë parimin e dallimit ndërmjet luftëtarëve dhe civilëve, të sulmeve pa dallim, të masave paraprake në sulm, të kufizimit të përdorimit të forcës dhe mjeteve të luftimit, dhe parimin e proporcionalitetit të sulmit.

Civilët, sipas përshkrimit të Protokollit Shtesë I, dhe siç kishte vendosur Tribunali Ndërkombëtar për Krime në ish Jugosllavi në rastin Blaškić në vitin 2000, janë “personat të cilët nuk janë anëtarë të forcave të armatosura”, ose që “(nuk) janë më anëtarë të forcave të armatosura”, prandaj ata gëzojnë mbrojtje ndërkombëtare nga dhuna dhe kërcënimet e dhunës ose sulmet e drejtpërdrejta ushtarake në një konflikt të armatosur. “Drejtimi i qëllimshëm i sulmeve kundër popullatës civile” ose kundër individëve që nuk marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në armiqësi, siç përcakton Gjykata Ndërkombëtare Penale (GjNP/ICC), përbën “krim lufte në konflikte të armatosura ndërkombëtare.”

Sidoqoftë, civilët në konfliktet e armatosura ndërkombëtare dhe jondërkombëtare, siç parasheh Protokolli I (Neni 51.3), e humbin mbrojtjen e tyre në momentin, dhe për aq kohë sa “marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në armiqësi”, dispozitë kjo që është respektuar nga Mbretëria e Bashkuar me rastin e ratifikimit të Konventës mbi Armë të Caktuara Konvencionale, si dhe nga Tribunali i Hagës në rastin Blaškić. Ndërsa në disa praktika, personi civil e humb mbrojtjen nga sulmet ushtarake kur merr pjesë aktive në armiqësi, megjithatë, siç argumenton Komiteti Ndërkombëtar i Kryqit të Kuq (KNKK), ai person civil nuk bëhet automatikisht luftëtar, së këndejmi i burgosur i luftës, dhe pas kapjes nga forcat kundërshtare, ai mund t’i nënshtrohet ligjit penal për të vetmen arsye—pjesëmarrje në konflikt.

Ky artikull diskuton statusin juridik të familjes Jashari nga Prekazi i Ulët, dhe duke e aplikuar të drejtën ndërkombëtare humanitare në kontekst të konfliktit në Kosovë, argumenton se të gjithë anëtarët e familjes Jashari, me përjashtim të Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, e gëzojnë statusin e civilëve përkitazi me Konventën e Katërt të Gjenevës, prandaj duhet të trajtohen si viktima të luftës dhe t’u ofrohet drejtësi. Për më tepër, artikulli, duke iu referuar Statutit të GjPN-së/ICC, konkludon se vrasja e familjes Jashari përbën krim lufte dhe krim kundër njerëzimit në bazë të së drejtës ndërkombëtare.

Familja Jashari: Civilë, Të Mbrojtur Ndërkombëtarisht     

Më 5 mars, 1998, forcat policore serbe sulmuan kullën e Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, duke vrarë—pas tre ditësh luftime—54 anëtarë të familjes së tyre të gjerë, përfshirë gra, fëmijë dhe pleq. Të gjithë anëtarët e familjes Jashari, me përjashtim të Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, ishin civilë, kategori kjo e mbrojtur me ligjin ndërkombëtar dhe ligjin ndërkombëtar humanitar. Sepse, ata nuk i takojnë asnjëres nga gjashtë kategoritë e luftëtarëve të përshkruara në Konventën e Tretë të Gjenevës, përkatësisht, ata nuk i përkisnin “banorëve të një territori jo të pushtuar të cilët, me afrimin e armikut, në mënyrë spontane, kapin armët për t’i rezistuar forcave pushtuese”, dhe, megjithëse, nuk kishin pasur kohë të organizoheshin në njësite të rregullta ushtarake, “ata mbajnë armët publikisht dhe respektojnë rregullat dhe zakonet e luftës”; e as nuk përfaqësonin personat të cilët e humbin mbrojtjen e tyre pasi “marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në armiqësi”, siç specifikon Neni 51.3 i Protokollit I.

Jasharët i takonin një populli që ra në duart e një pale në konflikt ose një force okupuese, ata ishin banorë të një territori të pushtuar, Kosovës, i integruar ilegalisht në Republikën Federale të Jugosllavisë (RFJ), Serbisë dhe Malit të Zi, pas shpërbërjes së Republikës Socialiste Federale të Jugosllavisë (RSFJ) në vitin 1992. Ata, përveç Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit, nuk ishin pjesëtarë të forcave ose grupeve të armatosura, pra Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës (UÇK), as nuk u organizuan, spontanisht, në një njësi të rregullta ushtarake, e as nuk morën pjesë drejtpërdrejt në luftime. Nëse ndonjë anëtar i familjes ishte përfshirë në njëfarë forme në armiqësi, ata e kishin bërë atë për të mbrojtur veten, familjen, pronën, dhe atdheun e tyre. Siç kish rrëfyer Besarta Jashari, e mbijetuara e vetme e familjes Jashari, me të filluar sulmi, gratë, fëmijët dhe të moshuarit ishin mbyllur në një dhomë në bodrum—për t’u mbrojtur nga granatimet. Në disa raste, sidoqoftë, disa anëtarë të familjes, si Adilja, gruaja e Adem Jasharit, kishin ndihmuar burrat duke sjellë municion, ose të rinjtë, Kushtrimi, Blerimi dhe Igballi, të cilët mbushnin karikatorët ose luftonin së bashku me Ademin dhe Hamzën (Hamzaj dhe Hoti, 2003).

Tutje, përveç Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit dhe dajës së tyre Osman Geci, të moshuarit Ali, Faik, Sinan, Shaban dhe Sherif Jashari, si dhe të rinjtë Besim, Blerim dhe Fitim Jashari, ndonëse figurojnë si anëtarë të Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës, ligjërisht nuk mund të trajtohen si luftëtarë. Kjo pasi që kategoria e parë ishte mbi të gjashtëdhjetat, ndërsa e dyta nën moshën tetëmbëdhjetë vjeç, e bazuar në ligjin e ish RFJ-së, të gjithë burrat e moshës 18 deri 55 vjeç ishin të obliguar të paraqiteshin si rezervistë në rast lufte ose të kërcënimit të menjëhershëm me luftë. Përderisa mosha mesatare varion, janë vetëm ata që janë rekrutuar ndërkaq, që sipas KNKK-së, llogariten si luftëtarë. Prandaj, duke e aplikuar ligjin e ish RFJ-së, Ali, Faik, Sinan, Shaban dhe Sherif Jashari dhe Besim, Blerim dhe Fitim Jashari nuk i plotësonin kriteret e moshës për t’u rekrutuar në rast të luftës ose të kërcënimit me luftë, rrjedhimisht, ata nuk mund të konsiderohen si luftëtarë, që i përkisnin Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës anëtarësia e së cilës ishte vullnetare.

Kjo nënkupton se të gjithë anëtarët e familjes Jashari, përveç Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit dhe Osman Gecit, e gëzojnë statusin e civilëve në përputhje me Konventën e Katërt të Gjenevës, së këndejmi duhet të trajtohen si viktima të luftës dhe t’u ofrohet drejtësi. 

Definicionet: Vrasje Masive, Krim Kundër Njerëzimit, Krim i Luftës 

Në diskursin publik, akademik dhe politik, vrasjes së familjes Jashari i referohet kryesisht si masakër ngjashëm si 186 masakrat tjera të kryera gjatë luftës në Kosovë, një term ky që nuk duhet të përdoret—për dy arsye. Një, sepse nuk ekziston një përkufizim ligjor mbi masakrën siç ekziston për gjenocidin, për shembull; masakra dhe gjenocidi, siç sugjerojnë Dwyer dhe Ryan, shpesh përdoren si zëvendësim për njëra-tjetren, veçanërisht në studimet e gjenocidit, dhe shumë pak studiues bëjnë dallimin ndërmjet masakrës, vrasjes masive dhe gjenocidit. Dy, masakra nuk paraqet kategori të veçantë të krimit si gjenocidi ose krimi kundër njerëzimit, e madje nuk është as nën-kategori e krimit kundër njerëzimit siç definohet nga GjNP/ICC. GjNP dhe Tribunali i Hagës nuk e përdorin nocionin masakër në proceset e tyre kundër kriminelëve të luftës; në vend të kësaj këto gjykata mbështeten në kategorinë e krimit kundër njerëzimit.

Për të përcaktuar krimin ndaj familjes Jashari, së pari do ta eliminojë termin masakër, dhe pastaj do t’i shikojë definicionet e vrasjes masive, vrasjes dhe shfarosjes si krime kundër njerëzimit, dhe të krimeve të luftës. Vrasja masive definohet si vrasje e qëllimshme e një numri të madh personash, që i përkasin cilitdo grup (etnik, politik, fetar) për aq kohë sa janë civilë dhe vdekjet e tyre janë shkaktuar qëllimshëm. Vrasja masive përfshin vrasjen e të paktën tre personave në një incident të vetëm, brenda së njëjtës zonë hapësinore, dhe brenda një periudhe të shkurtër kohore.

Krimi kundër njerëzimit, siç përshkruhet në Statutin e GjNP-së, përfshin cilindo nga veprimet e mëposhtme—kur kryhet si pjesë e një sulmi në shkallë të gjerë ose sistematik i drejtuar kundër popullatës civile me dijeninë e kryerjes së sulmit—përkatësisht vrasje; shfarosje; skllavërim; deportim ose transferim me forcë i popullsisë; burgim; torturë; dhunim; persekutim i bazuar në baza politike, racore ose etnike; dhe rrëmbim me forcë. Vrasja si krim kundër njerëzimit përfshin vrasjen e një ose më shumë personave, dhe akti/administrimi i saj është pjesë e një sulmi të gjerë ose sistematik i drejtuar kundër një popullate civile (Neni 7.1.a.). Shfarosja si krim kundër njerëzimit i referohet vrasjes së “një ose më shumë personave, përfshirë shkaktimin e kushteve të jetës të kalkuluara qëllimshëm që të shkatërrojnë një pjesë të një populli”, akt ky që ndodh si pjesë e “vrasjes masive të pjesëtarëve të një popullate civile”. (Neni 7.1.b) “Sulmi i drejtuar kundër popullatës civile”, sipas GjNP-së/ICC, përfshin kryerjen e akteve të shumëfishta—që u përmenden më lartë—kundër një popullate civile si pjesë ose në avancim të politikës dhe strategjisë së një Shteti ose organizate për të kryer një sulm të tillë.

Krimet e luftës, në veçanti, kur kryhen si pjesë e një plani ose politike, ose si pjesë e krimeve të kryera në shkallë të gjerë, përbëjnë shkelje të rëndë të Konventave të Gjenevës, përfshirë vrasje me dashje/me paramendim, torturë ose trajtime çnjerëzore; shkeljet tjera serioze të rregullave dhe zakoneve të luftës të zbatueshme në konfliktin e armatosur jondërkombëtar, përfshirë sulmet e qëllimshme ndaj popullatës civile që nuk merr pjesë drejtpërdrejt në luftime, duke shkaktuar qëllimisht shkatërrim të gjerë të pasurisë dhe përvetësim të pronës—e që nuk justifikohet me nevojë të ndërhyrjes ushtarake dhe që kryhet paligjshëm dhe në mënyrë të kalkuluar; dhe shkelje serioze të Nenit të Përbashkët 3, të të gjitha Konventave të Gjenevës, përkatësisht vrasje, trajtime mizore dhe torturë (GjNP, Neni 8).

Vrasja e Familjes Jashari: Krim Lufte dhe Krim Kundër Njerëzimit

Krimi kundër familjes Jashari bie në dy nga kategoritë e lartpërmendura—krim kundër njerëzimit dhe krim i luftës, meqë i plotëson kriteret për t’u llogaritur si i tillë: numrin e të vrarëve, statusin juridik të popullsisë dhe përkatësinë e saj etnike/ fetare, qëllimin, dhe akti i vrasjes—i sponsorizuar dhe drejtuar nga Shteti. Aspekti numerik: në mënyrë që një vrasje të kualifikohet si vrasje masive, sipas definimit të Peck dhe Jenkot, të paktën tre ose katër vrasje duhet të kryhen, afërsisht në të njëjtën kohë, në të njëjtën zonë hapësinore, dhe brenda një periudhe të shkurtër kohore. Dhe, akti i vrasjes, siç theksojnë Valentino, Huth dhe Balch-Lindsay, duhet të jetë i qëllimshëm dhe i drejtuar kundër cilitdo grup ose popullate civile (etnike, politike, fetare) për aq kohë sa vdekjet e tyre janë shkaktuar qëllimshëm. Numri, koha, hapësira dhe qëllimi janë karakteristikat përcaktuese të vrasjes masive.

A i plotëson rasti i familjes Jashari këto karakteristika për t’u kualifikuar si vrasje masive? Po. Numri i përgjithshëm i vdekjeve të shkaktuara si rezultat i sulmit ishte 57. Të gjithë të vrarët, përveç Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit dhe Osman Gecit, ishin civilë. Ata u vranë në të njëjtin vend, në kullën dhe lagjen Jashari, në fshatin Prekaz i Ulët, dhe brenda një periudhe të shkurtër kohore—ndërmjet 5 dhe 7 marsit të vitit 1998—dhe akti i vrasjes ishte i qëllimshëm si pjesë e planit dhe politikës shtetërore të RFJ-së dhe Serbisë dhe i fushatës së gjërë dhe sistematike të Millosheviqit kundër shqiptarëve të Kosovës—e lansuar në fillim të vitit 1998.

Qëllimi. Operacioni ushtarak i RFJ-së dhe i Serbisë kundër Jasharajve ishte i qëllimshëm, i cili pasoi dy sulme të mëparshme të drejtuara kundër familjes: i pari në dhjetor të vitit 1990; i dyti—më 22 janar të vitit 1998. Familja Jashari ishte në shënjestër të regjimit të Serbisë për shkak të bindjeve dhe aktiviteteve të tyre politike, si dhe origjinës etnike e religjioze: Adem Jashari kishte organizuar dhe marrë pjesë në demonstratat masive kundër terrorit dhe fushatës së dhunshme të Millosheviqit ndaj shqiptarëve të Kosovës e filluar në vitin 1990, pas suspendimit të autonomisë së Kosovës në vitin 1989; dhe së bashku me 14 anëtarë të UÇK-së, ishte dënuar në mungesë për “akte terroriste” nga një gjyq që, sipas Human Rights Watch, “haptazi dështoi t’i përmbushte standardet ndërkombëtare”. I trajnuar në Republikën e Shqipërisë në fillim të viteve 1990, Adem Jashari kthehet, me një grup, në Kosovë dhe në vitin 1993 krijon Ushtrinë Çlirimtare të Kosovës. Pas sulmit të janarit të vitit 1998, familja Jashari, veçanërisht Adem dhe Hamëz Jashari, ishin nën vëzhgimin dhe përcjelljen e vazhdushme të policisë së Serbisë.

Tutje, sulmi ndaj Jasharajve ishte i paramenduar dhe i orkestruar mirë—i drejtuar dhe urdhëruar nga Qeveria e Serbisë ose në bashkëpunim me të. Operacioni, siç kish raportuar Amnesty International, ishte ekzekutuar nga Policia Speciale e Serbisë, e trajnuar për operacione speciale si rrëmbim, në përbërje të Njësisë Speciale Kundër Terrorizmit, Njësisë së Operacioneve Speciale dhe Njësisë Speciale të Policisë, dhe ishte mbështetur nga transportuesit e blinduar të personelit, tankse e autoblinda, që përdornin artileri nga fabrika e municionit në Skenderaj. Forcat e policisë, disa qindra në numër, sipas kësaj organizate, ose mbi 5,000 sish bazuar në dëshmitë e banorëve lokalë, ishin të armatosura rëndë, përfshirë mitralozë të rëndë dhe topa, raketa dhe granatahedhës, pushkë sulmi, si dhe snajper. Sulmi, qartazi, ishte disproporcional në relacion me kërcënimin në fjalë—dhe përbente shkelje të rëndë të Konventave të Gjenevës dhe të Protokolleve të tyre, specifikisht forcat serbe shkelën parimin e dallimit ndërmjet luftëtarëve dhe civilëve, të proporcionalitetit të sulmit, të sulmeve pa dallim, të masave paraprake në sulm, dhe parimin e kufizimit të përdorimit të forcës dhe të mjeteve të luftimit.

Për më tepër, qëllimi ishte të vritej e tërë familja! Policia, siç argumenton Qendra për të Drejtën Humanitare në Prishtinë, ishte urdhëruar të vrasë pa dallim, këdo, qoftë fëmijë, grua apo i moshuar, që përpiqej të ikte ose të hynte në fshat. Human Rights Watch raportonte për ekzekutime jashtëgjyqësore dhe vrasje të paligjshme si rezultat i përdorimit të tepërt dhe pa dallim të forcës kundër civilëve, të arrestuarve dhe të dorëzuarve. Operacioni ushtarak serb, bazuar në dëshmitë e Amnesty International, ishte më i “përgatitur dhe i vendosur”, dhe qëllimi “ishte të eliminonte të dyshuarit dhe familjet e tyre”—dhe jo të kapte të dyshuarit e armatosur në mënyrë që të mbroheshin jetët e civilëve—të garantuara me ligjet kombëtare dhe ndërkombëtare. Dhe, ndërsa kreu i forcave të armatosura jugosllave, gjenerali serb Nebojsha Pavkoviq, e quajti sulmin “të suksesshëm”, një veprim normal policor kundër një krimineli të njohur, duke shtuar se “detajet e tjera nuk i mbaj mend”, vrasja e familjes Jashari, nëse i referohemi definicionit të Amnesty International mbi vrasjet politike, ishte “e paligjshme dhe e qëllimshme”—e urdhëruar nga qeveria Serbe ose në bashkëpunim me të, për shkak të “bindjeve ose aktiviteteve të tyre reale ose të nënkuptuara politike” dhe “fesë ose origjinës etnike”.

Sigurisht që, Adem Jashari ka mundur t’i evakuonte gratë, fëmijët dhe të moshuarit derisa e organizonte mbrojtjen, siç sugjerojnë disa gra të zonave urbane në Kosovë teksa e quajnë të marrë për sakrifikimin e gjithë familjes, sepse, siç kish thënë një grua, “askush nuk ka të drejtë që të flijojë fëmijët dhe gruan” pavarësisht rrethanave dhe qëllimit. E vërtetë, fillimisht, forcat e policisë së Serbisë, ndërsa gjuanin pandërprerë me armë automatike, i kishin bërë thirrje Jasharajve që të dorëzoheshin, por Shaban, Adem dhe Hamëz Jashari e kishin organizuar mbrojtjen, në të cilën kishin marrë pjesë edhe burra tjerë të lagjes, Sherif, Ali, Faik dhe Sinan Jashari. Jasharëve u ishte bërë thirrje të dorëzoheshin, ata kishin refuzuar. Atyre u ishte ofruar të largoheshin nga Kosova, ata nuk kishin pranuar. Në vend të kësaj, e tërë familja vendosi të qëndronte në shtëpi, dhe nëse ishte e nevojshme, siç kishte thënë Hamëz Jashari, të “vdisnin për të mbrojtur shtëpinë dhe atdheun e tyre”.

“Ne nuk kemi ku të shkojmë tjetër, do të qëndrojmë këtu dhe do të vdesim në vendin e të parëve tanë që luftuan gjatë shekujve. Ne kurrë nuk do të largohemi nga Kosova. Ata mund të vijnë kur të duan, ne do t’i presim këtu dhe do t’i përgjigjemi me çfarëdo mundësie e mjeti që kemi. Edhe nëse Evropa na i hap dyert, ne kurrë nuk do të largohemi nga vendi ynë”. (Hamëz Jashari, intervistë pas sulmit të dytë më 22 janar, 1998)

Veç kësaj, vrasja e Jasharajve, sipas Di Lellio dhe Schwandner-Sievers, nuk ishte vrasja masive e vetme, as më e keqja gjatë luftës; ajo nuk ishte ngjarja e vetme dhe vdekjet e shkatërrimi i pronës së tyre nuk ishte as fundi i tregimit. Sulmi u pasua nga vrasja masive në Likoshan dhe Çirez, 28 shkurt-1 mars, 1998: 28 shqiptarë ishin ekzekutuar dhe masakruar nga ushtarët dhe paramilitarët e Serbisë. Menjëherë pas saj, fushata ofensive e Serbisë u përhap dhe u intensifikua në shkallë të gjerë në tërë territorin e Kosovës, duke rezultuar në vrasje masive në Rezalle (prill, 1998), Lybeniq (maj, 1998), Poklek (maj, 1998), Duboc (shtator, 1998), Abri e Eperme (shtator, 1998), Gollubovc (shtator, 1998)—që përbënin disa nga gjithsej 186 vrasjet masive të kryera gjatë luftës në Kosovë.

Më e rëndësishmja, vrasja e familjes Jashari ishte pjesë e planit dhe e politikës shtetërore të RFJ-së dhe Serbisë, si dhe pjesë e fushatës së gjerë dhe sistematike të Millosheviqit kundër shqiptarëve të Kosovës e lansuar në fillim të vitit 1998. Siç theksonte aktakuza e Tribunalit të Hagës kundër Millosheviqit dhe të tjerëve, Sllobodan Millosheviq, individualisht ose në bashkëpunim me vartësit e tij, Milan Milutinoviq, Nikola Shainoviq, Dragoljub Ojdaniq dhe Vlajko Stojiljkoviq, kishte planifikuar, nxitur, urdhëruar, kryer, ose ndihmuar dhe mbështetur planifikimin, përgatitjen, ose ekzekutimin e fushatës së koordinuar dhe planifikuar mirë për dëbimin e paligjshëm dhe me forcë të qindra mijëra shqiptarëve të Kosovës, përfshirë vrasje masive, përndjekje në baza politike, racore ose fetare, shkatërrimin e pronës civile, që përbëjnë krime lufte dhe krime kundër njerëzimit në përputhje me Nenin 7.1 të Statutit të Tribunalit. Dhe qëllimi i kësaj ndërmarrje të përbashkët kriminale “ishte, ndër të tjera, dëbimi i një pjese të konsiderueshme të popullatës shqiptare të Kosovës nga territori i provincës së Kosovës” me qëllim modifikimin e përbërjes etnike në Kosovë në mënyrë që të sigurohet kontrolli i vazhdueshëm i autoriteteve të RFJ-së dhe Serbisë mbi provincën; dhe kjo politikë u arrit përmes një fushate masive ose sistematike të terrorit ose dhunës ndaj popullatës shqiptare të Kosovës duke filluar nga tetori i vitit 1998 deri më 20 qershor të vitit 1999. Në total, 13,535 persona—shumica dërmuese e tyre shqiptarë u vranë, rreth 862,979 të tjerë u dëbuan me forcë nga shtëpitë e tyre, 6,024 u raportuan si të zhdukur dhe supozohet se mbi 20,000 gra u abuzuan seksualisht.

Mjerisht, Millosheviqi vdiq pa u dënuar kurrë për krimet e tij të kryera në Kosovë dhe Bosnje dhe Hercegovinë. Megjithatë, Shainoviq, Ojdaniq, Pavkoviq, Lazareviq dhe Lukiq, u shpallën fajtorë për kryerjen e krimeve kundër njerëzimit në Kosovë, përfshirë deportim, si krim kundër njerëzimit; transferim me forcë dhe “veprime tjera çnjerëzore”, si krim kundër njerëzimit; vrasje, si krim kundër njerëzimit dhe shkelje e ligjeve ose zakoneve të luftës; dhe persekutim, si krim kundër njerëzimit (Milutinoviq dhe të tjerë).

Siç u tha më lartë, forcat policore të Serbisë—të urdhëruara ose në bashkëpunim me Qeverinë—kishin vrarë 54 anëtarë të familjes Jashari, të cilët i përkisnin shqiptarëve si grupi më i madh etnik në Kosovë, me qëllim që të “shkatërrojnë një pjesë të popullsisë”; ky akt u zhvillua si pjesë e “vrasjes masive të pjesëtarëve të një popullsie civile” dhe u krye si “pjesë e fushatës së gjerë dhe sistematike të Millosheviqit” kundër shqiptarëve, një popull i okupuar. Duke ndodhur në një konflikt të brendshëm, dhe që përfshinte “kryerjen e akteve të shumfishta”, si vrasje, shfarosje, shkatërrim i pronës civile, dëbim ose transferim me forcë i popullsisë dhe rrëmbim me forcë, sulmi kundër Jasharajve, sipas definicionit të GjPN-së/ICC, ishte vazhdimësi e politikës ose planit shtetëror të Serbisë, i kryer me dijeni ose paramendim, dhe si tillë përbën krim kundër njerëzimit, sipas Nenit 7.

Vrasja e familjes Jashari paraqet krim lufte, gjithashtu, i kryer si pjesë e krimeve të tilla në shkallë të gjerë—që do të thotë shkelje e Konventave të Gjenevës në atë se përfshinte vrasje me dashje, shkatërrim i gjerë dhe përvetësim i pronës së familjes Jashari—që nuk justifikohet me nevojë të ndërhyrjes ushtarake, dhe ishte kryer në mënyrë të paligjshme dhe të pamorlashme; shkelje tjera serioze të zbatueshme në konflikte të armatosura të karakterit jondërkombëtar, përfshirë sulme të qëllimshme kundër popullatës civile ose kundër individëve që nuk marrin pjesë drejtpërdrejt në luftime, dhunë ndaj jetës dhe personit, vrasje të të gjitha llojeve; si dhe dëm ose shkatërrim i qëllimshëm i pronës së Jasharajve, siç përshkruhet në Nenin 8 të Statutit të GjNP-së/ICC.

Si përfundim, anëtarët e familjes Jashari, me përjashtim të Adem dhe Hamëz Jasharit dhe Osman Gecit, pjesëtarë të një populli të pushtuar—dhe të vrarë në një një konflikt të brendshëm të armatosur, e gëzojnë statusin e civilëve në përputhje me Konventën e Katërt të Gjenevës. Prandaj, ata duhet të trajtohen si viktima të luftës dhe t’u ofrohet drejtësi. Vrasja e tyre, ndërkaq, përbën krim lufte dhe krim kundër njerëzimit sipas ligjit ndërkombëtar. Duhet theksuar se vrasja e familjes së Adem Jasharit kurrë nuk është hetuar/ose inicuar nga mekanizmat ndërkombëtarë të drejtësisë përgjegjës për hetimin e krimeve të luftës në Kosovë, UNMIK-u dhe EULEX-i, ndërsa ky rast nuk është përfshirë as në padinë e Tribunalit të Hagës kundër Millosheviqit dhe të tjerë dhe Milutinoviqit dhe të tjerë, e të mos flasim për Zyrën e Prokurorit të Krimeve të Luftës në Serbi. Në mars të vitit 2019, ndërkaq, Prokuroria Speciale e Kosovës paralajmëroi hapjen e një hetimi paraprak mbi vrasjen e Adem Jasharit dhe familjes së tij, pasi kishte marrë kompetencat për krime lufte nga EULEX dhe pas një verifikimi që dëshmonte se ky rast nuk ishte hetuar asnjëherë.

(Autorja është Hulumtuese, momentalisht e angazhuar si Research Fellow në World Mediation Organization në Berlin. Ajo ka mbaruar studimet Master në Marrëdhënie Ndërkombëtare në New School, New York, me fokus studimet e luftës dhe paqes, paqe-ndërtimi, shtet-ndërtimi dhe zhvillimi, si dhe e drejta ndërkombëtare dhe e drejta ndërkombëtare humanitare). 

The Rise of Domestic Terrorism in America: White Supremacist Attacks Predominate

As opposed to foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism has been on rise since the Oklahoma bombing in 1995—with far-right terrorism “significantly” outpacing terrorism from other types of perpetrators. Needless to say, white supremacists preponderate, carrying out 57% of plots and attacks through 1994—2020, respectively 67% of attacks in 61 incidents between January-August 2020.

Sebahate J. Shala

Insurrection. Sedition. Domestic terror. In an unprecedented occasion, members of the U.S. Congress, media and experts unanimously used the phrase “domestic terror” to describe the January 6 riots—when an angry mob, instigated by President Trump, breached the Capitol in attempt to overrule the result of the 2020 election. In a live appearance, the Washington, D.C., Mayor Muriel Bowser called the action a “textbook terrorism” while reading the definition about the crime in the U.S. Code: “[…] the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”    

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has so far charged 205 individuals relating to the Capitol siege and returned 35 indictments on federal crimes ranging from trespassing to murder to obstruction of justice to carrying or having accessible, in the grounds of the Capitol, of a firearm and ammunition. The authorities, too, are considering filing serious charges of sedition and conspiracy against some individuals—a federal crime involving an effort to conspire to overthrow the U.S. government—punishable up to 20 years in prison. No charges on the crime of domestic terrorism, though! 

That is, the U.S. Code falls short in determining the crime of terrorism, providing, as McCord explains, an exact definition for both “international” and “domestic terrorism”—the first occurring primarily outside of the U.S. territorial jurisdiction, or transcends national boundaries, and the second one primarily within the U.S. territorial jurisdiction. But these acts do not create “terrorism offenses,” as listed in Chapter 113b, Title 18, under “Terrorism,” which include crimes that prohibit: using weapons of mass destruction or directed at U.S. government officials or property; acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries; engaging in financial transactions with countries that support international terrorism; providing material support to terrorists; or to a designated foreign terrorist organization; etc. Besides, there is no federal crime of terrorism that applies to acts—otherwise qualified as “domestic terrorism”—when perpetrated with firearms or vehicles (the most common means of terrorist attacks used within and outside of the U.S.) but not connected to a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO).

The U.S. terrorism statutes deal primarily—and exclusively—with international terrorism and terrorism in the homeland committed in furtherance of the goals of a FTO, like ISIS or Al Qaeda, standing silent toward attacks or mass shootings carried out in furtherance of political or social ideologies not connected to an FTO. That is why the killing in Charlottesville, Va., in 2017, committed by James Fields, a self-proclaimed neo-Nazi white supremacist, including mass shootings in Pittsburg, Poway, or El Paso, executed in furtherance of white supremacist and anti-immigration ideologies—were not qualified as terrorism crimes, though they, according to McCord, met the federal definition of domestic terrorism. 

The “domestic terrorism” meaning, as explained in the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2020, refers to Section 2331, Title 18, of the U.S. Code, and doesn’t include acts carried out by individuals associated with, or inspired by a foreign person or an FTO; an individual or organization designated as such under the Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); or a state sponsor of terrorism (Export Administration Act, 1979, 50 U.S.C. 4605). Hence, the Capitol attack doesn’t constitute a terrorism act as long as it’s not associated with, or inspired by a foreign terrorist or an FTO. So far, no suspicious for such a connection is reported.

Noting that, unlike “international terrorism” organizations, accounting for 61 in total, the DOJ and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, although, they have openly delineated domestic terrorist threats conducted by individuals on behalf of ideologies, like anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government, black separatism, and so forth. Instead, the FBI and the DHS, as Bjelopera, a specialist in organized crime and terrorism, observes, use the “homegrown violent extremist” (HVE) to separate domestic terrorists from foreign terrorists. An HVE is defined as: “A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the U.S. or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.” The lack of official lists or processes to designate groups or individuals as domestic terrorists, according to this author, renders it difficult to assess domestic terrorism trends and evaluate federal efforts to counter such threats; therefore, all legal actions against an identified extremist group exercising violence are constitutionally protected and not reported on by DHS.

Far-Right Terrorism: The Greatest Domestic Security Threat  

Domestic terrorism, comparing to the declining trends of foreign terrorism, has been on rise since the Oklahoma bombing in 1995, known as the first homegrown terrorism attack and the deadliest after 9/11, killing 168 people and injuring several hundred. As a DHS report released on October 2020 warned: “Domestic violent extremism is a threat to Homeland.” The formerly Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad F. Wolf, expressed his concerns on the racially-and-ethnically-motivated-violent-extremists, specifically white supremacist extremists, who, as he suggested, will remain the “most persistent and lethal threat” in the homeland. A similar warning issued the FBI, too, arguing that “the top threat we face from domestic violent extremists” comes from racially and ethnically-motivated violent extremists, including white supremacists.  

The existing data indicates that the far-right attacks, those executed by white supremacists in particular, are predominant. In the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2020, the Congress maintains that “white supremacists and other far-right-wing extremists are the most significant domestic terrorism threat facing the United States,” posing the “greatest domestic-security threats” as a Trump Administration Department of Justice official wrote at the New York Times on February 2019. Further, an unclassified 2017-FBI and DHS intelligence bulletin indicates that “white supremacist extremism (WSE)” were responsible for 49 homicides in 26 attacks from 2000 to 2016, with a number of killings ranging from 1 to 49 in a given year since September 2001, accounting for 62 (73%) of 85 violent extremist incidents against 23 (27%) incidents committed by radical Islamist violent extremists. Moreover, in its annual hate crime incident report in 2018, the FBI found that hate crimes increased by approximately 17% in 2017, raising for the third consecutive year, by almost 5% in 2016, and by 6% in 2015.

Mass shootings in Charleston, SC (2015), Colorado Springs, Col. (2015), Portland, Or. (2017), Charlottesville, Va. (2017), and in Pittsburgh, Pa (2018)—among other attacks—were all perpetrated by far-right-wing extremists. The WSE, according to DHS, have been exceptionally lethal in their abhorrent, targeted attacks in the recent years, exploiting lawful protests to cause violence, death and destruction in America, including during 100 days of violence across cities in 2020.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) supports these data, as well. In a brief issued in June 2020, Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington argue that the far-right terrorism has “significantly outpaced terrorism from other types of perpetrators”—far-left networks and individuals inspired by ISIS and Al Qaeda, accounting for the majority of all terrorist incidents in the U.S. since 1995. The plots and attacks committed by the right-wing, as these authors observe, have grown significantly during the past six years, making up two thirds of the attacks and plots in America in 2019 and over 90% between January 1 and May 8, 2020.

Based on the CSIS accounts, from 893 terrorist attacks and plots carried out through 1994—2020, the majority of them (57%) were perpetrated by right-wing terrorists as opposed to 25% by left-wing terrorists, 15% by religious terrorists, and 4% by others. The right-wing attacks predominated throughout 1994-1999, accounting for more than half of all incidents in 2008 as well as every year since 2011, with the exception of 2013. In 2016, 2017 and 2019—the number of right-wing terrorist events matched or exceeded the number in 1995, including a recent high of 53 right-wing terrorist incidents in 2017. The right-wing activity increased in 2019 to 44 incidents.

In another CSIS brief, the War Comes Home: The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism in the United States, Jones et al. reported for a growing threat from domestic terrorism coming from politically-racially-ethnically-economically-healthy motivated extremists. Based on their dataset, white supremacists and other like-minded extremists perpetrated 67% of terrorist plots and attacks in 61 incidents between January 1 and August 31, 2020, using vehicles, explosives, and firearms, whilst targeting demonstrators and other individuals on racial, ethnic, religious, or political basis, including as well as police, military and government personnel and facilities. 

In October 2020, the FBI arrested Adam Fox, Barry Croft, Ty Garbin and several others for conspiring to kidnap and possibly execute the Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, as well as for discussing to kidnap Virginia Governor Ralph Northam, in part because of his lockdown orders to slow the spread of Covid-19.

Likewise, in an unclassified document, the Texas Department of Public Safety concluded that “mass attacks pose a persistent and varied threat to the State of Texas,” cautioning that racially motivated attacks are currently the most violently active type of domestic terrorism within the U.S. and Texas, committing 10 mass attacks in Texas through 2009-2019 (2020). In another report, this Department alarms that the white racially motivated (WRM) is currently the most violently active domestic terrorism type, committing—since 2018—at least three major attacks in the U.S. (including one in Texas) and several thwarted incidents, followed by Involuntary Celibates (Incels). 

Organization and Operation: Online Through A Decentralized, Leaderless Resistance 

The CSIS categorizes the right-wing terrorist individuals into three broad groups: white supremacists, anti-government extremists, and Incels. They function under a decentralized model, or leaderless resistance, as Bjelopera describes it—with threats coming from individuals not groups—and mostly operating and organizing through social media, therefore adopting some foreign terrorist organizations’ tactics. According to Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington’s findings, many white supremacists adhere to the Great Replacement conspiracy, while the white supremacist neo-Nazi organizations to the Zionist Occupied Government. Engaged in vandalism, trespassing, and tax fraud, domestic terrorists’ operation involves two levels of activity: operational, underground, where the ideologically motivated cells or individuals engage in illegal activity without any participation in or direction from an organization; and the above-ground public face (political)—focused on propaganda and the dissemination of ideology publicly.

Same, the rioters connected to the Capitol storm used social media platforms to organize and share information and resources. Researchers of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) have identified members of a dozen extremist groups, belonging to far-right wing, including adherents of QAnon conspiracy theory, the Proud Boys, the Three Percenters, the Nationalist Socialist Club(NSC-131)—a recently founded hate group known for disrupting Black Lives Matter protests, and No White Guilt, a white nationalist group blaming “anti-whiteism” for the spread of coronavirus in the U.S. The FBI arrested members of the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters in Ohio, Colorado, Indiana and Texas. Designated by the SPLC as hate groups, none of them however is treated as a domestic terrorist entity, consequently, no indictment of conspiring to mount an attack on the Capitol is raised against them. 

Far-right groups have a long history of existence. Perhaps, since the creation of the United States of America. Certainly, they have grown in number and activities in the last decade—and resurrected especially during President Trump election campaign and following his tenure in the White House. If it weren’t for Trump, I would never have heard about KKK (Ku Klux Klan), for example. Or QAnon, or Antifa (left-wing), which he brought into conversation over and over. 

As of profilisation, the far-right, according to Pitcavage, a historian with expertise on domestic terrorism and right-wing extremism, consists of two ideological strains: white supremacy and nativism—that solidified in the early-to mid-19th century—becoming staples of the far-right to this day. By late 1800, the far-right expanded with extreme hostility to socialism and communism and ideological anti-Semitism—four belief systems dominating for most of the 20th century, and complemented by another segment, anti-government extremism, after the end of the Cold War—with white supremacy and anti-communist extremism constituting its most important pillars. “Today, traditional white supremacists are still primarily represented by Ku Klux Klan groups, though these have been in decline, as well as other groups such as the Council of Conservative Citizens and the neo-Confederate League of the South,” writes Pitcavage. Since 1866, KKK has undertaken three distinctive and sustained campaigns of terrorism, occurring between 1866 and 1871, between 1915 and 1928, and roughly 1954 to the mid-1960s. Following the Oklahoma City bombing, meanwhile, race-based hate groups experienced a dramatic and steady resurgence, including KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, and Neo-Confederate organizations, exploding from 241 in 1996 to over 750 by 2006.

QAnon conspiracy theory surfaced in October 2017 with a series of cryptic messages unleashed by a user calling themselves Q, dropping as of 2020 over 4,000 posts. Designated by the FBI as a “domestic terror threat for its conspiracy theories,” QAnon claims that an elite group of child-trafficking paedophiles have been ruling the world for a number of decades and President Trump has a secret plan to bring this group to justice. QAnon activities spiked in March 2020 when the group spread conspiracies regarding COVID-19, anti-vaccine, anti-5G, anti-semitic and anti-migrant tropes. Unfortunately, many Americans tend to believe their conspiracies, including politicians—among those—14 congressional candidates who run for the-2020 election. The Republican Rep., Marjorie Taylor Greene (GA), for example, has been recently stripped from the House committees’ assignment due to her support for the QAnon conspiracy theory.

The Oath Keepers is an anti-government, pro-gun militia composed largely of former law enforcement and military veterans. They believe that the federal government has been co-opted by a shadowy conspiracy that is trying to strip American citizens of their rights. Three Percenters is an anti-government group with its name referring to the purported 3% of the American colonial population that rose up to fight the British Army in the Revolution.

Political Instability in Kosovo: 4 Elections in 10 Years=23,202,194 Euro

In less than a decade, Kosovo held four parliamentary elections—all early calling—totaling at 23,202,194 euro. Of this amount, Central Commission of Kosovo spent 17,684,155, political parties 5,518,039 euro. Only for the 2019 election, the Commission allocated 5.7 million euro—regarded as the most expensive elections since Kosovo independence. Political parties meanwhile spent 2,111,285 euro—with LDK leading the list with 735,541, followed by VV—451,979, AAK—346,544, PDK—316,342, and Nisma—AKR 115,862 euro. Since 2001, Kosovo held 14 elections, national and local, which cost over 36 million euro, excluding expenses of political parties. The election and political party systems on the one hand, and political rivalries over the control of economic resources and organized crime on the other, account for the main factors for Kosovo’s short-lived governments. Political instability is one of the main features of fragile states, which Kosovo is still viewed as such, unfortunately.        

Sebahate J. Shala

THERE’s an anecdote circulating in informal circles in Kosovo that says, if the country continues with the same trend, it will—sometime in the future—compete with Italy for the number of changing governments. Of course, the comparison is inadequate though the two countries share some commonalities. As parliamentary democracies, both have proportional election and multi-party systems—with Government as the main executive and the Parliament as representative body elected based on closed, respectively open lists of candidates.

In such contextualities, election and political party systems often force broad, unstable coalitions since no party takes enough votes as to govern alone. Consequently, government collapse, political instability, as well as shifting allegiances—based on party’s leaders or individual interests rather than ideological or programmatic orientations—are typical. Besides, Kosovo and Italy are widely known as corrupt countries ruled by politicians who use politics as a means to control organized crime and economic resources. Whereas Italy is one of the most corrupt countries in Eurozone, ranking 51 out of 180 countries in the 2019 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index—in par with Malta, Saudi Arabia, and Grenada—Kosovo maintains its place as a highly corrupted country in the Balkans’ region ranked 101 of 180 countries. In addition to organized crime and corruption, a stagnating economy, political apathy, misogyny and discrimination of women as well as youth unemployment—attributed to Italy’s political instability—are common characteristics for Kosovo, too.

As of today, Italy holds the record for the number of short-lived governments, having changed 69 governments in 73 years, including the last one that took shape in August, 2019. Over the same period, Spain had 23 governments, France—13, United Kingdom—28, and Germany—26 governments. In three decades, Italy had 13 prime ministers while Germany had three chancellors, France—five presidents and United Kingdom—seven prime ministers. Silvio Berlusconi is the only premier to have served full-two-terms out of three mandates leading the country from 2001 to 2006 and 2008 to 2011. The average duration of Italian governments is less than 13 months per government—with a record broken from the Giuseppe Conte government—11 days short of its 15th month in power. This means that German Chancellor Angela Merkel—elected in 2005—have seen nine Italian prime ministers come and go while she has retained the power.

Kosovo: 4 Governments in Less Than 10 Years=Millions Spent

THE small-size, young Kosovo has–in less than 10 years and almost 13 years as independent state—changed four governments, respectively five, with an average duration ranging from less than three to two years to only 51 days. So far, no government and primer served a full-term mandate except for the first Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi of Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) who led a government of broad coalition through March 2002 to December 2004. The subsequent government composed of Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), Allegiance for Future of Kosovo (AAK) and minorities lasted more than two years—a period that had seen three different prime ministers coming from AAK, Ramush Haradinaj, Bajram Kosumi, and Agim Ceku.

In the period between 2007 and 2017, PDK won four elections—not the majority though—necessary to form the government on its own. All those elections were early calling with governments serving in an average less and no more than three years out of four-years mandate. All but the last one, Haradinaj Government, were toppled with the initiative of PDK—whose partners varied from LDK, AKR and minorities (Thaci Government I, 2008—2010) to AKR and minorities (Thaci Government II, 2011—2014), to LDK and minorities (Mustafa Government, 2014—2017), to AAK, AKR, Nisma, and minorities (Haradinaj Government, 2017—2019). The Kurti Government, composed of VV, LDK and minorities, lasted only 51 days. It toppled following a no-confidence vote initiated by LDK—the partner of coalition—in part due to internal disagreements regarding the lift of tariffs against Serbia—pressured by the U.S. in order to resume dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia on Kosovo final status settlement, including the emerging conflict on competences between Prime Minister and President in leading the dialogue with Serbia and in managing the crisis as a result of Coronavirus COVID-19.

Figure 1.1. Adriatik Kelmendi, Facebook, March 25, 2020.

Since 2001, Kosovo held 14 elections, local and national (15 adding the upcoming election to be held on February 14, 2021), which cost the country over 31 million euro based on Kosovo Central Commission (KCC) data, excluding last election held on October 6, 2019. Adding 5.7 million euro allocated to 2019 election—considered as the most expensive parliamentary elections since independence—and let’s suppose that the KCC spent 5 million of that amount, the total cost of 14 election cycles in Kosovo goes to over 36 million euro. Only in three elections, 2010, 2014, and 2017, Kosovo spent 12,684,155 euro plus 5 million of 2019-election, that means 17,684,155. As the table 1.1. indicates, the 2010- election was the most expensive one compared to 2014 and 2017 elections (excluding 2019 election)—totaling at 4,568,730 euro—and considering here the re-voting process in Mitrovica and Skenderaj.

Table 1.1. Cost of Parliamentary Elections in Kosovo, 2010, 2014, and 2017. Source: Kosovo Central Commission.

Political parties on the other hand spent 5,518,039 euro in four last elections. Only in the last election, 25 political parties, according to KCC, spent 2,111,285 euro: 1,966,269 were spent by major parties, VV, LDK, PDK, AAK, Nisma and AKR. This is far more than the 2017 election which cost political parties (17) 777,625 euro in total—excluding AAK and AKR—which didn’t submit the auditing report; the main political parties spent 644,365 euro. 975,442 were spent by 23 parties in 2014 election (excluding AKR). 1,631,435 euro were spent by 29 parties in 2010 election—including LDD and re-voting in Mitrovica and Skenderaj—while excluding three parties belonging to the minorities. Of the money spent in 2019 election, LDK leads with 735,541 euro, followed by VV—451,979, AAK—346,544, PDK—316,342, and Nisma—AKR 115,862 euro.

Political Parties	2010	2014	2017	2019	Total
PDK	418,363	307,577	329,125	316,342	1,317,409
LDK	297,713	182,283	209,624	735,541	1,425,161
LVV	102,560	91,724	146,225	451,979	792,488
AAK	176,705	291,750		346,544	814,999
AKR	461,309			115,862	577,171
Nisma		14,712	14,884		29,596
Others	174,785	109,648	133,260	145,016	562,709
Total	1,631,435	997,694	777,625	2,111,285	5,518,039

Table 2.2. Political Parties Expenses in Elections 2010, 2014, 2017 and 2019. Source: Kosovo Central Commission.

Why do Italy and Kosovo Governments Collapse so Often? Electoral and Political Party Systems

THE collapse of Italy’s governments is attributed to the electoral and political party systems. Italy has a proportional (closed-list) voting system, which guarantees a big majority to the winning party in the parliament if the party wins at least 40% of the general vote. If this vote is not attained, then a coalition of forces is necessary. The Italy’s multi-party system imposes a coalition formula as none of the parties can form the government alone. Kosovo, too, suffers from the same problem. Kosovo is a single, multi-member electoral unit with a proportional representation voting system which shifted from closed to open-list in 2007: 100 of 120 seats are elected proportionally while 20 seats are reserved for national and ethnic minorities. The election threshold for a party, coalition and/or independent candidates is 5% of general vote.

Figure 2.2. The Election Map in 2019 Parliamentary Election in Kosovo.

Kosovo transitioned from one-party to the multi-party system and pluralism following the liberation from Serbia in 1999. The election system meanwhile was designed with the intention to enable a broader representation and inclusiveness in the society based on social, ethnic and gender representation. Apparently, the proportional election system is not working and—in spite—of ongoing efforts since 2011, the electoral reform has stagnated. There is no general consensus among political spectrum to find a model that would best fit Kosovo’s context. In a multi-party system such as in Kosovo with about 30 parties running in national election, no party is strong enough as to form the government; therefore, coalitions are necessary (KIPRED, 2015). However favorable it might be, the system in Kosovo, as Mentor Agani argues, often creates obstacles for the functioning of democracy by generating political crisis such as the one in 2014, as no party alone can create the government. In seven parliamentary elections since 2001, no single party—except LDK that initially won a high percentage of vote—won the majority required to form the government. When Kosovo faced a six-month political crisis following the election in 2014, the voter turnout, as Gent Gjikolli suggests, was 43% resulting of 30 running political parties and initiatives while PDK together with other parties won the election with 30% of the total vote (Id.).

In most of the cases, coalitions are result of interests of parties’ leaders or individuals rather than based on ideological or programmatic orientations. As Albert Krasniqi concludes: “The fact that Kosovo’s political scene is such that the rise of new parties is extremely difficult without coalitions with the old parties, further hinders the change of the existing situation for better—the need for new parties to connect with old coalitions obliges the new parties ‘to respect the rules of the game,’ i.e. to adopt undemocratic practices.” (Id.)

Kosovo—A Fragile State

THOSE who strongly oppose Kosovo’s statehood, namely Serbia and its allies, would like to see the young country fail. Often, they refer to Kosovo as a failed state due to political instability that the country has faced following its independence in 2008, especially since 2010 election—marked with massive vote theft and manipulation of election result from PDK. If political parties do not agree for a solution and if the COVID-19 crisis allows, Kosovo would soon go in another cycle of election sometime this year or next.

Political instability—which Kosovo has been going through for a decade now—is one of the main features of failed states. But Kosovo is not a failed state. Failed states, as Global Policy defines, are those which can no longer perform basic functions such as education, security, or governance, usually due to fractious violence or extreme poverty. Kosovo has never reached that point. The country is in a fragile state although it’s not included in the Fund for Peace’s fragile states’ assessment list. There are many definitions of fragile states. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF), fragile states are those whose poor quality of policies, institutions and governance, substantially impairs economic performance, the delivery of basic social services and the efficacy of donor assistance. Some of the characteristics attributed to them include weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, and often, violence or the legacy of armed conflict and civil war.

Fragility, as the EU frames, refers to the weak or failing structures and situations where social contract is broken due to state’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions: service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable access to power, security and safety of the populace and protection and promotion of citizens’ rights and freedoms. In measuring the vulnerability of state to collapse or their vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations, Fund for Peace through Fragile States Index uses 12 conflict risk criteria summarized in four indicators to determine whether conditions are improving or worsening: cohesion, economic, political, and social. In the first one—factionalized elites and group grievances are highlighted, in the second—uneven economic development, and in the third—state legitimacy and capacity, public services and rule of law.

The World Bank evaluates state fragility through the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which uses 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions. Based on the organization’s Risk and Resilience Assessment, Kosovo in recent years has been largely stable, retaining a degree of fragility and potential for violence. The World Bank identifies three main fragility risks: economic and political disenfranchisement, especially of youth; the unresolved issues with Serbia and interethnic relations; and the motives and actions of various political actors capitalizing on structural drivers of fragility.

Factionalized elites and group grievances, uneven economic development and resource distribution, questions of legitimacy and capacity, as well as rule of law—are found in Kosovo additionally to lack of a national unity and social cohesion. Kosovo, as Carleton University suggests, is experiencing a legitimacy and capacity issue in its state of affairs due to systemic isomorphic mimicry: the country is trapped in a feedback loop, fostering ineffective governance, decreasing international recognition, and weak service delivery from its institutions.

“The primary fragility drivers are governance and economy, whereas the secondary fragility drivers are security and crime, human development, demography, and environment. The primary fragility drivers contribute to three main risks that are weakening its state capacity and legitimacy: informal economy, the rule of law, and service delivery. In addition to its issues with international recognition, Kosovo’s internal performance has been mostly stagnant across all indicators, but a recent change in the government has seen a decrease in its governance and political stability with the rise of PM Albin Kurti.” (Carleton University, Ottawa, January 6, 2020)

International watchdogs emphasize weak rule of law as one of the major issues that has hampered the democratic and judiciary functioning, governance, as well as economic development in the country (EU Commission, 2019).